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ENTRY DECISIONS AFTER DEREGULATION: DOES
INCUMBENTS’ MARKET POWER MATTER?*
Lorenzo Ciari and Riccardo De Bonis
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of incumbents’ market power in shaping the en-
try decisions of Italian banks after branching liberalization in 1990. Using a unique
dataset on 260 banks, we ﬁnd that entry over the 1990-1995 period was targeted to-
wards markets that were more competitive to begin with, i.e. where banking spreads
were smaller. The results conﬁrm the entry deterrent role of market power in the
short-run and show a long run effect of regulation that survives after the removal
of administrative barriers. The capacity of market power to discourage entry is con-
ﬁrmed in instrumental variables speciﬁcations, where we use the characteristics of the
local banking markets in 1936, a proxy for tightness of banking regulation, to identify
an exogenous source of variation in the spreads.
Keywords: deregulation, banking, barriers to entry, market power
JEL classiﬁcation:L1, L5, G28
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1.1 Introduction and motivation
During the 1980s and the 1990s, most European countries and the US have imple-
mented regulatory reforms that affected the banking sector, aimed at removing restric-
tions to banking business and activities. In the US, the reforms started in the 1970s
and culminated in the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, which allowed nationwide acquisitions
of banks across states (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997). In Europe, the elimination of restric-
tions to banks’ activities started after the approval of the Single Market Program, that
required the integration of national ﬁnancial markets. The implementation of the First
and the Second Coordination Banking Directives in the early 1990s allowed European
banks to branch freely in each national market and across member states. At the same
time, privatization started in many countries.1
With the removal of administrative barriers to branching, banks increased the size of
their networks, expanding the scope of their activity within their own markets and en-
tering new markets. The study of banks’ expansion strategies became a relevant research
ﬁeld both from a management and an industrial organization perspective. The manage-
ment literature focused essentially on the existing nexus between banks’ organization
and strategic decisions,2 while the industrial organization literature focused on the iden-
tiﬁcation and quantiﬁcation of existing barriers to entry that survived after deregulation.
Such barriers are known to be pervasive in the banking industry, as documented by Vives
(2001).3
In this paper, we investigate the role played by incumbents’ market power in shaping
the entry decisions of banks after the removal of branching restrictions. We look at how
”initial” conditions in terms of competition intensity shape the short run adjustments of
1An excellent survey of the organization of the European banking market on the eve of the launch of the
monetary union is De Bandt and Davis (2000).
2In particular, the emphasis has been placed on testing the hypothesis related to the impact of differences
in functional skills, resources and organizational attributes possessed by the entrant and the entry timing
decision. A review of this literature can be found in Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2001) and Fuentelsaz et al.
(2002).
3The empirical literature on entry barriers faced by banks after deregulation is vast. We have identiﬁed
four main strands of this literature: the ﬁrst examines how asymmetric information between incumbents
and entrants shapes entry decision. The second analyzes the link between market structure and entry
(Amel and Liang, 1997; Calcagnini, De Bonis and Hester, 2001 and 2002; Adams and Amel, 2007); the third
looks at the importance of entry deterrence and ﬁrst mover advantages (Pita Barros, 1995 and Berger and
Dick (2007)). The fourth looks at the importance of distance as a factor shaping entry and the competitive
interaction among banks (Felici and Pagnini, 2008 and Degryse and Ongena, 2005).
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
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markets towards the new free-entry equilibrium. By ”initial” we refer to the period that
immediately precedes deregulation. We test the market power-entry relationship look-
ing at the Italian experience, which is particularly suitable for two reasons. First, Italian
local markets appeared extremely segmented in terms of market structure and competi-
tive interaction at the outset of deregulation. Second, as shown in Guiso et al. (2004a),
these heterogenous ”initial” conditions can in large part be attributed to the regulatory
framework introduced in the 1930s, which imposed different entry restrictions across lo-
cal Italian markets (De Cecco (1968)). The existence of such differences can be exploited
as an identiﬁcation approach that allows to isolate an exogenous source of variation in
local competition at the inception of the deregulatory process.
From a theoretical point of view, the relationship between incumbents’ market power
and entry is ambiguous (Cotterill and Haller 1992, Amel and Liang 1997). We try to dis-
criminate between two views. On one hand, markets which have been heavily regulated
and insulated from entry should be more proﬁtable and attract relatively more entry.
Those should be the markets in which there are higher proﬁt margins to erode and where
the incumbents might be relatively inefﬁcient, insofar as entry (or the entry threat) rep-
resents one of the main drivers of efﬁciency.4 On the other hand, the market power held
by incumbents might signal the existence of signiﬁcant barriers to entry. We believe these
barriers to be of two kinds: informational and strategic.
Informational asymmetries between entrants and incumbents as an entry barrier have
been thoroughly analyzed in theory. Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) and Dell’Ariccia(2001)
show that incentives to entry in credit markets can be dampened by an adverse selec-
tion problem due to the incumbents’ superior information about borrowers’ creditwor-
thiness.5 The adverse selection problem is a structural feature of the banking industry:
heterogenous degrees of market power held by the incumbents in local markets might
4Empirical evidence of the entry efﬁciency nexus can be found in Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) or
Claessens et al. (2001) for the banking sector or Aghion et al. (2009) in general .
5The role of asymmetric information as a barrier to entry has been empirically conﬁrmed, although
indirectly. For example, Shaffer (1998) and Bofondi and Gobbi(2003) show that the loan default rates expe-
rienced by the entrants is higher than those of the incumbents. Also, Gobbi and Lotti (2004) show, looking
at the Italian experience after deregulation, that entry through branching is less likely than de novo entry (the
creation of a new bank). The authors attribute this ﬁnding to the fact that asymmetric information plays
a less relevant role for de novo entrants, which have in general a higher knowledge of the local business
community.
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reﬂect different intensity of the informational asymmetry.6 In the context we study, the
asymmetric information channel matters also insofar as entry regulation has contributed
to the acquisition of informational rents for incumbents. Indeed, restrictions to entry
might have increased the ability of banks to collect a long time series of information about
the creditworthiness of customers, the more so in more tightly regulated markets.7
The second channel through which a regulatory regime that favors the creation of
dominant positions might discourage entry is related to the strategic interaction between
incumbents and future entrants. The higher margins granted by the regulation to the
incumbents translate into greater resources to engage in entry deterrence or to credibly
threat to do it. This is the so-called deep-pocket argument, dating back to Telser (1966)
and Benoit (1984). Financially stronger incumbents are in the position to engage in preda-
tory strategies, or in entry deterring strategies that are ﬁnancially costly in the short run,
but proﬁtable in the long run, as they discourage entry or they actually force new com-
petitors to leave the market.8 Moreover, the effectiveness of entry deterrent strategies in
an oligopolistic setting relies on the incumbents’ ability to coordinate. Being largely pro-
tectedfromthethreatofentryduringthelong-lastingregulatedperiod, inamarketwhich
wasformallyorganizedasacarteluntilthemid1970sandwherecompetitionwasbanned
because of its perceived detrimental impact on ﬁnancial stability, incumbents were in the
position to develop tacit or explicit coordination mechanisms (Scherer and Ross, 1990,
and Vives, 1991). Such collusive devices might well survive after deregulation, especially
where the incentives to deter entry are higher and the market structure helps to sustain
them.
We test the nature of the market power-entry relationship by estimating a simple
6Demand side factors such as the size of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the relevant market, institutional qual-
ity or the scope for non-lending related activities for banks might determine the relevance of the adverse
selection problem.
7The idea that we explore is that in presence of restrictions to entry, the ability of a bank to engage in a
long lasting relationship with his clients is increased. When the regulatory regime allows entry, borrowers
might more easily shift from one bank to another, thus disrupting the quality and depth of information that
each incumbent has on a given ﬁrm. This, in turn, reduces the informational advantage that incumbents
have on average over entrants.
8There is a wide literature that examines the role played the ﬁnancial strength of market participants
on industry outcomes and entry. A recent contribution is the one by Cestone et al. (2009), who study how
the ﬁnancial strength of business groups shapes entry decision of French ﬁrms both in the manufacturing
and in the service industry. Our paper is related to their work, although we look at market power and
regulation as a source of ﬁnancial strength while they look at incumbents’ access to business group deep
pockets.
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/316941.1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 5
model of the probability of entry on a panel of 99 local Italian markets. Our dependent
variable is the opening of at least one new branch over the years 1990-1995 in a province
in which a bank was not operating at the beginning of the sample period. We estimate
how the probability of entry over the years that follow the removal of administrative
barriers is inﬂuenced by the market power held by the incumbents at the outset of the
deregulation. We measure market power in local markets using the spread between loan
rates (computed from single loan contracts) and the average deposit rate in the province,
correcting the spread for the riskiness of local borrowers, as well as for other factors unre-
lated to market power. Given the potential endogeneity of our measure of market power,
we also use the characteristics of the banking sector in the 1930s, a proxy for the strength
of regulation in local markets, as instruments for the market power held by incumbents
at the inception of deregulation.9
Our results suggest that market power acts as an entry deterrent mechanism in the
years that follow the lifting of administrative barriers, at least in the short-run. In other
words the econometric exercises are in favor of the second view we presented earlier. In-
deed, the probability of entry is signiﬁcantly lower in those markets where incumbents
enjoy higher rents associated with the long lasting regulation approved in the 1930s. This
result bears important policy implications, insofar as the removal of entry barriers was
conceived to promote the convergence of local markets towards a competitive equilib-
rium, pushing new competitors towards areas where the rents enjoyed by the incumbents
were higher. The entry deterrent effect of market power is ampliﬁed in our instrumental
variables speciﬁcation. Finally, we perform an interaction analysis in which we look at
how the market power-entry relationship changes according to banks’ and local markets’
characteristics. The results suggest that both informational asymmetries and strategic
barriers are in place.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional features of
the Italian banking sector, from the regulation of the 1930s to the complete removal of
branching restrictions in the 1990s. Section 3 presents the empirical model, while Sec-
tion 4 describes the variables employed and the relative data sources. Section 5 presents
the main empirical results, while section 6 illustrates the interaction analysis. Section 7
9The use of regulation as potential instrumental variable for different proxies of competition intensity is
widespread. See, for example Aghion et al. 2005 .




concludes. The Appendix contains some robustness checks.
1.2 The Italian banking sector: from the 1936 law to the liberalization
The regulation of the Italian banking sector was introduced in 1936, after the ﬁnancial
crisis that hit the US and Europe in the early 1930s. The law imposed restrictions to
the ability of different types of credit institutions to open new branches and to extend
loans. An area of competence was assigned to each bank on the basis of its presence
on the Italian territory in 1936, and the ability of each bank to grow and operate was
limited to that area. The regulation established a differential treatment for the different
existing credit institutions, in terms of their potential expansion. Indeed, while national
banks were allowed to branch only in the main cities and in areas of particular economic
relevance, cooperative banks and local commercial banks were allowed to branch in the
entire territory of the province in which they were located in 1936. Finally, savings banks,
public institutions controlled by local governments, were allowed to branch within the
entire territory of the region.10
The main effect of the regulation was to freeze the structure of the Italian banking
market for the next ﬁfty years. However, the ability of different credit institutions to
grow was affected in a very different way: while local banks’ ofﬁces grew by 138% on
average, big national banks’ ofﬁce grew by 70% on average. This heterogeneity cannot
be attributed to different conditions in the demand for the services, as local and national
banks differed in their legal status but not in their functions. As a consequence of the
institutional framework introduced in 1936, the Italian local markets developed over the
next ﬁfty years very different market structures. In areas where local banks, and in par-
ticular savings banks, were prevalent for reasons mainly related to the colonial heritage
of the country, markets grew less concentrated relative to areas where big national banks
were the main market players.
Deregulation started in the late 1980s, triggered by the initiatives taken at the EU level
to create a single market. In particular, European Directives asked for the creation of uni-
10We use the term regulation relating both to the legal rules introduced in the 1930s in the aftermath of
the ﬁnancial crisis and to the policy adopted by the government and the central bank towards the banking
sector until the 1980s. Such policy was consistently inspired by the need to restrict competition between
banks, with signiﬁcantly more space to expand granted to local and in particular savings banks. An in-
teresting description of the Italian banking regulation can be found in Polsi (2001) and in Conti and La
Francesca (2000)




versal banks, credit institutions that should be free to branch across states once they had
obtained a license in their home country. Branching restrictions were entirely removed
in Italy in 1990.11 In 1993, a new Banking code was approved, which incorporated the
Second Coordination Banking Directive and completely reorganized the sector.
1.2.1 The banking sector after deregulation
Following liberalization, branches increased rapidly, raising from around 15,600 in
1989 to 23,400 in 1995. International comparisons of banking structures show that in a
short time Italy reached about the median in European rankings of indicators of banking
capacity. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the number of branches between 1987 and 1998:
the pattern is fairly stable in the years that precede the liberalization. In 1990, with the
complete removal of administrative barriers, the number of branches starts growing and
keeps growing at positive rates over the following years.
In Figure 2 we plot the growth rates of the number of opened branches: the growth
rate is close to zero in 1988 and 1989, while it goes to 10 % in 1991 and remains very high
in the following years. A stabilization in the growth rate is observed starting from 1995.
A careful look at the data, however, reveals that only a small fraction of opened branches
is represented by entry into new geographic markets. Indeed, more than 90% of the new
branches that were opened over the 1990-1995 period were opened by incumbents, that
is by banks that were already operating in the local market before the liberalization. This
preliminary observation suggests the existence of signiﬁcant barriers to entry.
We investigate the role of incumbents’ market power in shaping the entry behavior of
banks. Table 1 presents simple correlation statistics between entry into new geographic
markets over the years 1990-1995 and a set of proxies of the market power held by incum-
bents at the outset of liberalization. We correlate the decision of a bank to open at least
one branch in a local market (province) where it was not operating in 1989 with different
measures of market concentration (CR4 and the Heﬁndahl-Hirschman index), the aver-
age interest rate on loans in the province, and a measure of the spread between loans and
deposits rates. These market power proxies are averages of the 1987-1989 period.
11An anticipation of liberalization took place in the 1980s, when the Bank of Italy authorized the opening
of new branches throughout the country. The Bank of Italy decided which banks could open branches in
a given area, still in according to the principles of a ”regulated” expansion of the banks’ networks. Such
regulatory approach was abandoned in 1990.




Figure 1.1: Evolution of the number of branches
The ﬁgure plots the total number of branches of Italian banks over the period 1987-1998.
Source: Bank of Italy
The table shows a negative and signiﬁcant correlation between the decision to enter
a new geographic market and all proxies of incumbents’ market power, which are sig-
niﬁcantly correlated among each other. This data suggests that entry was lower in more
concentrated markets, where prices and spreads were higher. Such ﬁnding is merely de-
scriptive, but it clearly points to the necessity of a closer investigation, since branching
deregulation was expected to spur entry in those markets where instead it appears to be a
less signiﬁcant phenomenon, at least in the ﬁve years that followed deregulation. A con-
ﬁrmation comes from a simple count of the entry episodes matched with different spread
levels. We segment our provinces’ sample into low (ﬁrst quartile), medium (second and
third quartile) and high (fourth quartile) spread provinces: the entry episodes are 130
in low spread provinces, 230 in medium spread provinces, and only 64 in high spread
provinces.
The increase in the number of branches came hand in hand with privatization and
a consolidation waves through mergers and acquisitions. In 1990 public sector banks -
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
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Table 1.1: Market power and entry: correlation pattern
entry CR4 herf avint spread
entry 1
CR4 -0.0307* 1
herf -0.0485* 0.4383* 1
avint -0.0521* 0.3205* 0.4389* 1
spread -0.0285* 0.1834* 0.2023* 0.5107* 1
*p < 0.01
banks of national interest, credit institutes of public law, and saving banks - were the
dominant banking institutions in Italy, accounting for a market share of approximately
70%. In the years that followed the liberalization, the State and the local governments,
through the foundations (juridical entities of public law), still maintained the control of
their banks in most of the cases. The privatization of large Italian banks took place only
from 1993 onwards (Farabullini and Hester, 2005), while the foundations substantially
diminished their ownership of public sector banks only after 1995. The liberalization and
the privatizations triggered a major consolidation of the banking sector. Mainly because
of mergers and acquisitions, there was a substantial decrease in the number of banks
operating in the Italian territory, from 1,193 in 1989 to 1,023 in 1995.12
1.3 The empirical model and speciﬁcation issues
We estimate a model for the probability of entry by branching into local markets over
the period that goes from 1990 to 1995. Our analysis concentrates on the short run market
adjustment following deregulation. The choice of the 1990-1995 period has two main
motivations. First, we want to capture the potential extra effect on entry decisions of
the new discipline of the banking sector introduced in 1993 with the new Banking Code,
after the full liberalization of branching in 1990. Second, limiting our sample to 1995, we
can analyze the post deregulation branching behavior of banks before the consolidation
process and privatizations begin to unfold their effects. Moreover, as we have seen before,
in 1995 there was a stabilization in the growth rate of branches. Following the existing
12The number of mergers involving Italian banks increased substantially at the beginning of the 1990s.
However, the market shares of banks involved in acquisitions became particularly high beginning from the
the second half of the 1990s and continued to grow in the new millennium.
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of the growth rate of branches
The ﬁgure plots the growth rate in the number of branches of Italian banks over the period 1987-1998.
Source: Bank of Italy
literature and the indications of the Bank of Italy,13 we deﬁne a local market as a province,
a juridical entity analogous to the US metropolitan statistical areas. We pool the episodes
of entry over the reference period and check how the probability that a bank opens a
branch in a province in which it was not operating before 1990 is affected by the pre-
liberalization market and banks’ characteristics. The explanatory variables thus capture
the conditions under which the banks develop their strategic entry decision.14
We deﬁne the set of potential entrants as the set of banks that were operating at the
end of the sample period (1995). In this way, we exclude from our analysis the very few
entryepisodesinvolvingbanksthatceasetoexistoverthereferenceperiod. Foreachbank
included in the sample, we consider the subset of provinces in which the bank was not
13The Bank of Italy was the Italian competition authority for the banking sector until 2006. The power to
decide on competition issues was then passed to the Italian competition authority.
14Using pre-deregulation variables to explain post-deregulation entry behaviours, we limit the poten-
tial endogeneity bias associated with the simultaneous determination of the banks’ decision to enter new
markets and market outcomes.
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operating in 1989. In modeling the entry decision of banks, it should be recognized that
when banks design their networks, they take into account both their own and competi-
tors network choices. However, given the difﬁculty of estimating such a complex model,
we follow Pita Barros (1995) and Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2001) and adopt a partial equi-
librium model in which we assume that banks take independent decisions in relation to
their presence in each of the different geographical markets. In the appendix we present
results of speciﬁcations in which we attempt to control for the interrelation between the
entry decisions.
We assume that a bank expands the scope of its operation as long as the expected
stream of proﬁts guarantee survival in the long run. The decision to enter a new ge-
ographic market can be modeled as a function of the difference between the expected
revenues associated with entry and the cost of entry. Expected proﬁts depend on both
demand and supply side factors, as well as on the characteristics of the entrant, while the
cost of entry is a function of the extent of entry barriers faced by the entrant.15
Let Yij be a dichotomous dependent variable deﬁned as:
Yij =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if bank i originally not operating in province j
enters province j over the reference period (90-95)
0 otherwise
In the main speciﬁcation, we use a probit probability model.16 This implies that the
probabilitythatabanki, initiallynotoperatinginmarketj, decidestoenterinthatmarket,
is given by:
Pr(Yij = 1) =
Z Xib+Zjw+Wijg
 ¥
f(t)dt = F(Xib + Zjw +Wijg)
15Amel and Liang (1997) model entry by a ﬁrm into a market as a positive function of the difference
between the ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts and entry-forestalling proﬁts. Entry-forestalling proﬁts represent that
level of proﬁts below which no ﬁrm will choose to enter, and they are a function of entry barriers and
characteristics of the market. Expected proﬁts can be characterized as a function of pre-entry proﬁts, entry
barriers, market concentration, and other market characteristics.
16We tested the robustness of our results to the choice of different functional form. In particular, we
exploited the panel dimension of our dataset to estimate a conditional ﬁxed effect logit model that elimi-
nates the bias resulting from bank level heterogeneity that is invariant across markets. See the results in the
Appendix.
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where the Xi are bank level characteristics that affect the entry decision, Zj are charac-
teristics of the target market, and Wij are characteristics that link the single bank and the
target market. The banks’ characteristics are size and geographic scope of operation, as
well as indicators of efﬁciency and proﬁtability. The link between a potential entrant and
each target market is represented by the geographical distance between a bank’s head-
quarters and each of the Italian provinces. The target market characteristics are the size
of the market, its potential growth and a measure of the scope of entry, represented by the
initial density of branches in a province. Finally, our main variable of interest is a proxy
for the intensity of market power held by the incumbents at the outset of deregulation,
represented by the spread of loan rates over deposit rates. Although the use of spread
measures as proxies for market power is quite common in the empirical banking litera-
ture, the possibility to achieve a correct interpretation of such measures is subject to a set
of ”identiﬁcation” issues, to which we turn in the next section.17
1.3.1 Identiﬁcation
Our main empirical challenge consists in ﬁnding an identiﬁcation strategy that allows
to interpret the results we obtain as evidence of a causal link between incumbents’ market
(monopoly) power and the entry decisions of banks. There are two distinct issues to face
in this context. The ﬁrst issue is that the observed spread between the loan and the de-
posit rates might capture characteristics of the marketplace that have nothing to do with
market power. The main concern is that observed spreads might be correlated with the
riskiness of local borrowers or with any features of banks that impact on their operating
costs. For example, spreads may vary across markets because of existing differentials in
the cost of collecting information. The second issue is that, even if we believe that the pro-
posed strategy correctly identiﬁes market power, there exist many potential sources of the
incumbents’ dominant position. For example, banks might enjoy market power through
a collusive agreement that restrains competition, or because of their superior efﬁciency
vis-´ a-vis potential entrants. The policy implications that we may derive from our study
17Another widely used measure in the empirical banking literature to proxy for the intensity of competi-
tion in a market is the degree of concentration of the industry. However, the use of concentration indexes as
proxies for competition has been widely criticized from a theoretical point of view, as concentration may ac-
tually be the outcome of a ﬁerce competitive ﬁght in which less efﬁcient ﬁrms are kicked out of the market.
On this issue see Berger and Hannan (1989) and (1992), and Jackson (1992).
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would change in the two cases. As a consequence, only if we can say something about
the source of incumbents’ market power we can also say something about its relationship
with entry decisions.
Our preliminary identiﬁcation effort consists in using a measure of the spread that
does not simply capture the difference between loan and deposit rates. Starting from
individual loan contracts, we use a reﬁned measure that represents the residual part of the
spread that is explained neither by the riskiness of local borrowers, nor by a set of banks’
characteristics that might affect their marginal cost, as will be thoroughly explained in the
next section. Moreover, in the estimated equations, we insert many controls to proxy for
factors that might impact on the spread and that are not related to the monopoly power
held by incumbents.
The main identiﬁcation approach consists however in the use of instrumental vari-
ables. The history of Italian banking regulation suggests using the characteristics of the
banking sector in the 1930s as instruments for the spread observed in the late 1980s. The
regulationofthebankingsectorapprovedinthe1930shaddifferingimpactsacrossItalian
credit institutions. As a consequence, the Italian provinces developed different compet-
itive conditions during the following ﬁfty years. The fact that local banks, and among
them savings banks, were granted a greater possibility to expand than national banks,
had the consequence of allowing more entry and more competition in those areas where
local, and in particular savings banks were prevalent at the time of the regulation.18 The
different tightness of regulation was motivated by political and historical reasons, and it
was largely exogenous with respect to the economic performance of the markets. The use
of the characteristics of the banking sector in the 1930s as instruments for the competitive
conditions at the outset of deregulation has been suggested by Guiso et al. (2004a, 2004b).
The exogeneity of the differential treatment of the regulation is based on the following
arguments: ﬁrst, the number and composition of banks in 1936 was not linked to any
characteristics of the region that affected the ability of banks to expand or the proﬁtability
18As we already mentioned in the introduction, the banking market was formally organized as a cartel
until the mid 1970s. The spirit of the regulatory regime was to protect the banking market from competition,
which was deemed dangerous for ﬁnancial stability. During the 1980s, the cartel was formally abandoned
and banks were let formally free to compete on prices and on other dimensions of their business. However,
local markets differ substantially in terms of their market structure, and this is in large part attributable to
the regulation. The idea we explore and test looking at the data is that the cartel was perpetuated in those
markets where few banks had the ability and the incentives to keep the collusive agreement.
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of a local market; second, the regulation produced a differential impact on the various
areas of the country mainly for ”exogenous” reasons related to the political support that
the different credit institutions guaranteed to the fascist regime. Finally, the regulation
was kept for so many years for reasons that have nothing to do with the economic perfor-
mance of the regions.
Instrumental variables isolate that part of the loan deposit rate spread that is ex-
plained by the regulatory regime introduced in 1936. This allows us to interpret the ob-
served spread-entry relationship as one due to market power, since the channel through
whichtheregulationaffectsthespreadistheprotectionfromcompetitivepressures. More-
over, the instrumental variables approach allows us to address our second identiﬁcation
concern, ruling out the ”efﬁciency” source for the observed market power entry rela-
tionship. Indeed, the local markets which were more protected by the regulation from
the entry threat are unlikely to be the markets where incumbents are more efﬁcient ﬁfty
years later. This argument relies on the widely documented nexus between entry and
efﬁciency.19
As a reﬁnement of our identiﬁcation approach, we perform an interaction analysis
aimed at shedding light on the channels through which monopoly power affects entry
behavior. The existence of strategic and informative barriers suggests an heterogenous
effect of market power on entry, depending on the characteristics of the entrant, of the
local markets and on the mode of entry. We postpone the discussion of these interactions
to a later section of the paper, after presenting the data employed for the analysis and the
results of our main speciﬁcation.
1.4 Data sample and descriptive statistics
In the following sections we describe the main variables used in our regressions. We
begin with the dependent variables, the entry measures. We then move to the descrip-
tion of the proxy for market power and of the instruments. We conclude by describing
the control variables employed in the different speciﬁcations proposed. Table 2 provides
19A relevant contribution is Aghion et al. (2004), who show how the policy reforms in the United King-
dom that changed entry conditions by opening up the U.K. economy during the 1980s have led to faster
total factor productivity growth of domestic incumbent ﬁrms and thus to faster aggregate productivity
growth. For similar evidence related to the banking sector, see Jayratne and Strahan (1998) and Sturm and
Barry (2004).
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summary statistics.
1.4.1 The deﬁnition of entry: entry through branching and entry by ac-
quisition
InordertoconstructtheentrymeasuresweemployBankofItalystatisticsthatrecords
the annual number of branches that each bank has in each province. The dependent
variables are measures of entry in local banking markets. We distinguish two types of
entry: entrythroughbranchingandentrybyacquisition. Entrythroughbranching(entry)
occurs whenever a bank opens, between 1990 and 1995, at least one branch in a province
in which it was not operating in 1989, at the outset of deregulation. This is our main
dependent variable. However, as part of our identiﬁcation approach, we also use entry
by acquisition as dependent variable. Entry by acquisition (entryacq) occurs when a bank
enters a province through the acquisition of another bank.
1.4.2 Measuring market power
Our main independent variable is a measure of the extent of monopoly power in
local banking markets in the period immediately preceding deregulation (marketpower).
We proxy market power in a local market by using the spread between the loan rate
applied to ﬁrms and the average deposit rate in the province. The spread is calculated
from data on individual loans extended by a bank in a province. In order to control
for ﬁrms’ and banks’ characteristics that might have effects on the spread which are not
related to market power, the spread is regressed on indicators that capture the riskiness of
local borrowers and the efﬁciency of banks. The borrower characteristics controls are: the
ﬁrms’returnsonsales, theirleverage(asproxyforﬁnancialfragility), theirsize(measured
by log assets) and their Z-score (a measure of the ﬁnancial distress status of a ﬁrm), which
is likely to capture important information that banks use to assess the riskiness of their
borrowers. The bank characteristics included are size, proﬁtability, ownership structure
as well as the ratio of non performing loans over total loans (the source is Bilbank, a
commercial database). The residual part of the spread that is not explained by lenders
and borrowers’ characteristics, which is assumed to measure the banks’ market power,
is captured by a full set of provincial dummies. The employed measure of local market
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power is then a normalized version of the coefﬁcient attached to each province.20
1.4.3 The instruments: the characteristics of the banking market structure
in 1936
Our measure of market power - the spread - though controlling for many factors other
than market power that might have an inﬂuence on it, might still suffer form an endo-
geneity bias, in the sense that it might capture market level characteristics other than the
intensity of competition. The history of Italian banking regulation provides valid instru-
ments for our analysis, as discussed in the previous identiﬁcation section. We use some
statistics on the banking structure in 1936 as instruments for the spread observed in the
late 1980s. As we have seen, the regulation gave a greater possibility to expand to lo-
cal banks and among them to savings banks. As a consequence, in local markets where
this type of bank was prevalent in 1936 there was more entry in the following ﬁfty years
and this explains a substantial part of the spread differentials in the late 1980s, as we will
show later. More speciﬁcally, the instrumental variables used in our speciﬁcations are the
following: the fraction of banks’ branches owned by local banks in each province in 1936,
the number of savings banks per 1000 inhabitants in the region in 1936, and the number
of banks ofﬁces per 1000 inhabitants in each province in 1936. We take our measure of
market power, as well as the instrumental variables, from Guiso et. al (2004a).
1.4.4 Control Variables
The control variables can be divided into three categories: variables that capture char-
acteristics of the target market of the potential entrants, variables that measure character-
istics of the potential entrants that might affect the entry decision, and variables that link
the market of origin of a potential entrant with the target market.
20The variables used to construct the index of market power refer mostly to the years that precede dereg-
ulation, in particular to 1985. Data on interest rates refer to 1991, when deregulation had not yet begun
to unfold its effects, as demonstrated in Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), who show that interest rates remain
basically unchanged until 1992.
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1.4.4.1 Market level variables
All market level variables refer to a period that precedes the lifting of the regula-
tory barriers to entry, as we want to capture the initial conditions faced by the entrants
when the regulatory barriers were lifted. The size of the market, capturing the potential
demand for loans, is proxied by the total loans granted in the province (loans), while
the potential for market growth is measured through the growth rate of loans (loans-
growth), as well as by the growth rate of value added in the province (vagrowth). The
supply side characteristics included in the study are the concentration of the loan market
in the province, and the branch density in the province. The concentration in the loan is
measured through the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (herf), while branch density (scope-
ofentry) is measured as the ratio between the number of branches in the province and
the surface of the province itself. Finally, we use a dummy to identify the local markets
located in the South of Italy (south), to proxy for potential institutional and development
factors driving the entry decisions. All the market level variable are averages of the years
1987-1989. In our interaction analysis, we exploit two variables proxying the size of non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms operating in the province and the size of non loan-related activities of the
banking sector in each province. The size of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms is measured through the
average number of employees per ﬁrm operating in each province in 1991 (empl), while
the size of non loan-related activities (securities) is captured by the securities held by
banks on behalf of the customers in a given province (it is an average for 1990 and 1991).
1.4.4.2 Bank level variables
The bank level characteristics are constructed from the data on the number and loca-
tion of branches of a given bank and from balance sheets. The variable (size) measures
the number of branches by a given bank at the beginning of the reference period. The
variable (scope) measures the number of provinces in which the bank operates21. The
variable (sizeloans) measures the total amount of loans extended by a bank. We mea-
sure the ﬁnancial soundness of a bank by the variable (badloans), that is the ratio of bad
loans to the total amount of loans extended by a bank. The bank balance sheet statistics
21In the main speciﬁcations, the variable used is a dummy variable that separate single-province banks
from banks operating in more than one province. The variable, which shows to be highly signiﬁcant in all
regressions, has been so constructed to avoid problems of collinearity with other size variables.
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are taken from Bilbank. A ﬁnal variable included in our speciﬁcations is the distance be-
tween the market of origin in which potential entrants operate, and the target market.
Distance can be measured across different dimensions (on this subject see Alessandrini,
Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2009). Given the nature of control that distance has in this work,
we controlled exclusively for the geographical distance between a bank’s headquarters
and the center of each province(distance).
Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
entry 0.021 0.143 0 1 20164
entryacq 0.004 0.064 0 1 20164
marketpower 1.722 0.747 0 3.628 20164
loans 1760.506 3492.381 100.529 27649.279 20164
loansgrowth 0.156 0.056 -0.006 0.355 20164
scope 0.711 0.453 0 1 20164
scopeofentry 0.287 0.182 0.036 1.282 20164
avvagrowth 0.091 0.01 0.058 0.11 20164
herf 0.095 0.049 0.029 0.263 20164
empl 34048.701 31902.655 5044 236115 20164
securities 2710.855 7251.355 34.89 62263.844 20164
size 47.412 88.052 0 1250 20164
sizeloans 777.886 2017.002 0 17004.975 20069
badloans 0.001 0 0 0.006 19974
distance 25.556 26.856 0 146.599 20164
1.5 Main results
In this section we present the main results of our work. Table 3 shows the results
of the principal speciﬁcation. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that records
entry by branching in local markets over the period 1990-1995. We employ bank level
data in which each observation corresponds to a bank-province pair. In column (1) we
report the estimates for our baseline speciﬁcation, consisting of a probit model. Both the
ﬁrm level and market level variables play a signiﬁcant role in shaping banks’ short run
geographic diversiﬁcation decisions. The size of a bank and its scope of operation have
a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the probability of entry. The positive effect of size is
consistent with the view that resource constraints play a crucial role in shaping entry de-
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cisions (Cotterill and Haller, 1992; Ingham and Thompson, 1994): size can be seen as a
proxy for slack resources available within a ﬁrm, and the availability of such resources
facilitates the overcoming of entry barriers, especially in a context in which it might be
difﬁcult to access external funds (Felici and Pagnini, 2008). Also the market level con-
trols show in general the expected sign and signiﬁcance: the size of the market, as well as
past value added growth in the province, exert a positive role in attracting new entrants.
These measures correctly capture the growth potential of the market, as suggested in the
literature (Amel and Liang, 1997; Pita Barros,1995). Also, a greater density of branches
per inhabitants, measured by the variable scopeofentry, reduces the likelihood of entry
by banks, although the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant. The other variable that enters signif-
icantly in our model is the distance between a potential entrant’s headquarters and the
target market. Felici and Pagnini (2008) stress different sources of distance-related en-
try barriers. First, the role of reputation in attracting customers is crucial in banking as in
many other commercial sectors. A bank has accumulated over the years reputational cap-
ital that can be invested when entering a new market; however, this reputation effect dis-
sipates with distance. Second, it is well known (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999 and Dell’Ariccia,
2001) that asymmetric information represents a major entry barrier in banking. Potential
entrants face adverse selection problems being uninformed about the quality of potential
borrowers, over which the incumbents possess an informational advantage. For a poten-
tial entrant, the cost of collecting information about local borrowers is likely to be reduced
if the market is located close to where the entrant already operates. We will return to this
point in our interaction analysis.
We now turn to our main variable of interest, i.e. market power. As we can see, the
degree of market power held by the incumbents, as measured by the spread between loan
and interest rates at the outset of liberalization, exerts a negative effect on the probability
of entry. The effect is signiﬁcant at 5% level of conﬁdence, and remains signiﬁcant in the
richer speciﬁcation proposed in column (2), which extends the baseline model. We in-
clude a different measure of a bank’s size, that is the total amount of loans extended by a
bank in the period immediately proceeding deregulation (sizeloans); the variable loans-
growth measuring the average observed growth of the total amount of loans extended in
a province, and the south dummy variable, capturing potentially important institutional
differences between northern and southern regions of the country. The results in this sec-
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ond speciﬁcation conﬁrm that bank’s size is positively correlated with the probability of
entry into a new geographic market, and that the potential growth of the credit market,
as proxied both by value added growth in the province and by the growth rate of the
amount of loans extended in the province, exerts a positive effect on the probability of
entry. The variable south does not play a signiﬁcant role.
The proxy for market power included in column (1) and column (2) of Table 2 is the
spread between the loan and deposit rates for each province. As we have seen in Section
3, the observed spread between loan and deposit rates might capture characteristics of
the banking market unrelated to the intensity of incumbents’ monopoly power.
To reﬁne our identiﬁcation strategy, we use an instrumental variables approach, as
described in section 3. We use the characteristics of the banking sector in 1936 as instru-
ments for the spread between loan and deposit rates. Column (3) presents the results of
a 2SLS estimation (assuming a linear probability model). This speciﬁcation conﬁrms the
validity of our main ﬁnding: market power acts as an entry deterrent mechanism. Indeed,
the probability of entry is lower in those markets where entry regulation was tighter. At
the bottom of column (3) we report statistics that are useful to test the validity of our IV
strategy: the Hansen J-statistic, the GMM counterpart of the Sargan statistic, shows that
we cannot reject the null of no correlation between the instruments and the error term in
our equation. The F-test of excluded instruments shows that the instruments are jointly
signiﬁcant in explaining the endogenous measure of market power, which is supported
also by the Anderson canonical correlation, which seems to exclude a weak-instruments
problem in our model. In column (4) we present the result of an non linear instrumental
variable probit model (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 for a detailed description of the
model). The results appear qualitatively similar to the previous models and conﬁrm that
market power exerts a negative effect on entry.
In summary, the results contained in Table 3 illustrate that the probability of entry is
signiﬁcantly reduced in markets where incumbents have been protected for many years
from the threat of entry. In order to give a sense of the magnitude of the estimated effect,
we run several simulations. We compare the suggested magnitude of the market power
effect on entry of the speciﬁcation presented in column (1) and column (3), respectively
the simple probit and the instrumental variable probit models. The simple probit model
predicts that going from the most competitive province in Italy (Ravenna) to the least
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Table 1.3: Market Power and entry: main results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
probit probit 2sls ivprobit
marketpower -0.00232** -0.00270** -0.0132** -0.00609*
(0.00110) (0.00117) (0.00604) (0.00369)




scope (d) 0.00849*** 0.00840*** 0.00438** 0.00856***
(0.00150) (0.00143) (0.00213) (0.00149)
scopeofentry -0.00285 -0.00313 -0.0161 -0.00784
(0.00315) (0.00295) (0.0108) (0.00586)
distance -0.438*** -0.458*** -0.357*** -0.426***
(0.0482) (0.0467) (0.0516) (0.0434)
loans 0.00109*** 0.00108*** 0.00285*** 0.00109***
(0.000246) (0.000220) (0.000821) (0.000132)
vagrowth 0.177** 0.157** 0.341** 0.232**





Observations 20164 20069 20164 20164
Hansen J stat. 0.212
F-square ﬁrst 6.86**
Anderson CC 1806***
Marginal effects; Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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competitive one (Catanzaro), the probability of entry drops by 52%, holding constant
all other variable included in the model. The instrumental variable probit, in which we
address the potential endogeneity of our spread measure, the probability falls even more,
by 82%.
In Table 4 we test the robustness of our main ﬁnding using market-level data (i.e.
aggregated statistics). The dependent variable has been changed into the total number of
entry episodes recorded in a province between 1990 and 1995. In column (1) we report the
result of an OLS speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant effect of market power
on entry. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in column(2), where we show the results of 2SLS
estimation. Again, as in the context of bank-level data, the magnitude of the estimated
effect increases signiﬁcantly when we account for the endogeneity of market power using
the characteristics of the banking sector in 1936 as instruments. Finally, the results are
conﬁrmed in column(3) where we estimate a model ´ a la Poisson.
Table 1.4: Market Power and entry: aggregate market data
(1) (2) (3)
Ols 2sls Poisson
marketpower -1.296*** -3.789*** -0.903**
(0.377) (1.281) (0.361)
scopeofentry -0.517 -4.075* -1.194
(1.142) (2.345) (0.998)
loans 0.000498*** 0.000500*** 0.000223***
(0.000168) (0.000160) (0.0000529)
loansgrowth 11.07* 11.05* 7.726
(5.585) (6.117) (4.826)




Observations 95 95 95
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1.6 Interaction analysis
The results presented in the previous section illustrate that the regulation approved in
1936, shaping the competitive framework for the successive 50 years, impacted the entry
behavior of banks in the aftermath of deregulation. Indeed, in markets which have been
more protected from the entry threat, incumbents enjoy greater market power, and this
acts as an entry deterrent mechanism. This evidence bears important policy implications,
as it suggests that liberalization policies might not quickly deliver the expected beneﬁt of
increased competition just where it is more necessary.22
In this section we provide the results of an interaction analysis, in which we explore
how the market power entry relationship changes with the characteristics of the entrants,
of the target markets, and the mode of entry. These further speciﬁcations try to shed
light on the existence of strategic and informational channels behind the estimated nexus
between entry and monopoly power.
The strategic explanation of the negative relationship between market power and en-
try relies on one main argument: incumbents that have been protected by regulation for
decades have accumulated ”deep pockets” that can be exploited to discourage entry after
the removal of administrative barriers. The strategic deterrence effect of market power
is reinforced by the incumbents’ ability to coordinate in their actions. This coordination
is much more likely where the regulation created a strongly concentrated market. The
strategic channel story suggests that the ability to overcome the entry barrier represented
by incumbents’ market power should be a function of the availability of slack resources
for potential entrants or, more generally, of their ﬁnancial strength. Therefore we interact
our independent market power variable with dummies that identify the group of banks
that appear more ﬁnancially equipped to engage in an entry ﬁght and reap the beneﬁts of
higher margins. The results are presented in Table 5. The ﬁrst variable that we consider in
column (1) is size, always measured by the bank’s branches network. Size can be seen as
a proxy for ﬁnancial strength: bigger banks should be better equipped for surmounting
the strategic barriers erected by incumbents. We test whether the observed market power
22Unfortunately, the lack of pricing data does not allow us to verify the effects of the post-deregulation
entry behavior on the commercial conditions faced by ﬁrms. However, a simple (unreported) analysis on
average interest rates, seems to support the idea that less competitive provinces, where interest rates on
loans were higher in the late 1980s, did not converge rapidly to the levels of more competitive provinces in
the years that follow the liberalization.
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entry relationship changes according to the size of entrant banks. We deﬁned three size
categories (small, medium and large banks) using the size empirical distribution. Small
banks are those whose size does not exceed the ﬁrst quartile of the distribution, while big
banks are those whose size exceeds the third quartile. Medium banks are those whose
size lies between the ﬁrst and the third quartile. We tested the differential effect of market
power on entry estimating three different coefﬁcients for our market power variable, that
is interacting the market power variable with three dummies, one for each size category.
For this interaction analysis, we employed the linear instrumental variable model, which
facilitates the interpretation of interaction coefﬁcients. Column (1) of Table 5 illustrates
that the negative effect of market power on entry is statistically signiﬁcant only for small
and medium sized banks. For large banks, the effect is still negative, but is greatly re-
duced in magnitude and no longer statistically signiﬁcant. This result is conﬁrmed by
column (2), where we use a different proxy for a bank’s size, based on the total amount
of loans extended (the variable loans described above). Again, the market power entry
deterrent effect disappear when we look at large banks.
Size is only one of the potential proxies of the ﬁnancial strength of a bank and of
its ability to surmount the barriers represented by incumbents’ market power. The mar-
ket power entry relationship may also be affected the ﬁnancial soundness of the entrant.
Among the potentially available proxies of a bank’s ﬁnancial soundness, we focus on the
the proportion of bad loans over total loans. This variable should capture the allocative
efﬁciency of banks and the possibility to sustain the short term losses associated to the
incumbents’ reaction upon entry. As for the previous interactions, we estimate the effect
of market power on entry for three groups of banks, identiﬁed by the size of the ratio
between bad loans and total loans. The results are shown in column (3). The results
indeed conﬁrm that the entry deterrent effect of market power on entry disappears for
banks whose ﬁnancial position appears sounder. Overall, the results presented in Table 5
suggest that incumbents’ market power does not reduce the probability for banks which
are ﬁnancially stronger. Being aware that multiple stories might support such empiri-
cal ﬁndings, the results appear consistent with the strategic interaction channel proposed
above.
The deterrent effect of market power might also be attributed to an informational ad-
vantage of incumbents, as we saw in the introduction. The idea is that the regulation,
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/316941.6. INTERACTION ANALYSIS 25



























scope (d) 0.00491** 0.000605 0.00461**
(0.00231) (0.00209) (0.00219)
scopeofentry -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0143
(0.00957) (0.00970) (0.00962)
distance -0.379*** -0.375*** -0.376***
(0.0503) (0.0478) (0.0478)
loans 0.00287*** 0.00292*** 0.00292***
(0.000779) (0.000783) (0.000783)
loansgrowth 0.0567** 0.0575** 0.0568**
(0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0258)
vagrowth 0.276* 0.286* 0.282*
(0.149) (0.150) (0.150)
Observations 20164 20069 19974
Marginal effects; Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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insofar as it protected incumbents from the entry of new competitors, has contributed
to the creation or at least to the reinforcement of an informational dividend. This div-
idend indeed should be higher where competition was relatively more restricted from
regulation. We explore the existence of an informational channel as a potential explana-
tion of our results through four further speciﬁcations presented in Table 6. In column
(1) we change our dependent variable, looking at entry by acquisition instead of entry
through branching. The idea is that if market power acts on entry as it signals an infor-
mational advantage of incumbents over entrants, the effect should be greatly reduced or
even reversed when entry takes place through the acquisition of an incumbent bank. The
reason is that the assets acquired by the entrant include the informational capital of the
incumbent. The results seem to conﬁrm the intuition, as market power does not exert a
signiﬁcantly negative effect on entry by acquisition.23
In column (2) we look at the role of distance in shaping the market power entry re-
lationship. The idea is again suggested by the literature on the informational barriers to
entry in the banking sector. Felici and Pagnini (2008) stress that the cost of collecting in-
formation about local borrowers should be lower when the entrant is closer to the target
market. This suggests the possibility to test whether market power acts on entry through
the information channel by looking at whether the estimated relationship changes when
market power is interacted with distance. Indeed, interacting our market power vari-
able with a dummy that identiﬁes a close distance between potential entrants and target
markets, we see that the negative effect of market power is reverted for entrants that are
located close to the target market. In column (3) we test how the market power entry
relationship changes with the size of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms operating in the target province:
in the methodological section above we explained how the literature that describes the
asymmetric information problem associated to entry in the banking sector suggests that
information asymmetries might be reduced if the requirement of soft information about
local ﬁrms is lower. When the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms operating in a province are relatively
big, the screening of their quality as borrowers is based mainly on balance sheet, that is
on hard information, which reduces the informational gap of entrants vis-a-vis the in-
cumbents. This suggests that, if the market power entry relationship is determined by
23The result is also consistent with the strategic deterrence story. Indeed, when entry takes place through
acquisition, the entrant replaces an existing incumbent and does not represent a threat as in the case of a
de-novo entrant.
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Table 1.6: Market power and entry: the role of acquisitions, distance, and target market
characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)

















size 0.00834*** 0.276*** 0.271*** 0.270***





scope (d) 0.00394*** 0.00394* 0.00449** 0.00449**
(0.00104) (0.00226) (0.00190) (0.00190)
scopeofentry -0.000645 -0.0141* -0.0147* -0.0328**
(0.00157) (0.00828) (0.00836) (0.0131)
distance -0.0555*** -0.0807* -0.415*** -0.387***
(0.0179) (0.0458) (0.0361) (0.0358)
avimp 0.000571** 0.00281*** 0.00510*** 0.00207***
(0.0000245) (0.000283) (0.00172) (0.000659)
avimpgrowth 0.00797 0.0489*** 0.0533*** 0.0511***
(0.00556) (0.0181) (0.0168) (0.0170)
avvagrowth 0.0161 0.224* 0.0319 0.206*
(0.0270) (0.118) (0.109) (0.108)
Observations 20164 20164 20164 20164
Marginal effects; Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
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an adverse selection problem, the negative effect of market power on entry would be re-
duced if the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that operate in the market are relatively big. We measure
the average size of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in a province by their average number of employ-
ees. Using the same approach for the previous interaction analysis, the results in column
(3) show that indeed, the negative effect of market power on entry disappears in markets
where ﬁrms are relatively big. In column (4) we present the ﬁnal results of our interaction
analysis, where we look again for evidence of an asymmetric information channel driv-
ing the observed relationship between incumbents’ market power and entry. The scope
of asymmetric information between entrants and incumbents is mainly related to the loan
segment of a bank’s activity. In other words, the greater is the proportion of banks’ rev-
enues coming from non loan-related activities, the lower is the scope for informational
barriers to entry. This suggests that the entry deterrent effect of market power should be
reduced the higher the potential for non loan-related revenues. The scope of non-loan
related revenues for a banks is captured by the amount of securities held on behalf of cus-
tomers within the boundaries of a given province. The interaction analysis conﬁrms that
the negative role exerted by market power on entry is signiﬁcant only in those markets in
which the amount of securities held on behalf of customers is relatively low.
Overall, ourinteractionanalysisshowshowtheobservedaveragerelationshipchanges
when we look at subsamples of entrants and local markets. The results do not rule out
any of the proposed channels through which market power might act as an entry deter-
rent mechanism. On the contrary, our exercise points to the existence of multiple channels
operating at the same time.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we obtain three main results. First we ﬁnd that entry in the years that
followed branching deregulation was targeted towards more competitive markets, i.e.
where the incumbents had less market power. As underlined by North (1993), institutions
and time matter. The survival of a strict regulation on banking entry for more than 50
years contributed to the incumbents having strong market power. We measure market
power with a risk-adjusted spread between loan and deposit rates. Given the potential
endogeneity of the spread, we use the characteristics of the banking markets in the thirties
as instrumental variables for market power. These characteristics - essentially the number
of small/local banks/branchesin provincialmarkets -were highlypersistent. Theylasted
until the eigthies due to the framing of the regulation, and are able to explain in large
part the development of competitive interaction in local markets for the following ﬁfty
years. Our results hold: i.e. instrumental variable regressions conﬁrm the capacity of
incumbents to deter entry. This evidence is also consistent with the idea that extra-proﬁts
persist in the long run because incumbent ﬁrms are able to discourage the entry of new
competitors (Mueller, 1986). Second, our econometric exercises suggest that the market
power entry relationship depends on the quality of the potential entrants and on other
structural characteristics of the target market. The results are compatible both with an
information and a strategic channel explaining the nexus between market power and
entry. Third, if entry in local markets takes place through acquisition of an incumbent
bank, market power does not exert a negative effect on entry. Again, this is consistent
withtheabilityofentrantbankstoovercometheentrybarrierrepresentedbyincumbents’
market power, be it linked to a strategic or to an informative advantage. Our evidence is
consistent with the idea that in the banking industry large market shares may be acquired
by new intermediaries only through acquisitions.





In this appendix we provide a set of robustness checks performed in order to test how
the main result presented in the paper is affected by the choice of the speciﬁcation, by the
deﬁnition of the pool of potential entrants into a market and by the consideration of the
potential interdependence of entry decisions among banks.
We start in column (1) of Table 7 by presenting the results of the estimation of our
baseline speciﬁcation by using a conditional ﬁxed effect logit model. This model applied
to the data allows to control for the possible existence of unobservable bank level hetero-
geneity. The model, described in detail in Cameron and Trivedi (2005), determines the
probability of entry among the set of Italian provinces, conditioned on the the total num-
ber of entries effectively undertaken by each bank. Such transformation, analogously to
the linear panel data transformation (the de-meaning of variables), gets rid of the individ-
ual ﬁxed effects and allows to retrieve consistent and efﬁcient estimates of the parameters
of interest. This model is relevant if unobservable bank level heterogeneity is deemed
to play an important role, as suggested among others by Fuentelsaz and Gomes (2001)
and more recently by Felici and Pagnini (2008). The conditional ﬁxed effect approach has
two drawbacks: ﬁrst, the effect on the probability of entry of bank speciﬁc variables is no
longer identiﬁable; second, the conditioning approach is such all the observations corre-
sponding to those banks that did not enter any market over the considered period are lost
in the estimation, so we have a considerably lower number of observations. The results
conﬁrm our main ﬁnding that market power, as measured by the spread between loan
and deposit rates, exerts a negative effect on entry.
In column (2) we present the results of a speciﬁcation in which we modify the deﬁni-
tion of potential entrants. In the main model, all banks operating in the country at the end
of the sample period (1995) are set as potential entrants in each local market. Although
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we consider this as the preferable approach, we test the robustness of our main ﬁndings
against the exclusion from the set of potential entrants in each local markets the banks
whose headquarters are far away from the target market. We use a statistical criterion,
and drop the fourth quartile of the distribution of the variable distance. Again, the re-
sults of the speciﬁcation, estimated with IV probit, conﬁrm the negative effect exerted by
market power on the probability of entry.
In column (3) and (4) we propose a preliminary way to address the potential concern
that entry decisions of banks are not conditionally independent. The approach we follow
consists in controlling for factors that potentially determine the dependence structure of
theentrydecisions, inordertoverifywhethertheobservednegativerelationshipbetween
market power and entry still holds. The ﬁrst control in column (3) is suggested by Felici
and Pagnini (2008), and their argument goes as follow: a bank can expand its network
of branches either by opening a new outlet in its pre-entry locations or by branching into
new geographic markets. The two expansion strategies may be independent, comple-
ment or substitutes. If the strategies are indeed substitutes, in order to branch into a new
geographic market a bank should abandon some expansion projects in its pre entry loca-
tions. This would imply that the bank under consideration is subject to some constraints
and that these constraints may determine a lack of independence of entry decisions. Es-
sentially, what Felici and Pagnini (2008) aim at modeling is the dependence of the entry
decisions of a given bank across different markets. In order to control for this effect, we
follow them and introduce a variable (expansion), deﬁned by the ratio between the num-
ber of pre-entry locations where a bank opened a new outlet and the total number of its
pre-entry locations (recorded at the beginning of our sample period, that is prior to dereg-
ulation). As for Felici and Pagnini (2008), the variable enters signiﬁcantly in the estimated
speciﬁcation with a positive sign (which suggests complementarity between the two ex-
pansion strategies), but the main result of our paper related to the market power-entry
relationship does not change. In column (4) we try to model an additional factor that
might shape the dependence of the entry decisions, namely the intensity of multi-market
contacts between banks. The banks included in our estimation are both potential entrants
for the markets in which they do not operate at the time of deregulation and incumbents
in all the markets in which they possess branches. A bank deciding whether or not to
enter a new geographic market might take into consideration the number of ”contacts”
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Table 1.7: Market Power and entry: robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit FE ivprobit ivprobit ivprobit
marketpower -0.0434** -0.00933* -0.0109** -0.0177**
(0.0203) (0.00503) (0.00542) (0.00790)
size 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.327***
(0.0276) (0.0259) (0.0278)
scope (d) 0.00486** 0.00649*** 0.00408*
(0.00234) (0.00239) (0.00214)
scopeofentry -0.110 -0.0146* -0.0146 -0.0440***
(0.0765) (0.00890) (0.00955) (0.0144)
distance -0.0102*** -0.000658*** -0.000361*** -0.000249***
(0.00119) (0.0000706) (0.0000492) (0.0000568)
loans 0.0218*** 0.00312*** 0.00287*** 0.000563
(0.00229) (0.000756) (0.000778) (0.000566)
loansgrowth 0.641*** 0.0559** 0.0570** 0.113**
(0.238) (0.0253) (0.0259) (0.0455)
vagrowth 2.968** 0.321** 0.283* -0.0320





Observations 12201 18397 20164 20069
Marginal effects; Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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it has with the incumbents operating in the target market, that is the fact that it is con-
temporaneously present with those incumbents in other markets. The acknowledgement
of this link between entrants and incumbents might shape the dependence of entry de-
cisions. The literature on mutual forbearance-collusion and multi-market contact is well
known (see the theoretical contributions of Bernheim and Whinston, 1990 and Spagnolo,
1999 among others). This literature suggests that banks might refrain from entering a
market in which operate incumbents with whom they have contacts in other local mar-
kets. However, a recent contribution by Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) shows that, for
low levels of multi-market contacts, there might be an incentive to enter those markets,
precisely to set up a network that might facilitate collusive practices afterwards. What-
ever the story is, multi-market contact between entrants and incumbents might generate
a dependence in the entry patterns, both between the entry decisions of a given bank in
different markets (that share the same incumbents) and between the entry decisions of
different banks. For this reason, we introduce a control variable that counts the number
of multi-market contacts that each bank has with the incumbents in the target market.
The variable multimarket is given by the ratio between the sum of contacts that a bank
has with the incumbents in the target market and the number of provinces in which a
bank is operating at the beginning of the sample period. The variable enters positively
the estimated speciﬁcation, which suggests that banks, at least at the early stage of dereg-
ulation, were targeting markets in which incumbents were ”known” incumbents. This,
however, does not alter the main ﬁnding of our paper, that is the negative link between
market power and entry.
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This paper describes in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality
of competition policy, the Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the
deterrence properties of a jurisdictions competition policy where for competition pol-
icy we mean the antitrust legislation including the merger control provisions and its
enforcement. They incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy
regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise
them so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been
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A. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce the Competition Policy Indexes, from hereon
CPIs, a novel set of indicators of the quality and intensity of competition policy. The
CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a jurisdictions competition policy where for
competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control pro-
visions and its enforcement.1 The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a
competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices
and summarise them, so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons.2 The CPIs
are based on a bottom-up approach in which each jurisdictions scores can be related to
speciﬁc features of its competition policy. Applying a consolidated methodology, similar
to that developed by the OECD for the indicators of product market regulations (PMR)3
and the competition law and policy indexes (CPL),4 the CPIs have a pyramidal structure
which encompasses a large number of sub-indicators that are progressively aggregated
using a set of weights at each level of aggregation. We ﬁrst use an aggregation scheme in
which the weights of the different sub-indicators are assigned according to the relevance
that, in our view, each item deserves. Subsequently we adopt an alternative scheme,
which aggregates the different features of a competition policy regime using factor anal-
ysis, as a robustness check. As mentioned above, the methodology herein proposed for
building the CPIs is akin to the one used by the OECD for building the PMR indicators
and the CPL indexes. However, the former aims at measuring restrictions to competi-
1A jurisdiction is the territory within which the power to interpret and apply a speciﬁc legislation can
be exercised. It does not always coincide with the boundaries of a nation (e.g. the European Union).
2BuccirossiP., L.Ciari, T.Duso, G.Spagnolo, andC.Vitale, CompetitionPolicyandProductivityGrowth:
An Empirical Assessment, London, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7470, Centre for Economic Policy Research
(2009), estimate the effects of competition policy on total factor productivity (TFP) growth in a panel of 22
industries in 12 countries between 1995 and 2005. They ﬁnd a robust, positive and signiﬁcant relationship
between the CPIs and TFP growth and conclude that good competition policy institutions are beneﬁcial to
society by increasing efﬁciency and, hence, welfare.
3See Boylaud O., G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta, Summary Indicators of Product Market Regulation with
an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation, OECD Economic Department Working Paper, No 226,
OECD Publishing (2000); Conway P,.V. Janod and G. Nicoletti, Product Market Regulation in OECD Coun-
tries, OECD Economic Department Working Paper, No 568, OECD Publishing, (2005); Conway, G. Nicoletti,
Product Market Regulation in the Non-Manufacturing Sector of OECD Countries: Measurement and High-
lights, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No 530, OECD Publishing (2006); Wolﬂ A., I. Wanner,
T. Kozluk and G. Nicoletti, Ten Years of Product Market Reform in OECD Countries: Insights from a Re-
vised PMR Indicator, OECD Economic Department Working Paper, No 695, OECD Publishing, (2009).
4See Hj J., Competition Law and Policy Indicators for OECD Countries, OECD Economic Department
Working Paper, No 568, OECD Publishing, (2007).
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tion due to inappropriate regulations (e.g. on entry or business activities) and the latter
considers both policies that enhance the general level of competition (i.e. ex-post poli-
cies implemented by the Competition Authorities, from hereon CAs) and policies that
encourage and promote competition in deregulated network industries (i.e. ex-ante poli-
cies implemented by sector regulators). The CPIs, instead, focus solely on the policies
that enhance the general level of competition. In addition, while the PMR indicators have
been calculated only for three years (1998, 2003, and 2008) and the CPL indexes only for
one year (2003), the CPIs have both a cross-country and a cross-time dimension, as we cal-
culated them for 13 OECD jurisdictions over a period of ten years (19952005).5 The next
section discusses the features of the competition policy regime that we have included in
the CPIs because we believe them to be the most important determinants of its effective-
ness. Section III explains how the CPIs are structured, while sections IV, V and VI explain
in more detail the steps followed in their construction. Section VII describes the data we
have used to calculate the CPIs over our sample. Section VIII explains how we derived
the weighting schemes based on factor analysis. Section IX illustrates how well competi-
tion policy works in the jurisdictions in our sample by examining the evolution of some
of the CPIs over the relevant period. Section X compares the CPIs with other indicators of
a similar kind that have been developed in the literature. The last section contains some
concluding remarks.
B. What makes competition policy work?
In this paper the term competition policy refers to the competition legislation (includ-
ing the merger control provisions) and its enforcement. All other forms of competition-
enhancing policies, such as the reduction of red tape that favours the entry of new ﬁrms,
consumer protection, competition advocacy, state aid controls or ex-ante sectoral regula-
tion, are not included in our deﬁnition of competition policy. Hence, for the purpose of
this paper, a competition policy includes a set of prohibitions and obligations that ﬁrms
have to comply with to ensure that competition is not reduced or altered, together with
5The 13 jurisdictions included in our sample are: Canada, Czech Republic, European Union, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA. These OECD countries have
been selected to be representative of different legal systems (common law and civil law), to include both
EU and non-EU countries and, among the EU countries, both founding members and countries that have
recently entered the Union, namely Hungary and the Czech Republic.
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an array of tools for policing and punishing any violation. We will generically refer to
these as the features of a competition policy regime. Many economists share the view
that the ultimate aim of competition policy should be to maximise social welfare, which
is given by the un-weighted sum of the proﬁts of all the ﬁrms and of aggregate consumer
surplus.6 Other alternatives have been proposed, where a lower weight is given to the
welfare of the ﬁrms with respect to that of the consumers, or where the welfare of society
is identiﬁed only with that of the consumers.7 Yet, in the praxis, the objective function
of the European Commission, the US antitrust authorities, as well as those of most other
national CAs, incorporates a deﬁnition of social welfare that includes only the consumer
surplus. In this paper, we are not going to discuss what should be the appropriate def-
inition of social welfare that a competition policy should protect and enhance. Hence,
we shall take as given the way in which each jurisdiction has designed, and each CA
has implemented, its competition policy over the years considered in our sample. The
role of a CA consists of using the powers and the resources conferred on it by the law
to ensure that ﬁrms operating within its jurisdiction undertake the least possible number
of behaviours that reduce social welfare by impairing competition. This implies that the
aim of a CA consists of deterring anticompetitive behaviours.8 It follows that the most
6Kaplow L., and S. Shavell, Fairness versus Efﬁciency (Harvard University Press, 2002); Motta M., Com-
petition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge University press, MA 2004); Buccirossi P.,
Introduction in Buccirossi P. (Ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics (Boston, MIT Press, 2008).
7Neven D.J., and L.H Rller, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model
of Merger Control, 33 (910) International Journal of Industrial Organization (2005) at 829848 consider the
political economy environment that an antitrust agency is operating in and how this impacts on the choice
of the appropriate welfare standard in merger control. The authors show that, when the antitrust agency
can be inﬂuenced by third parties and it is imperfectly monitored, neither a consumer surplus standard
nor a welfare standard dominates. Yet, when lobbying is efﬁcient, accountability is low, mergers are large,
and a marginal increase in merger size is highly proﬁtable, a consumer surplus standard is more attractive.
The authors do not discuss whether their analysis can or should be extended to other competition law
infringements. On this topic see also Salop S. What is the real and proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: TheTrueConsumerWelfareStandard,StatementbeforetheAntitrustModernizationCommission,
(2005).
8In order to avoid confusion we want to stress that the form of deterrence we refer to here is the one
called ex-ante, or general deterrence, which consists of preventing agents from undertaking illegal be-
haviours by threatening violators with sufﬁciently heavy and prompt sanctions. There is also a second
form of deterrence, called speciﬁc deterrence, or desistance, which takes place only ex-post (i.e. after an
unlawful behaviour had already taken place and was discovered or when an anticompetitive merger is
blocked or remedied) and works through a corrective change in behaviour induced in the economic agents
prosecuted and convicted for the detected violation (or whose merger was stopped). Speciﬁc deterrence is
of course much less important, as it has a limited effect and comes with prosecution costs, but it still plays
a relevant role for those complex behaviours where mistakes in the forecast of their effects on social welfare
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effective competition policy regime is one in which the CA achieves total deterrence and,
hence, never has to block a merger, never has to uncover a cartel or any other anticom-
petitive agreement, and never has to condemn a ﬁrm for abusing its dominant position.9
In such an ideal regime ﬁrms do not dare to propose an anticompetitive merger, do not
attempt to form a cartel, never enter into an anticompetitive agreement and do not even
consider using their market power with the aim of excluding rivals and reducing social
welfare.10 In addition, in the ideal competition policy regime, ﬁrms never refrain from
attempting a merger, concluding a contract or undertaking a unilateral conduct, if these
actions improve social welfare. In this paper we evaluate a competition policy regime
on the basis of its ability to deter all those market conducts that harm social welfare. To
do so we identify those features of a competition policy regime that we believe to have
the strongest impact on the level of deterrence it can engender. We base our choice of
these features on the economic theory of the public enforcement of law. This theory orig-
inates from Becker’s seminal paper,11 which shows that entry into illegal activities can be
explained by the same model of choice that economists use to explain entry into legal ac-
tivities, and which applies the economic approach to incentive design to address the legal
problem of deterring unlawful behaviours. This theory claims that the level of deterrence
depends on: 1) the level of the punishment wrongdoers can expect to suffer if they are
convicted relative to their expected gain from the violation, 2) the perceived probability of
being caught and convicted, and 3) the perceived probability of errors in the investigation
and evaluation of the violations.12 Since Beckers contribution, competition law enforce-
are likely.
9There is no reason to believe that the ideal competition policy regime is the one that a jurisdiction
should strive for. Indeed, the ideal regime, even if it were feasible, would entail very high implementation
costs, and these are probably much higher than the ones society would be rationally willing to bear: the
ideal competition policy regime is in general not the most efﬁcient one.
10The reason why our indicators measure the deterrence properties, rather than the quality of a compe-
tition policy regime, is because the latter increases with the level of deterrence up to the point when this
becomes over-deterrence. However, it is very hard to say when the level of deterrence engendered by a
competition policy regime has reached the point when it also starts to inhibit efﬁcient behaviours. Hence,
we consider it more appropriate to limit our analysis to the level of deterrence.
11Becker G., Crime and Punishment an Economic Approach, 76 (2) Journal of Political Economy (1968) at
169217.
12See Polinsky A.M. and S. Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 Journal of
Economic Literature, (2000) at 4576; Buccirossi P., G. Spagnolo and C. Vitale, The Cost of Inappropriate In-
terventions/nonInterventionsunderArticle82OFT864(2006), andSchinkelM.P.andJ.Tuinstra, Imperfect
competition law enforcement, 24(6) International Journal of Industrial Organization (2006) at 539572. These
errors weaken the level of deterrence a given sanction can induce. An enforcement agency can commit an
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ment has become a speciﬁc research subject, which has gone well beyond extending, or
adapting, results in the economic theory of the public enforcement of law. Building on
this literature, we identify the policy variables/dimensions that are most likely to affect
the three key determinants of deterrence when the relevant law is the competition leg-
islation, and, thus, make the policy more or less effective.13 With regard to violation of
antitrust rules these are: 1) the degree of independence of the CA with respect to political
or economic interests; 2) the separation between adjudicator and prosecutor; 3) the qual-
ity of the law on the books (i.e. how close are the rules that make the partition between
legal and illegal conducts closer to their effect on social welfare); 4) the scope of investiga-
tive powers the CA holds; 5) the level of the ﬁnancial loss (i.e. the overall sanction) that
ﬁrms and their employees can expect to suffer as a consequence of a conviction;14 6) the
level of activity of a CA, and the amount and the quality of the ﬁnancial and human re-
sources the CA can rely on when performing its tasks.15 In the case of merger control, the
selected features are slightly different because investigative powers are not very relevant
in merger cases (as these are ex-ante investigations which do not involve infringement
of legal obligations, but rather a request for approval for a business operation) and there
are no sanctions for potentially anticompetitive mergers but only (small) sanctions for
procedural violations.
error when it convicts someone who has not violated the law (normally referred to as a type I error) or
when it acquits someone who is effectively guilty (normally referred to as a type II error). The probability
that someone may be held liable even when she is adopting a legal behaviour reduces the rewards that are
obtained from respecting the law, thus increasing the net gain from a breach of the law. Similarly the prob-
ability of being acquitted although one is violating the law renders the probability of being investigated
and convicted lower, reducing the expected sanction. Hence, both types of errors make the alternative of
violating the law more attractive.
13See Buccirossi P., L. Ciari, T. Duso, G. Spagnolo, and C. Vitale, Deterrence in Competition Law, Mimeo,
(2009).
14The expected sanction depends on both the types and the levels of the sanction that can be imposed
and the types and the levels of the sanction that are actually imposed.
15There are of course other potential determinants of deterrence that do not fall among the categories
discussed above. For example, when a cartel is international in scope and leniency policies are not coordi-
nated across countries and agencies, the risk for the ﬁrst whistleblower in a country to be only the second
one (hence, obtaining reduced or no leniency) in other countries because cartel partners react by rushing
to self-report elsewhere may clearly hinder the deterrence effects of leniency programs. However, in this
study we are focusing on cross-country differences, hence these issues, though interesting, fall outside the
scope of our analysis.
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C. The structure of the Competition Policy Indexes
Each indicator is obtained from the linear aggregation of data on the competition
policy variables discussed above.16 This aggregation follows a series of steps, which are
discussed below and summarised in Table 1.
1. Each piece of information on each policy feature is assigned a score on a scale of
0-1 against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practice (from worst to best). In order
to assign scores we determine what could be considered as best practice by relying on
scientiﬁc papers and books, on documents prepared by international organisations such
as the International Competition Network and the OECD, and on our judgement. These
references are cited below, when we discuss in more detail how each feature is scored,
and are summarised in two tables included in Appendix A.
2. All the information on a speciﬁc policy feature is summarised in a separate low-
level index using a set of weights to aggregate it.
3. The low-level indexes are aggregated into two medium-level indexes for each of
three types of possible competition law infringements and for mergers. The ﬁrst one
summarises the institutional features of the competition policy and the second one sum-
marises the enforcement features.
4. The medium-level indexes are then aggregated to form a number of different sum-
mary indexes, which we generically refer to as the CPIs. More speciﬁcally we calculate
(for each jurisdiction and each year in the sample):
- one index that measures the deterrence effect of the competition policy with regard
to all antitrust infringements (the Antitrust CPI) and one that measures its deterrence
effect in the merger control process (the Mergers CPI);
- one index that assesses the deterrence effect of the institutional features (the Insti-
tutional CPI) and one that assesses the deterrence effect of the enforcement features (the
Enforcement CPI);17
16We are aware that there might be complementarities among different aspects of competition policy that
we may miss by using this linearly additive speciﬁcation. However, we believe that it would be difﬁcult to
choose a more precise approximation of the relationship that could exist between these variables. Hence,
we decided to select this aggregation form that has the advantage of being simple, transparent and at the
same time rather complete.
17The Enforcement CPI summarises information about the quality and quantity of resources available
to CAs, together with information about the level of activity and the criminal sanctions imposed. The
possibility to have wider enforcement information included in our index was limited by data availability
problems.
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- a single index that incorporates all the information on the overall deterrence effect
of the competition policy regime in a jurisdiction (the Aggregate CPI).
D. The construction and composition of the low-level indices
The ﬁrst two steps in the construction of the CPIs consist of calculating the low-level
indexes. Each of these indexes includes information on one of the sets of policy variables
discussed above (in section II), which we believe affect the level of deterrence engendered
by the competition policy of a jurisdiction, and hence its effectiveness. We calculate sep-
arate indexes for each of the three possible competition law infringements (i.e. hard-core
cartels, abuses of dominance and agreements other than hard-core cartels) and for merg-
ers to take into account the differences in the legal framework and, where possible, in the
enforcement.18 We mentioned earlier that each piece of information is assigned a score
on a scale of 0-1 against a benchmark of generally agreed best practice (from worst to
best). When a data entry is quantitative it is normalised by dividing it by the highest cor-
responding value held by any CAs in the sample, so that even quantitative information
assumes a value between 0-1. More details on how we assigned the scores can be found in
thenext subsections. When an index includes more than one piece of information, these
(or more precisely their scores) are weighted and summed together to obtain a single
value for each low-level index. The weights used for the aggregation of the scores are
based on our own evaluation of the importance of the various data. Details on how the
subjective weights are chosen can be found in subsection IV.H. In order to check whether
our choice of the weights has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the results, we also use a different
set of weights, generated by a statistical technique: the factor analysis. This robustness
check shows that the results do not signiﬁcantly vary, when this alternative set of weights
is employed (see section VIII for more details). We move now to the description of the
low-level indexes that form the basis of our CPIs. Table 1 shows the content of each of
the low-level indexes. The numbers in brackets refer to the weights used to sum up the
information contained in each index.
18This was not always easy. For example the CAs rarely have separate divisions that deal with the dif-
ferent types of infringements, hence we could not obtain separate data on the resources employed to police
each one.
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Independence of the competition authorities
An important determinant of the effectiveness of a competition policy regime is the
independence of the CA with respect to political or economic interests. A CA which takes
into account interests that are (potentially) in contrast with those that should guide its
activity is more likely to commit errors when reaching decisions.19 Thus, this ﬁrst index
measures the independence of a CA by considering its institutional status, as well as
the role that the government plays in the adjudication of competition infringements and
in the assessment of mergers. With respect to competition cases, in some jurisdictions
separate bodies are responsible for the investigation of a case and for its adjudication.
Hence, this low-level index has two components: i) the institutional nature of the body
that performs the investigation, and ii) the institutional nature of the body that makes the
decision and the role of the government in this decision-making process.
i)Ajurisdictionscores1whenthebodythatperformstheinvestigationhastotalstatu-
tory independence, because it is either a court or an independent agency. It scores 0
if it is a ministerial agency/department. An intermediate score is given to the case in
which the investigation can be performed by either an independent agency or a ministe-
rial agency/department.
ii) A jurisdiction scores 1 when the body that takes the decision has total statutory
independence and the government cannot over-rule a decision by the relevant CA, it
scores 0.5 when the adjudicator has total statutory independence but the government can
19There is a wide and consistent literature that discusses the importance of having an independent com-
petition authority in line with our explanation; see Genoud C. Toward a content and contextual approach
of delegation, or how and why we should open the regulation black box ECPR Joint Session of Workshops,
Edinburgh (2003), Majone D. Regulating Europe Routledge (1996), Oliveira G., E.L. Machado, and L.M.
Novaes Aspect of the independence of Regulatory Agency and Competition Advocacy in Mehta S.P. and
S.J. Evenett (Eds.) Politics Triumph Economics? Political Economic Regulation and the Implementation of
Competition Law and Economic Regulation in Developing Countries, Academic Foundation (2009), OECD
Optimal Design of a Competition Agency Note by the Secretariat CCNM/GF/COMP (2003); OECD De-
signing Independent and Accountable Regulatory Authorities for High Quality Regulation(2005), OECD
European Commission Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy (2005), Voigt S. The Economic Effects
of Competition Policy on Development Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators, 45(8) Journal
of Development Studies, (2009) at 12251248. Gilardi makes a slightly different argument in that he claims
that independent regulatory and competition agencies are more protected from political and electoral in-
ﬂuence and thus they can adjust their regulatory policies in the long term and create a more stable and
predictable regulatory environment; see Gilardi F. Policy credibility and Delegation to Independent Regu-
latory Agencies: a comparative empirical 9(6) Journal of European Public Policy (2002) at 873893, Gilardi F.
Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe: a Cross-Sectional Comparison, Paper
prepared for the workshop Delegation in Contemporary Democracies ECPR Joint Session of Workshops,
Edinburgh (2003).
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over-rule a decision, and it scores 0 if it is a ministerial agency/ department.
We give equal weights to each piece of information. In the case of merger control,
there are jurisdictions in which one body ﬁrst performs a high-level evaluation also re-
ferred to as Phase 1 and another one undertakes, when deemed necessary by the ﬁrst one,
a more detailed examination also referred to as Phase 2. Hence, in the case of mergers
this index includes: i) the institutional nature of the bodies involved in Phase 1 and Phase
2; and ii) the role of the government.
i) A jurisdiction scores 1 when the bodies that reach a decision in Phase 1 and Phase 2
(iftheseareseparate)areindependent, 0ifbothbodiesareministerialagencies/departments,
and 0.5 if one is independent and the other is not. If there is only one body, the score is 1
if it is independent and 0 if it is not.
ii) The score is 1 if the government cannot over-rule a decision on a merger, and 0 if it
can.
Also in this case, we give equal weights to each piece of information.
Separation of powers
A second relevant characteristic is the degree of separation between the body that
performs the investigation on an allegedly anticompetitive behaviour (or merger) and
the one which takes the decision on whether the behaviour should be sanctioned (or the
merger blocked). The stronger the separation between prosecutor and adjudicator (e.g.
when the investigation is made by an independent public body and the decision by a
court) the more balanced the decision is likely to be and this, in turn, lowers the prob-
ability of an error.20 Similarly it matters whether the appeal court i.e. the court that is
responsible for reviewing the CAs decision is a specialised body with competence only
in competition matters or whether it is the appeal body for all judicial decisions.21 (e.g.
20For an in-depth discussion of the role of separation of powers in the context of institutions in general
see Posner R. Comment: Responding to Gordon Tullok 2 Research in Law and Policy Studies (1988), Block
M., J. Parker, O. Vyborna and L. Dusek An Experimental Comparison of Adversarial and Inquisitorial Pro-
cedural Regimes 2(1) American Law and Economic Review (2000) at 170-94;, Dewatripont M. and J. Tirole
Advocates 107(1) Journal of Political Economy (1999) at 139. Wils W. The Combination of the Investiga-
tive and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: a Legal and
Economic Analysis 27(2) World Competition (2004) at 20124; and Neven D.J, Competition Economics and
Antitrust in Europe, Economic Policy (2006) at 741791 discuss the importance of separation of powers with
regard to competition and regulatory institutions.
21See OECD, Private Remedies, Policy Roundtables, Paris (2007).
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OECD 2007). A specialised body is formed by individuals that have competence in those
speciﬁc subjects and are therefore better able to consider all the details and correctly eval-
uate all the evidence when deciding on a case. This low-level index captures information
on these elements, more precisely on: i) the existence of a separation between the adjudi-
cator and the prosecutor, which in our view reduces the bias in the decision; ii) the nature
of the appeal body; and only in the case of mergers iii) whether the body that decides if a
merger should undergo a Phase 2 investigation and the body responsible for undertaking
the Phase 2 investigation are separate.
i) A jurisdiction scores 0 when the same body adjudicates and prosecutes, while it
scores 1 if these two activities are performed by separate bodies.
ii) A jurisdiction scores 1 when the relevant appeal court specialises in competition
matters and 0 when this court deals with appeals on all kinds of decisions.22
iii) A jurisdiction scores 0 when the same body performs Phase 1 and Phase 2 investi-
gations, and scores 1 when two different bodies undertake the two activities.
In the low-level indexes for the competition law infringements we give a weight of
2/3 to the scores on the degree of separation between adjudicator and prosecutor and a
weight of 1/3 to the nature of the appeal court. In the index for mergers, where we have
three elements, we give equal weight to each of them.
Quality of the law
We deﬁne deterrence as the prevention of conducts that reduce social welfare, how-
ever the latter may not always be the conducts that are declared illegal by the competition
legislation. Rules are indeed imperfect as they can ban conducts that are competitive, or
allow conducts that are anticompetitive. Hence, the third policy variable we need to con-
sider is the quality of these rules, i.e. the quality of the law on the books. This is a matter
of judgement, which makes measuring this policy variable extremely difﬁcult. However,
we can observe whether the competition legislation (and the soft law that disciplines its
22In most jurisdictions, all mergers that undergo some form of control are ﬁrst subject to a general in-
vestigation, referred to as Phase 1. Those mergers that raise concerns and that may be blocked or may
require remedies, are subject to a second more detailed analysis, called a Phase 2 investigation. In some
jurisdictions the same body that decides on whether a merger should undergo a Phase 2 investigation, also
performs this investigation. In other jurisdictions, a separate body is responsible for undertaking the Phase
2 investigation. The decision on the outcome of each investigation can be made by the same body that
investigates or from a separate one.
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actual application, e.g. guidelines) has rules that make the partition between legal and
illegal conducts closer to their effect on social welfare. In the case of antitrust infringe-
ments, this index focuses on: the standard of proof that is required when deciding on a
speciﬁc type of violation, which can be a per-se prohibition or a rule-of-reason approach;
and the goals that inform the decision-making process. For abuses of dominance, we
consider the standard of proof required for a price exclusionary practice, predation, a
non-price exclusionary practice, and refusal to deal. If, in assessing each of these alleged
abuses, a jurisdiction applies a rule-of-reason standard and it considers only economic
goals it scores 1. The reason is that, in this case, the CA decides whether there has been
an abuse on the basis of the effects of the behaviour rather than by relying on set rules.
On the other hand, if it imposes a per-se prohibition a jurisdiction scores 0. An interme-
diate score applies if the CA applies a rule-of-reason standard, but it also considers non-
economic goals when evaluating the effects of the action (e.g. the effect of the behaviour
on the level of employment).23 For anticompetitive agreements other than hard-core car-
tels, we only consider the practice of exclusive contracts, because this is very common in
most markets. If, in assessing such an infringement, a CA requires that the actual effects
of the behaviour are proven and it considers only economic goals when evaluating the
effects, it scores 1. If it also considers non-economic goals it scores 0.5, and if it imposes
a per se prohibition it scores 0.24 For hard-core cartels, instead, a per-se ban scores 1. In-
stead, if the imposition of a sanction requires showing that the cartel had an effect on the
market and the CA considers only economic goals, the score is 0.5, otherwise, if it consid-
ers also non-economic goals, the score is 0. The reason why the scoring is reversed in the
case of cartels is the gravity of this practice and of its consequences, which, as is generally
agreed, calls for a stricter rule.25 The index for hard-core cartels includes also a second
element: the leniency program. A CA that has such a program is more likely to discover
and deter a higher number of cartels.26 Hence, a jurisdiction scores 1 if it has a leniency
23See Voigt above n. 19.
24See Voigt id.
25See Motta above n. 6 and OECD, Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanction
against Cartels under National Competition Laws (2002).
26There exists a number of theoretical, empirical, and policy studies pointing to the leniency programs as
one of the most successful policy tools with which to ﬁght hard-core cartels. See Aubert C., W. Kovacic, and
P. Rey, The Impact of Leniency and Whistleblowers Program on Cartel 24 International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization (2006); Harrington J. Optimal Corporate Leniency Program 56(2) Journal of Industrial
Economics (2008) at 215216; ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notiﬁcation Procedures and Review
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program for cartel whistleblowers and 0 if it does not. The merger control index has a
different composition as it is based on the characteristics of the notiﬁcation obligation,
and on the criteria used for assessing concentrations.
i) With regard to notiﬁcation, the absence of any obligation to notify is scored 0, while
a score of 0.33 is given to the CAs that impose such an obligation but have no minimum
threshold, since the lack of such a limit renders it more difﬁcult for CAs to focus resources
on important cases.27 Higher scores are given when there is such a threshold: 0.66 is
given to a CA with a minimum threshold based on market shares, and 1 to a CA with a
minimum threshold based on the ﬁrms turnover. The reason why turnover is considered
to be best practice is that it is easier to apply and is less open to uncertainty.
ii) The application of an efﬁciency defence in the competitive assessment of mergers is
scored 1, because it allows us to take into consideration all the economic consequences of
the concentration on the market and on consumers. The absence of any efﬁciency defence
is scored 0.
In the aggregation process, we give equal weights to both elements.
Powers during investigations
This index, which is calculated only for competition law infringements, measures the
type of powers a CA holds during the investigation phase. These include i) the power
to impose, or request, interim measures, that allows preventing any anticompetitive be-
haviour from leading to serious and irreversible damages while a ﬁnal decision is being
reached. Furthermore, they include ii) the powers to gather information by inspecting
the premises of the ﬁrms under investigation and the private premises of their employ-
ees, as well as by wiretapping conversations. The stronger the latter powers, the more
and the better the information at the CAs disposal is, and thus the higher the probability
of detection and the lower the probability of errors, especially type II errors.
www.internationalcompetitiononnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mnprecpractices.pdf (2006); Motta M.
and M. Polo, Leniency Program and Cartel Prosecution 21 International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion (2003)at 347379; Motta above n. 6; OECD Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanction and
Leniency Programmes (2002); OECD, Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels, above n.
25; Spagnolo G. Divide and Imperia: Optimal Leniency Programs CEPR Discussion Paper No 4840 (2004);
Spagnolo G., Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust, in Buccirossi P. (Ed.) Handbook of Antitrust Eco-
nomics (MIT Press, Cambridge MA 2008).
27See ICN id.
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i) With respect to interim measures, a jurisdiction scores 1 if it has interim measures
and 0 if it does not.
ii) With regard to information gathering powers, a jurisdiction scores 1 if both busi-
ness and private premises can be inspected, 0 if none of them can be inspected, and 0.5 if
only business premises can be inspected, as the wider the powers the more thorough the
investigation.
We give a weight of 1/4 to the availability of interim measures and of 3/4 to the types
of information gathering powers held by the CAs. With respect to hard-core cartels, the
power to impose interim measures is not relevant. Hence, this index only measures the
types of powers to gather information. Moreover, we do not build this low-level index for
mergers because investigative powers are not very relevant in merger cases as these are
ex-ante investigations, which do not involve infringement of legal obligations but rather
a request for approval for a business operation.
Sanctions and damages written on the books
One important element in deterring anticompetitive behaviours is the credible threat
of ﬁnancial losses that ﬁrms (and their employees) can expect to suffer as a consequence
of a conviction.28 This low-level index considers i) the range of potential sanctions that
offenders ﬁrms and ii) their employees are faced with and iii) whether affected parties can
sue for damages. The overall index is composed in equal parts by the scores of these three
elements. These losses are determined by the sum of the sanctions that can be imposed
28For a theoretical analysis of the role of the sanctions in achieving deterrence see Becker above n. 11;
Landes, W.M. Optimal Sanction for Antitrust Violation, 50 The University of Chicago Law Review (1983)
at 625678; Simon M.J. and G. J. Werden Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison 32 Antitrust Bulletin (1987)
at 917937; Geradin D. and D. Henry, The EC Fining Policy for Violation of Competition Law: an empiri-
cal review of Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts Judgement in Cseres K.J., M.P.
Schinkel. and F.O.W. Vogelaar (Eds.) Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy: Economic and Legal
Implication of the Tendency to Criminalize Antitrust Enforcement in the EU Member States, (London, Ed-
war Elgar, 2005); Kobayashi, B., Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations 69 George Washington Law Review, (2001), 715;
Buccirossi P. and G. Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go
to Prison in V. Goshal and J. Stennek (Eds.), The Political Economy of Antitrust, (Elvesier, North Holland
2007); Schinkel M.P. Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe 30(4) World Competition (2007) at. 539572.
Empirical analyses can be found in Craycraft C. Antitrust Sanctions and Firm Ability to Pay 12 Review
of Industrial Organization (1994) at 171183; Craycraft J.L., J.C. Gallo, K.G. Dau Schmidt and C.J. Parker
Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A study of Law and Economics 16 Research in Law and Eco-
nomics, (1997) at 2571; Connor J.M Optimal Deterrence and Private Antitrust Enforcement Mimeo Purdue
University, (2005).
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by the CA, and/or the court, (e.g. ﬁnes, imprisonment, disqualiﬁcation, damages), to
which it is necessary to add any damage repayment to the affected parties, because what
determinesthebehaviourofaﬁrmarethetotallossesimposedbyagivencourseofaction.
It is important to highlight that the level of the ﬁnancial loss depends on two elements:
the law on the books and how this is enforced. For example, the sanctions imposed by the
CA (or a court) depend: on the criteria set out in the law regarding the type of intended
sanctions and maximum level they can reach, and on how these criteria are applied (i.e.
their enforcement). If the monetary ﬁne can reach up to 10 per cent of the turnover of a
ﬁrm, but no ﬁne of this level has ever been imposed, even when a serious breach of the
law took place, as such ﬁrms will not expect to have to pay such a ﬁgure, despite what
the law says. This index only refers to what is set out in the law. We consider separately
the level that the actually imposed sanctions. Since no sanctions are imposed following
merger investigations, there is no such index for mergers.29
i) With regard to the sanctions that can be imposed on ﬁrms, this index considers
how the maximum level of the ﬁne is set: the score is 1 if this limit is expressed as a
proportion of the turnover of the offending ﬁrm or of the illicit gain obtained from the
infringement, 0.66 if the level of the ﬁne is left to the discretion of the adjudicator, 0.33 if
the maximum level of the ﬁne is set in absolute terms, and 0 if no ﬁnes are imposed.30 For
theabusesofdominanceindexwealsoincludethetypesofsanctionsthatcanbeimposed.
A jurisdiction scores 0 if neither monetary ﬁnes nor structural remedies can be imposed,
0.75 if only monetary sanctions are possible, and 1 if both are allowed. To obtain a single
score for the sanction to ﬁrms, we give a weight of 1/3 to the type of possible sanctions
and of 2/3 to the criterion for its calculation.31
ii) With regard to sanctions on the employees of the offending ﬁrms, the index con-
siders both the types of sanctions and their maximum level:
- for monetary ﬁnes, the score is 0 if no such ﬁnes can be imposed and 1 if there is no
explicit limit to this type of sanction; instead, if there is a maximum value set by law, the
score is the normalisation of this value, which is obtained by dividing this value by the
maximum value in the sample;
29There are ﬁnes only for breaching procedural obligations, such as the duty to notify (when this exists),
and for completing a merger that was prohibited. These, however, are very limited.
30These weights are based on the discussion put forward by OECD, Fighting Hard Core Cartels above n.
26, at 11 and OECD Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels above n. 25
31Again these insights are based on the considerations expressed by OECD id
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- for disqualiﬁcation, the score is 1 if the employee can be disqualiﬁed from the posi-
tion of director and 0 if this is not possible;
- for jail sentences, the score is 0 if the individual cannot be imprisoned; in all other
cases, the score is the maximum jail term that the courts can impose, divided by the
longest jail term available in any jurisdiction enclosed in the sample.
To obtain a single score for this element of the index, we have given a weight of 3/10
to monetary ﬁnes, a weight of 2/10 to disqualiﬁcation and a weight of 5/10 to imprison-
ment.
iii) With regard to private actions, the score is 0 if no private actions are possible,
while it is 1 if both affected ﬁrms and affected individuals can appeal to a court for a
damage payment and if class actions are possible. The intermediate scores 0.33 and 0.66
are given only if the affected ﬁrms, or both the affected individuals and the affected ﬁrms
respectively, can undertake a private action, but class actions are not available.
Resources
The effectiveness of the enforcement activity of a CA is likely to be affected by the
ﬁnancial and human resources devoted to it. This index measures both the quantity of
these resources, i.e. i) budget and ii) total staff of the CAs, and their iii) quality, more
speciﬁcally the number of economists with a relevant PhD and of qualiﬁed lawyers.
When a jurisdiction has two CAs we consider their resources jointly. Since all this data is
quantitative we normalise the original data between 0-1 in the following way:
i) The budget is divided by the nominal GDP of the country (both expressed in US
dollars using PPP exchange rates), so as to allow a comparison between countries of dif-
ferentsizesandlevelsofeconomicdevelopment. Thisvalueisthendividedbythehighest
corresponding value held by any CAs in the sample.
ii) The number of staff members is divided by the real GDP of the country, to allow
a meaningful comparison between countries. This value is then divided by the highest
corresponding value held by any CAs in the sample.
iii) Both the number of economists with a PhD and the number of qualiﬁed lawyers
are divided by the number of total staff. This value is then divided by the highest corre-
sponding value held by any CAs in the sample.
Wegiveaweightof1/2tothebudgetdata, aweightof1/4tothedataonthetotalstaff
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and a weight of 1/4 to the data on the composition of this staff. This index has the same
value for all the three possible infringements, as well as for merger control, because we
do not have separate data on the resources devoted to each type of practice. This is due
to many CAs not having separate divisions that deal with different types of behaviours
and/or not keeping a record of the personnel and resources of different divisions.
Actually imposed sanctions and cases
How effective sanctions are as a deterrent depends not just on their type and level as
set in the law, but also on the strictness of sanctions that have actually been issued. Un-
fortunately, data on this subject are scarce.32 We obtained only limited data for hard-core
cartels. These refer to the maximum jail term imposed on the employees of the offending
ﬁrms (for those countries in which such a sanction is possible). In order to score this data
we divide the relevant ﬁgure by the highest one imposed by any CAs in the sample.33
The credibility of a CA in preventing anticompetitive behaviours/mergers also de-
pends on how active it is in assessing mergers and investigating complaints of infringe-
ments. This level of activity is proxied with the number of cartels investigations opened
and the number of mergers examined, each divided by the real GDP of the relevant coun-
try, as the size of the economy can have an impact on the absolute number of anticom-
petitive behaviours. We then normalise this ratio by dividing it by the highest one in the
sample.34 When a country has two CAs we consider the number of cartel investigations
performed by both of them.
For hard-core cartels we give a weight of 2/3 to the data on the jail term and 1/3 to
the number of cases investigated.
32
33CAs do not keep easily accessible records of ﬁnes and other sanctions, especially if one wants to relate
them to seriousness and the duration of the infringement or to the magnitude of the affected commerce.
In addition, in most instances, the CAs decisions have been appealed and it is difﬁcult to track down the
outcome of the appeal, which is the one that really matters. This element of the indicator could beneﬁt from
further work.
34The reason why we have not also included the number of cases of other types of antitrust infringements
is that, unfortunately, it has proved impossible to collect consistent data on the number of investigations
carried out on abuses and agreements other than cartels.
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Rationale behind the subjective weights
In the preceding sections we indicated the weights that we used to aggregate the
single pieces of information to construct the low-level indexes. We now explain how
we select them. The general rule we follow is a sort of Principle of insufﬁcient reason,
whereby whenever we do not have speciﬁc reasons to believe that one feature matters
more than others, we give equal weights to all elements in the low-level index.35 There
are six cases in which this neutrality rule is not applied. These are explained below.
1) In the low-level indexes on the separation of powers for all antitrust infringements,
Separation between adjudicator and prosecutor is weighted 2/3, while Nature of appeal
court is weighted only 1/3. The rationale behind this choice is that the appeal court does
not intervene in all cases, as the undertaking may not appeal. In addition the appeal
decision is taken much later, with respect to the decision of the CA. Hence, the nature of
an appeal court should have a weaker and less certain inﬂuence on the effectiveness of a
competition policy regime.
2) In the low-level indexes on the powers to investigate for abuses of dominance and
for agreements other than cartels, Availability of interim measures we give a weight 1/4,
while for Combination of powers we give a weight of 3/4. This choice rests on the fact
that, while the latter is crucial for the CAs intervention since it affects how thorough an
investigation can be, the former only affects the timeliness of the intervention, but does
not alter the probability of errors.
3) In the low-level indexes on sanctions and damages for abuses of dominance, the
sanctions on ﬁrms include two elements: the types of sanctions that can be imposed and
their level. To obtain a single score we give a weight of 1/3 to the type of possible sanc-
tions and of 2/3 to the criterion for its calculation, because we believe that the latter has a
stronger impact on deterrence.36
4) In the low-level indexes on sanctions and damages, we have different types of
sanctions that can be imposed on offending individuals. To obtain a single score we give
a weight of 3/10 to monetary ﬁnes, a weight of 2/10 to disqualiﬁcation and a weight
35For a discussion of this principle in statistics in a historical perspective see Stigler S. The History of
Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900 (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 1986).
The principle of insufﬁcient reason was renamed the principle of indifference by Keynes J.M., A treatise on
Probability, (MacMillan,1921).
36The reason why we believe that the criterion for setting the level of the ﬁne is so important is that this
most affects the incentives faced by a ﬁrm in the course of its decision process.
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of 5/10 to imprisonment. These weights are based on our view that monetary ﬁnes can
be paid by the companies the individuals work for, while prison sentences have to be
undergone by the individuals found guilty.
5) In the low-level indexes on resources we give a weight of 1/2 to the budget data,
a weight of 1/4 to the data on the total staff and a weight of 1/4 to the data on the com-
position of this staff. The reason is that we believe that the monetary resources are those
that most affect the means that a CA has to undertake its investigative and enforcement
activities.
6) In the low-level indexes on cases for hard-core cartels we give a weight of 2/3 to
the data on the maximum jail term and 1/3 to the number of cases investigated, because
we believe that the former data is more important in signalling the toughness of a com-
petition regime.
E. The construction of the medium level indexes
The next step in the construction of the CPIs consist of vertically aggregating the
low-level indexes to obtain, for each type of infringement and for mergers, a medium-
level index that encompasses all the information on the institutional features as well as
a medium-level index that encompasses all the information on the enforcement features.
The value of each of these eight medium-level indexes is given by the weighted average
of the low-level indexes they comprise. These weights are shown in Table 2.
The weights are chosen so as to attribute greater importance to the low-level indexes
that incorporate the most important policy features. Hence, in the institutional feature
index, in the case of the antitrust infringements, we give a weight of 1/3 to sanctions
and damages, while we give a weight of 1/6 to all the other features. This is due to
the fact that sanctions seem to have a stronger impact on deterrence.37 In the enforcement
feature index, we give a lower weight to the data on the number of cases if at all available
because we believe that the resources are a better indicator of how active a CA is in its
competition enforcement activities.
37See Levitt S.D., Deterrence in Wilson J.Q. and Petersilia J., (Eds.) Crime (ICS Press, 2001), Levitt S.D.
Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106(6) Journal of Political Economy (1998) at 11561185; Levitt S.D. and T.J.
Miles Economic Contribution to the Understanding of Crime 2 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences
(2006) at 147164.
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F. The construction of the high-level indexes
The last step consists of aggregating the medium-level indexes in a set of high-level
indexes, the CPIs, that incorporate all the information on the deterrence effect of the com-
petition policy regime in a jurisdiction in a speciﬁc year. Table 3 shows these CPIs and the
weights (in brackets) used in the aggregation process.
First, we calculate the Antitrust CPI as the weighted average of all the medium-level
indexes relative to antitrust infringements, and the Mergers CPI as the weighted average
of two medium-level indexes relative to merger control. We then calculate the Institu-
tional CPI as the weighted average of the four medium-level indexes relative to the insti-
tutional features, and the Enforcement CPI as the weighted average of four medium-level
indexes relative to the enforcement features. Finally, we calculate an index that incorpo-
rates all the information on the deterrence effect of the competition policy regime in a
jurisdiction in a speciﬁc year (the Aggregate CPI).
G. Data
In this section we explain how we collected the data on the relevant competition pol-
icy features that we employed to calculate the CPIs. Most of the data were directly ob-
tained from the CAs operating in the 13 jurisdiction included in our sample.38 We sub-
mitted a tailored questionnaire to each of them with questions on the institutional frame-
work of their competition policy regime and on how this evolved over time (to capture
any changes that happened over the ten-year period 19952005). In addition, we asked
them about the quantity and quality of the resources they employed to enforce the com-
petition legislation over that time period, as well as about the sanctions imposed on ﬁrms
and their employees and the cases/mergers they have investigated. The data from this
survey were integrated with information derived from the country studies carried out by
38We surveyed only the CAs which are either independent public bodies or ministerial agen-
cies/departments, and did not survey the courts (though we collected data on their powers and activi-
ties). The bodies that we surveyed are: Competition Bureau (Canada); Urad pro ochranu hospodarske
souteze (Czech Republic); Directorate General for Competition Affairs (European Union); Conseil de la
Concurrence (France); Direction Gnrale de la Concurrence (France); Bundeskartellaamt (Germany); Gaz-
dasgi Versenyhivatal (Hungary); Autorit Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italy); Japan Fair Trade
Commission (Japan); Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands); Servicio de Defensa de la Com-
petencia (Spain); Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (Spain); Konkurrensverket (Sweden); Ofﬁce of
Fair trading (UK); Competition Commission (UK), Federal Trade Commission (US); Antitrust Division -
Department of Justice (US).
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the OECD in the context of its reviews of regulatory reforms, from the chapters on com-
petition and economic performance in the OECD Economic Surveys and from the CAs
own websites.
Missing data
Despite the active collaboration of most CAs, it was not possible to collect all data on
the enforcement characteristics of the competition policy necessary to build the CPIs for
the period considered (19952005). Hence our database had some missing observations.
In order to ﬁll them in, we asked the CAs to provide us with an imputation of the missing
observations based either on other data at their disposal or on their historical knowledge
of the trends. When this was not possible, we performed some very limited imputation of
the missing data, whenever this was allowed by the characteristics of the other available
data on that speciﬁc feature. More speciﬁcally, we performed two types of imputation.
The ﬁrst consisted of extending a series of data over time, if we had enough data (at
least ﬁve observations) and if it was possible to trace a clear trend in them. For example,
if we had data on the level of a CAs budget from 1996 to 2000 (i.e. 5 years) and this
was constantly growing, we calculated the budget for 2001 and 2002 using the average
growth rate observed in the available data. We calculated only two of the missing data
because we believe that our imputation should not exceed 50 per cent (i.e. since we had
5 observations we calculated 2 more, whereas if we had had 7 observations we could
have calculated the 3 missing ones). The second imputation consisted of exploiting the
information from other data to impute a different, unavailable, series of data. We used
this imputation criterion only for two speciﬁc variables: the level of a CAs budget for
competition activities and the number of its staff devoted to competition activities. Where
we only had data on the budget for competition activities but not on the staff, and had
data on the overall budget of the CA and on the total staff employed by the CA, we used
the ratio between the budget in competition activities and the total budget to impute the
fraction of the staff employed in competition activity. Despite this work, we were not
able to ﬁll all the existing gaps. This means that in some cases we did not have all the
information necessary to calculate a speciﬁc index. To avoid calculating indexes whose
value could be altered by the lack of information, we chose not to calculate an index (both
at the low, medium and high level of the pyramid) if 50 per cent or more of the relevant
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information content was missing. For example, the low-level index on resources includes
information on the CAs budget with a weight of 1/2, on quality of its staff with a weight
of 1/4, and on the composition of its staff with a weight of 1/4. If we did not have the data
on the level of the budget for a given country in a given year then we did not calculate
this index because half of the information content was missing. On the contrary, if we
had no information on the composition of the staff, we could still calculate the index as
only a quarter of the information content would be missing, i.e. we would be above the
50 per cent threshold. In cases like these, however, we adjusted the weights to account
for this missing observation. In our example, the budget was given a weight of 2/3 and
the quality of the staff a weight of 1/3. We made only one exception to this rule, in that
we did not calculate the Aggregate CPI if we could not calculate the relevant Enforcement
CPI, even if this just accounted for 1/3 of the overall information content of the Aggregate
index. We decided that in the case of the Aggregate CPI it was important to have data on
both the institutional and enforcement features.
The EU
OursampleincludesnineEuropeancountries, whicharepartoftheEuropeanUnion.39
Hence, in these countries the EU competition policy works alongside their national com-
petition policy. This means that, in order to correctly evaluate the effectiveness of the
competition policy regime in each Member State it is necessary to consider both the na-
tional and the EU regime. Therefore for these countries, we also built a set of CPIs, which
incorporate information on both the national and the EU competition policy. However,
since we have no information on the EU enforcement features, we have only been able
to calculate this set of indexes for the institutional features. These indexes have been cal-
culated as the simple average of the countrys Institutional CPI and the EU Institutional
CPI.
H. Robustness of the indexes
TheconstructionoftheCPIscontainsacrucialelementofsubjectiveevaluation, which
consists of the set of weights employed to combine the information gathered at each level
39These are France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK and since 2004 also the Czech
Republic and Hungary.
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of aggregation. There is thus a risk that the value of the CPIs may be driven by the
adopted subjective weighting scheme. In the previous sections we justiﬁed our choice of
weights (see section IV.H). Nonetheless, to verify if the CPIs are sensitive to the adopted
weighting scheme, we employed a statistical technique, the factor analysis, to derive a
new set of CPIs where the weights assigned to each piece of information are totally driven
by the characteristics of the data themselves. The factor analysis is a statistical method
which groups together variables that are highly correlated (and thus, to some extent, re-
dundant) into a number of latent factors. The most important output of the factor analy-
sis is the matrix of loadings. The loadings measure the correlation between the variables
and the factors, and allow the assignment of each variable to a given factor based on the
strength of their correlation. Different techniques can be used within the framework of
factor analysis to compute the loadings and to estimate the factors. Our analysis is based
on the methodology employed by the OECD when calculating the PMR indicators.40 This
methodology involves a number of steps:
1. The ﬁrst step consists of grouping the variables according to different areas of the
competition policy: hard-core cartels, abuses, other agreements, and mergers, with no
distinction between institutional and enforcement features.
2. The second step consists of extracting the factors i.e. identifying the number of
factors necessary to represent the original data using the principal component method.
With this method, the factors are chosen so that the ﬁrst one explains as much information
contained in the original data as possible; the second factor is orthogonal to the ﬁrst and
explains as much residual information as possible, and so on. The exact number of factors
that should be retained can be decided by the researcher. Yet, usually one keeps adding
factors until the explanatory power of the last factor included remains above a certain
threshold.41
3. The third step consists of the rotation of the factors, which permits a better inter-
pretation of the results. The rotation allows us to get loadings that are closer to 1 or 0,
thus allowing us to more easily assign a selected variable to a unique factor. We use the
varimax rotation technique, which preserves the orthogonality between the factors.
40See Conway P,.V. Janod and G. Nicoletti, Product Market Regulation, above n. 3.
41The threshold is set with reference to the value of the eingenvalue associated to each factor. In most
applications and statistical packages (e.g. STATA, which we used) that perform factor analyses, the level of
threshold is set by default to the value of 1.
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4. The fourth step consists of the construction of the factors. We construct the factors
as the weighted average of the original variables, where the weights are the normalised
squared factor loadings of each variables.
5. The ﬁfth step consists of the aggregation of the factors in order to have a single
indicator for each of the areas of the competition policy (hard-core cartels, abuses, other
agreements, and merger control). The factors are weighted according to the proportion of
the overall variance of the data explained by each one and summed one to the other.
6. Finally, we run the factor analysis on these four indicators again (repeating the
procedure described above) to calculate the aggregate CPI.
Table 4 shows the output of the factor analysis for one of the areas of competition
policy: hard-core cartels. In the ﬁrst column, we report the entire list of variables on
which the factor analysis has been performed. All the institutional and the enforcement
variables have been included. The principal component method allows us to identify
four separate factors that capture 73 per cent of the variability in the original data. The
columns called factor loading show the loadings for each factor, which measure the cor-
relation between each variable and that speciﬁc factor, while the third column, called
weights of variables, show the weights that each variable gets in the computation of the
factor, based on the normalised squared of the factor loadings. The four factors are then
aggregatedasaweightedsum, wheretheweightisproportionaltotheexplanatorypower
of the factor with respect to the original data, captured by the normalised sum of the
squared factor loadings.
A similar procedure is used for the other areas of competition policy: abuses, other
agreements and mergers. Then we run the factor analysis on the results again to obtain
the aggregate CPI.
I. Results
In this section we present the results and discuss the CPIs. We start by showing, in
Figures 1 to 6, the values of the Institutional CPIs and the Enforcement CPIs for the juris-
dictions in our sample over the period 19952005.42 To allow for a clearer interpretation of
the results we include only a limited number of jurisdictions in each ﬁgure. Yet, to allow
42We were not able to collect any data on the enforcement features for the European Union, hence we
could not calculate the Enforcement CPI for this jurisdiction.
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readers to easily perform comparisons among them, we also report the simple average
in each ﬁgure. Figure 1 shows the Institutional CPIs for the three OECD countries in our
sample that are not part of the EU. They remain relatively stable over the period under
exam, but they differ considerably among each other. The one for the US takes very high
values (ranging between 0.74 and 0.76), which are constantly among the highest in the
sample and well above the sample average (ranging between 0.54 and 0.62); the values
for Canada are also above the sample average (ranging between 0.58 and 0.62), while
Japans values are very low (between 0.46 and 0.5).
Japan consistently has the lowest Institutional CPIs for the entire sample period. The
reason behind Japans low performance is manifold. First, Japan suffers from the lack of
a leniency program for cartel whistleblowers. Second, in Japan there is no separation
between the body that prosecutes violators of the antitrust law and the body that ad-
judicates such cases. Further elements are the absence of the possibility to start a class
action and the fact that the Japanese competition legislation envisages the consideration
of non strictly-economic goals when assessing the effects of abuses of dominance. The
index for Canada shows a rise between 1998 and 2000. This improvement in the institu-
tional features of the competition policy can be attributed to two major policy changes:
the introduction in 1999 of the power to wiretap during investigations on alleged antitrust
infringements and the introduction of a leniency program in 2000. Figure 2 shows the En-
forcement CPIs for the same three countries. While the Institutional CPIs tend to be stable
over time, because institutional changes are less frequent due to institutional inertia, the
evolution of the Enforcement CPIs for the three non-EU countries exhibits more cross-
time variation. Moreover, the ranking is different with respect to Figure 1, as Canada is
now the country with the highest values (ranging between 0.37 and 0.44). The main rea-
son why Canada has higher values than the US is due to the size of the annual budget for
competition activities (relative to the countrys GDP) and the number of the CAs employ-
ees (relative to the countrys GDP). However, the positive gap with respect to the US and
the sample average tends to shrink over time and, by the end of our sample period, it is
almost closed, with both countries as well as the average taking values close to 0.35.
Also in this case, Japan shows very low values for the Enforcement CPIs. This is
due to the low level of human and ﬁnancial resources available to the Japanese CA. The
signiﬁcant drop from a value of 0.13 to a value of 0.05 that can be observed between 1997
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and 1999 is due to a strong reduction in the number of mergers examined by the Japanese
CA, as a result of a change in legislation that modiﬁed the criteria for the notiﬁcation of
mergers. Figure 3 depicts the Institutional CPIs for the large EU member states in our
sample and for the EU itself. The CPIs for Spain (ranging between 0.48 and 0.54), France
(from0.46to0.52)andItaly(whichstaysstableonthevalueof0.51)areconsistentlybelow
the sample average (0.55 to 0.63). Germany, instead, shows a much better performance
(ranging between 0.67 and 0.7) and its Institutional CPI is well above the sample average.
The Institutional CPIs for the EU (from 0.52 to 0.65) and the UK (from 0.4 to 0.71) start
below the average (from 0.54 to 0.62), but grow signiﬁcantly over time until they pass it.
The most interesting features of this picture are the changes that characterise three of
the jurisdictions. The CPI for the UK jumps from the lowest level to a level well above
the sample average. This is due to the major changes that accompanied the introduction
of the Competition Act in 2000. Both Spain and France experience a substantial improve-
ment between 2000 and 2003. The former beneﬁted from the introduction of class action
in 2001 and of the powers to investigate business premises in 2003. In the latter country,
the quality of the institutional CPI improved because of the introduction of a leniency
program for cartel whistleblowers and as a consequence of the introduced obligation to
notifymergers. Finally, theInstitutionalCPIsfortheEUshowstwoupwardjumpsin1996
and in 2004. The ﬁrst one, in 1996, is due to the introduction of a leniency program for car-
tel whistleblowers, while the second, in 2004, is the result of the introduction of the power
to inspect private premises in the investigation of hard-core cartels and abuses. Figure 4
depicts the Enforcement CPIs for the same subset of jurisdictions. The ﬁgure does not
include the EU, as we were not able to collect data on its enforcement features. Moreover,
the data for France and Spain in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the sample are also missing. This
lack of information does not allow us a clear picture of the trend for these jurisdictions
Surprisingly, with respect to the enforcement characteristics of the competition policy,
Germany (ranging between 0.13 and 0.15) now ranks well below Italy (ranging between
0.18 and 0.28) and the UK (ranging between 0.21 and 0.4), and close to Spain (ranging
between 0.13 and 0.17). This is partially due to the fact that less ﬁnancial resources are
available to the German CA, but is also a consequence of its limited number of employ-
ees (with respect to the UK) and their lower level of skills (with respect to Italy). Another
relevant aspect to note is the consistent improvement in the overall deterrence properties
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of the enforcement features of the competition policy in the UK, as the introduction of
the Competition Act in 2000 was accompanied by a steady growth in the ﬁnancial and
human resources available to the two CAs. The decline of the constantly very low French
index (from 0.095 to 0.09) is due to a decrease in the overall number of employees, a re-
duction in the number of qualiﬁed economists and in the budget in real terms. Figure 5
depicts the Institutional CPIs for the small EU countries in our sample. Sweden is con-
sistently the country with the highest Institutional CPI values (ranging between 0.75 and
0.77) not just in this group but in the whole sample. The institutional CPIs for the other
jurisdictions start below the sample average. However, both the Czech Republic (rang-
ing between 0.38 and 0.66) and Hungary (ranging between 0.48 and 0.61) improve over
time and their Institutional CPI moves above the average. The Czech Republic experi-
ences a ﬁrst, considerable shift in 1996, due to the CA acquiring independence from the
government previously all decisions were taken by a ministerial department. A further
improvement takes place in 2004, when the power to investigate business premises is in-
troduced. In Hungary the major increase happens in 2000, and can be attributed to an
increase in the investigative powers of the CA and to a shift in the criterion used to set the
sanctions for antitrust infringements, which changed from a discretionary decision left to
the adjudicator to an approach based on the ﬁrms turnover.
The Netherlands did not have a CA before 1998. Hence, it was not possible to cal-
culate a CPI until that year. In subsequent years the index has been substantially stable
(ranging between 0.505 and 0.525). It experiences only a small jump in 2002, due to the
introduction of a leniency program for cartel whistleblowers. Figure 6 depicts the En-
forcement CPIs for the same subset of jurisdictions. Again, Sweden shows the highest
values of the Enforcement CPI in the ﬁrst half of the sample period, yet this consistently
declines over time (ranging between 0.6 and 0.4). The main reason behind this decline
is a reduction, in real terms, of the ﬁnancial and human resources available to its CA.
The Czech Republic shows a constant pattern over the entire sample period (ranging be-
tween 0.19 and 0.27), and its Enforcement CPI is always below the sample average, while
Hungary (ranging between 0.43 and 0.55) shows high values and exhibits a substantial
improvement in 2002, due to an increase in the budget of the CA. The continuous up-
ward trend for the Dutch Enforcement CPI (ranging between 0.22 and 0.78) is related to a
constant increase in the amount and the quality of its CAs resources.
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Figures 1 to 6 give a general idea of the quality of the competition policy in the juris-
dictions included in our sample and of the relevant changes that occurred over time. It
is evident from them that there is substantial cross-sectional and cross-time variation in
both the Institutional and Enforcement CPIs. In Figures 7, 8, and 9 we show the values of
the Aggregate CPIs for the same group of countries. We do not comment on these ﬁgures,
as from the description above it should be clear why the indexes follow the patterns ob-
served. However, it should be stressed that the institutional component of the aggregate
index takes a greater weight (2/3), hence the evolution of the Aggregate CPIs is mostly
explained by the institutional features of the competition policy. It should once more be
stressed that we could not calculate the Aggregate CPI for the European Union, as data
on the enforcement features of this jurisdiction were not available.
Table 5 shows the ranking of the 12 countries in our sample based on the average
value of their Aggregate CPIs over the years 1995 to 2005 and on its value in 2005. Sweden
and the US are the best-scoring countries and this is true for each year in the sample;
similarly, France, Spain and Japan constantly have the lowest scores. The UK and Canada
are the countries that experience the most marked changes. Table 6 shows the ranking
obtained when the Aggregate CPIs is calculated using the weights obtained through the
factor analysis. The rankings resulting from the use of the two weighting schemes are
broadly consistent. Sweden and the US rank at the top while France, Spain and Japan
lie at the bottom in both tables. Only Germany and the Netherlands have a different
ranking. As a further check we calculated the correlation coefﬁcient between the values
of the aggregate CPIs built with our weights and the one built with the weights obtained
from the factor analysis. This coefﬁcient is very high (equal to 0.96) and it is signiﬁcantly
different from zero at the 1
J. Comparisons with other similar indicators
There exist few indicators in the literature that, like the CPIs, try to measure the
strength of competition regimes. As mentioned in the introduction, the OECD has de-
veloped a set of CPL indicators (only for the year 2003) to measure the strength of a
countrys policies aimed at preserving and promoting competition (Hj, 2007). These indi-
cators measure both the competition policy, as we have deﬁned it in this paper, and the
sectoral regulatory policies. The ranking of the CPL indicators, with respect only to the
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competition policy, slightly differ from the one of the aggregate CPIs.43 Several factors
may determine these differences. First, the CPL indicators do not include information
on some institutional characteristics which are included in the Aggregate CPI, namely
the extent of powers available for the CAs during the investigations and the separation
of powers between the prosecutor and the adjudicator. In addition, the CPL indexes at-
tribute a relatively greater importance to the independence of the CA. Further, the CPL
indexes do not rigidly separate the institutional features of a competition policy regime
from the enforcement ones. For example, potential sanctions that is, the sanctions en-
visaged by the national legislation are included among the enforcement features of a
competition policy regime together with the actual sanctions; whereas in the CPIs these
data are kept separate. Another element that might contribute to the different rankings
of the Aggregate CPIs and the CPL Indexes is the inclusion in the latter of more detailed
information on the enforcement features of the competition policy regime. This is due
to the CPL indexes being constructed for a single year, which makes the collection of en-
forcement data substantially easier. Another set of indicators that has some similarities
with the CPIs are the four indicators developed by Voigt.44 These indicators focus on the
institutional and enforcement features of competition regimes, but they are less compre-
hensive than the CPIs. In addition they do not attempt to summarise the key features of a
regime in a single index, but are more akin to the low-level indexes discussed in section 4
in that each one includes information on a limited aspect of a competition regime.45 Hyl-
ton and Deng also provide a quantitative summary measure of competition law.46 Their
objective was to gauge the size of the overall competition law net by collecting informa-
tion on the breadth of the law and on its penalty and defence provisions in 102 countries
over the time period January 2001 to December 2004. Their scope index differs from the
CPIs in that it tries to provide a summary description of the areas covered by competition
law rather than an evaluation of its quality. Indeed, the scope index does not attempt to
43See Hj above n. 4. Hjs ranking based on the Antitrust Framework index, which is possibly the clos-
est measure to our CPI, for the countries in our sample is: US, Czech Republic, Canada, Hungary, UK,
Germany, Japan, Sweden, Italy, Netherlands, France, Spain.
44See Voigt above n. 19.
45One indicator evaluates the substantive content of the competition legislation, a second indicator eval-
uates to what degree this legislation adopts an economic as opposed to a legal approach, a third indicator
reﬂects the level of the formal independence of the CA and a fourth one measures its factual independence.
46See Hylton K. and F. Deng Antitrust around the World: An empirical analysis of the scope of competi-
tion law and their effects 74 (2) Antitrust Law Journal (2007).
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measure how the law is effectively enforced, nor the degree of independence of the CA or
the quality of the law.47 In addition to these indicators, which try to measure the strength
of competition regimes in an objective manner by relying on hard data on the characteris-
tics of a countrys competition policy, there also exist other indicators which are based on
the subjective assessment of the effectiveness of these policies. The best example of these
subjective indexes is the one published every year by the World Economic Forum (WEF)
in its Global Competitiveness Report. The WEF indicators score the competition policies
of 80 countries on the basis of the results of a survey of top business executives, who are
asked to rank their countrys antimonopoly policy between 1 (lax and not effective at pro-
moting competition) and 6 (effective and promotes competition). The strong drawback
of these types of indicators is that they are not easily comparable among each other, as
they are built on subjective survey answers. Indeed, local business people may not be fa-
miliar with competition regimes in other countries and may have difﬁculties performing
a meaningful comparison. As a consequence the scores are likely to depend on peoples
expectations with regard to their country.
K. Conclusions
This paper presents a newly-designed set of indicators for measuring the deterrence
effect of a competition policy regime, the CPIs. These indicators embody both formal
and practical aspects of such a regime by combining key information on the legal frame-
work, the institutional settings, and the enforcement tools. This information is evaluated
against a benchmark of best practices and then aggregated. The weights used for the ag-
gregation are based on our own evaluation of the importance of the various features of
the competition policy, as well as on the completeness of the data we have managed to
collect. We have assessed the sensitivity of the CPIs by recalculating them using a set of
weights generated by a purely statistical technique, the factor analysis. There is scope for
further research and reﬁnement of the CPIs. Firstly, the exercise could be repeated so as
to cover a longer time period, as well as more countries. Secondly there remains room
for expanding the database to include more detailed data on the enforcement features. In
47The information collected concerns the geographical scope of competition law, the remedies it allows,
the type of private enforcement available to the damaged parties, the merger notiﬁcation and assessment
procedure, and the type of abuses of dominance and restrictive trade practices prohibited.
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particular, the indicators would beneﬁt from the inclusion of more extensive information
on the level of the sanctions that are effectively imposed on offending ﬁrms and on the
extent to which offending ﬁrms are sued for damages.
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L. Tables and ﬁgures
Table 2.1: The low level indexes
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Table 2.2: The medium level indexes
Table 2.3: The CPIs
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Table 2.4: The output of factor analysis: hard-core cartels
Table 2.5: The ranking of the countries on the basis of the Aggregate CPIs
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Table 2.6: The ranking of the countries on the basis of the factor analysis: Aggregate CPIs
Figure 2.1: The Institutional CPIs for the non-EU countries in our sample: Canada, Japan
and the US
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/31694L.. TABLES AND FIGURES 73
Figure 2.2: The Enforcement CPIs for the non-EU countries in our sample: Canada, Japan
and the US
Figure 2.3: The Institutional CPIs for the large EU countries in our sample: France, EU,
Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK
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Figure 2.4: The Enforcement CPIs for the large EU countries in our sample: France, Italy,
Germany, Spain and the UK
Figure 2.5: The Institutional CPIs for the small EU countries in our sample: Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden
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Figure 2.6: The Enforcement CPIs for the small EU countries in our sample: Czech Re-
public, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden
Figure 2.7: The Aggregate CPIs for the non-EU countries in our sample: Canada, Japan
and the US
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Figure 2.8: The Aggregate CPIs of the large EU member states in our sample: France,
Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK
Figure 2.9: The Aggregate CPIs of the small EU member states in our sample: Czech
Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden
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Tables 7 and 8 summarise the scores given to each feature of a competition policy
regime in building the low-level indexes (see section 4) and provide reference to the
sources on which we based our evaluation. For those variables that could be measured
on a meaningful quantitative scale, e.g. those dealing with the amount of resources or
with the powers of the CAs, our scoring approach is based on the simple assumption
the more, the better.48 Hence, a jurisdiction obtains a higher score if the relevant CA is
endowed with more investigative powers or resources.
48This assumption reﬂects the view that the more powers and resources a CA has, the more accurate the
decisions it makes so that errors are less likely. It is apparent that if too much resources and powers are
employed to reach a given level of deterrence, some issue on the efﬁciency of the CA may arise. However,
in this paper we are interested only in measuring the effectiveness of competition policy and not in its
efﬁciency.
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Table 2.7: References for questions relative to antitrust features
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Table 2.8: References for questions relative to merger control features




COMPETITION POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and
Cristiana Vitale
Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness of competition policy by es-
timating its impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth for 22 industries in 12
OECD countries over the period 1995-2005. We ﬁnd a robust positive and signiﬁ-
cant effect of competition policy as measured by newly created indexes. We provide
several arguments and results based on instrumental variables estimators as well as
non-linearities to support the claim that the established link can be interpreted in a
causal way. At a disaggregated level, the effect on TFP growth is particularly strong
for speciﬁc aspects of competition policy related to its institutional set up and antitrust
activities (rather than merger control). The effect is strengthened by good legal sys-
tems, suggesting complementarities between competition policy and the efﬁciency of
law enforcement institutions.
Keywords: Competition Policy, Productivity Growth, TFP, Institutions, Deterrence,
OECD
JEL classiﬁcation: L4, K21, O4, C23
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A. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of competition policy in providing
higher welfare to society thanks to improved efﬁciency and productivity.1 While most
economists, starting from Adam Smith, agree that competition works in the general inter-
est, there is no such consensus on the ability of competition policy to be socially beneﬁcial.
Some economists, dating back to the ”Austrian School” (e.g. Von Mises, 1940), argue
that any state intervention that interferes with free markets will make society worse off.
According to them, competition policy is not an exception, even though its aim is to safe-
guard effective competition.
More recently, Crandall and Winston (2003) claimed that, at least in the US, antitrust
law has been ineffective. They maintain that its poor performance is mostly due to the
difﬁculty of distinguishing genuine and healthy competition from anti-competitive be-
haviors (in all areas of competition law) and to the undervalued power of the markets to
curb anti-competitive abuses. They do not ask for a repeal of antitrust law, but urge ap-
plying it only for blatant price-ﬁxing and merger to monopoly. Baker (2003) and Werden
(2003) disagreed with Crandall and Winston’s point of view. They argue that the net effect
of competition policy on social welfare is positive. In their opinion, competition policy
improves social welfare by also (or mostly) inducing ﬁrms to forgo anti-competitive be-
haviors without an explicit intervention of any competition authority, i.e. by deterring
them. The debate appears to be still unsettled. As noted by Whinston (2006), even in
the most established area of competition policy, cartel deterrence, ’strong’ empirical ev-
idence of the actual effects of the practices forbidden by antitrust law (e.g. competitors
communicating on prices), and of active antitrust law enforcement on social welfare, is
still missing.
This paper is an attempt to provide ’strong’ empirical evidence, at least with respect
to the effectiveness of the application of competition law in general. In order to do so,
1By competition policy we mean the set of prohibitions and obligations that forms the substantive rules
of competition (or antitrust) law together with the array of tools available to competition authorities for
policing and punishing any violation of the same rules.
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we estimate the impact of competition policy and some of its components on total factor
productivity (TFP) growth on a sample of 22 industries in 12 OECD countries over the
period 1995-2005. To measure competition policy, we identify a set of its institutional and
enforcement features that we consider to be key in deterring anti-competitive behavior.
We then aggregate these variables to form a set of summary indicators, the Competition
Policy Indicators (CPIs). We generate an Aggregate CPI that summarizes all the key fea-
tures of the competition policy of a country, as well as more disaggregated ones that refer
only to the features of competition policy relative to speciﬁc behaviors (i.e. cartels, other
competitive agreements and abuses of dominance – collectively referred to as ’antitrust’ –
and mergers), or only to the ’institutional’ or the ’enforcement’ features of a competition
policy.
As a measure of efﬁciency we use TFP growth, which measures the increase in the
amount of output that can be produced with a given increase in the amount of inputs.
The theoretical and empirical literature has shown the existence of a positive relationship
between competition and productivity. For this and related reasons, as we will argue in
more detail in section 2, we believe that there should be a positive link between good
competition policy and productivity. Since there is no consensus on the proper way to
measure the extent of product-market competition and even the most widespread mea-
sureusedtothisend, theprice-costmargin, hasbeenstronglycriticized(e.g. Boone, 2008),
we think that to study the direct impact of competition policy on productivity growth, a
crucial determinant of economic growth, is a proper way to measure the gross contribu-
tion of competition policy to social welfare.
In all speciﬁcations of our model, we control for country-industry and time ﬁxed-
effects, product market regulation, trade liberalization, and other likely determinants of
productivity growth, and we ﬁnd that the Aggregate CPI has a positive and highly sig-
niﬁcant effect on TFP growth. This impact is larger for industries far away from the tech-
nological frontier, suggesting that effective competition in such laggard sectors is even
more important to foster productivity and increase efﬁciency. When we use the more
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disaggregated CPIs, separating the effects of the institutional and enforcement features,
and distinguishing between mergers and antitrust, we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcients estimates for all these indicators, though institutions and antitrust appear to have
the strongest and a more signiﬁcant impact on productivity growth. For the Aggregate
CPI we ﬁnd the same result both when we estimate the model by OLS, as well as in al-
ternative IV speciﬁcations, which use either some political variables or the competition
policy in other countries as instruments for the policy. In addition to the IV estimation,
we exploit the possible non-linearities in the effectiveness of competition policy on TFP
growth to improve our identiﬁcation strategy. Competition policy is expected to be more
effective in countries with better legal institutions as well as in industries where no other
sector-speciﬁc authorities are in charge of regulating the competitive processes. This is
what we ﬁnd.
The interaction between competition policy and institutions is not only part of our
identiﬁcation strategy. Indeed, competition policy does not work in isolation. Our CPIs
describe some internal features of competition policy. However, the effectiveness of com-
petition policy is also likely to depend on external factors: the quality of a country’s in-
stitutions in general, and of its judicial system, in particular. These external factors may
matter for two main reasons. First, the general quality of the institutions of a country
creates an environment that affects the effectiveness of all public policies. In a context
where public bodies in general are effective and efﬁcient the bodies that preside over the
enforcement of competition law also tend to be effective and efﬁcient. Hence, if we do not
control for institutions, the CPIs might capture some features that, instead, are a reﬂection
of these more general factors. Second, inherent complementarities between competition
policy and the judicial system might exist, as the enforcement of the policy is often done
by the courts, directly or in appeal. For these reasons the courts, and the legal system in
general, may play an important role in determining the deterrence properties of a com-
petition policy regime. When we add the dimension of the quality of the institutions to
our estimate, we observe that there are both direct effects of institutions on TFP growth
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and complementarities between them and our measures of competition policy. Indeed,
we ﬁnd that the effects of competition policy are strengthened in countries where the cost
of enforcing contracts are low and the quality of the legal system is high, which points
to sizable institutional complementarities between competition policy and the efﬁciency
of legal institutions. These results suggest that competition policy grossly contributes to
social welfare, especially in those countries where it is coupled with efﬁcient and effective
institutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy provide
the theoretical background of our empirical research and relate our paper to the relevant
literature. Section 3 presents and discusses our empirical model and the identiﬁcation
strategy. Section 4 presents the data we use, the CPIs and how they have been built, and
the political variables we use as instruments in the policy equation. Section 5 discusses
our results and performs some robustness checks. Section 6 brieﬂy concludes.
B. Theoretical Background and Literature Review
The objective of competition policy is to deter behaviors that reduce competition.
Therefore, the causal link between competition policy and efﬁciency goes through the im-
pact of the former on market competition. Aghion and Schankerman (2004) provide a the-
oretical framework for explaining this link. They point out that competition-enhancing
policies may improve productivity by facilitating the weeding out of less efﬁcient ﬁrms;2
by promoting cost reduction investments by incumbent ﬁrms;3 and by encouraging en-
try of new, more efﬁcient ﬁrms. Nickell (1996), Blundell et al. (1999) and Aghion et al.
(2004, 2009), using ﬁrm-level data, show that product market competition has indeed a
2More generally, competition acts as a selection process that reallocates market shares in favor of the
most productive ﬁrms. Haskel (2000) provides empirical evidence of this process. Disney et al. (2003) and
Syverson (2004) show that competition reduces productivity dispersion suggesting that inefﬁcient ﬁrms are
forced to either catch-up or to exit.
3Competition also presses managers to reduce x-inefﬁciency (Hicks, 1935, Leibstein, 1966). This point
is made theoretically by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), while Vickers (1995), Nickell et al. (1997), Grifﬁth
(2001) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) provide empirical evidence of a positive relationship between
competition and x-efﬁciency.
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positive impact on productivity. However, some disagreement exists on the impact of
competition – and of competition enhancing policies – on innovation. Whinston and Se-
gal (2007) study a dynamic Schumpeterian model in which incumbents and innovating
entrants compete for the market. They ﬁnd that pro-competitive policies that facilitate
entry tend to increase entrants’ incentives to innovate by front-loading the returns from
their R&D investments. Contrastingly, Acemoglu and Cao (2010) propose a model where
both the incumbents’ and entrants’ innovation rates are endogenous, ﬁnding that subsi-
dies to entrants may reduce productivity growth by curbing incumbents’ innovation.4
The disagreement on the effect of competition – and hence competition enhancing
polices – and innovation is also reﬂected in the extensive macroeconomic literature on
Schumpeterian growth. At ﬁrst sight, the intuitive Schumpeterian argument that ﬁrms
invest and innovate to capture future monopoly rents suggests a negative relationship
between competition and innovation. However, this intuition, which is reﬂected in early
Schumpeterian growth models like Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Caballero and Jaffe
(1993), has been overturned by several recent contributions. In particular, Aghion et al.
(2001) study a model of step-by-step innovation where both leaders and laggards produce
and innovate. Laggards must ﬁrst reach the leader’s technological level before being able
to challenge its leadership and replace it. Aghion et al. (2001) ﬁnd that in most cases
an increase in competition spurs innovation, as the standard negative effect linked to
lower rents is dominated by a positive ’escape-competition-effect’. Aghion et al. (2005),
which can be considered to be the benchmark in the literature on competition and inno-
vation, further develop this approach taking into account the probability that an industry
is in a neck-and-neck situation. They predict an inverted U shape for the relationship be-
tween competition and innovation, and ﬁnd this prediction to be conﬁrmed by ﬁrm-level
4Bartelsman and Doms (2000) empirically show that a large fraction of productivity growth is indeed
due to incumbents’ incremental innovation. Aghion et al. (2009) study the effect of the threat of techno-
logically advanced entry on incumbents’ innovation. They ﬁnd that such a threat increases innovation in
sectors close to the technology frontier, where an innovating incumbent can survive the entry of techno-
logically advanced ﬁrms. Yet, it reduces innovation in laggard sectors where the threat of technologically
advanced entry decreases the incumbent’s expected rent from innovating.
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data. A different link between competition and productivity is studied in Acemoglu et
al. (2006), who examine the process of selection of more efﬁcient ﬁrms and managers in-
duced by competition. They show that this selection is beneﬁcial for countries close to the
technological frontier where its effect on cutting-edge innovation is more important. Yet,
selection may be harmful for countries far away from the frontier, where the intensity of
investment to adopt existing technologies is more important and is reduced by stronger
competition.5
In light of the previous discussion, in principle we cannot rule out that competition
policy, if too strict, may also have some adverse effects on efﬁciency. This identiﬁes an
issue that we will empirically address in section 3. However, it seems important to point
out some reasons why the ambiguity of the impact of competition on innovation may not
extend to competition policy. First, even if the relationship between competition and in-
novation has an inverted-U shape, competition policy is less likely to have a strong impact
in those markets where competition is already intense. Indeed, in most areas of com-
petition law (i.e. vertical agreements, abuses of dominance and mergers) the pertinent
prohibition applies only if the relevant market signiﬁcantly departs from perfect compe-
tition (e.g. high concentration, high barriers to entry, large switching costs, etc.).6 As for
cartels, even if the prohibition applies irrespective of the competitive conditions of the
market, they generally represent the most serious restriction of competition. Moreover,
the idea that cartels foster innovation has been generally dismissed (Nocke, 2007). Sec-
ond, in most jurisdictions, all the relevant antitrust prohibitions (again with the exception
of cartels) admit an ’efﬁciency defense’. This defense is meant to allow conducts that, al-
5Denicol` o and Zanchettin (2009) also analyze the role of competitive selection on growth in a model
where competition is less extreme and innovations are not ’drastic’. More efﬁcient and less efﬁcient ﬁrms
coexist for several periods and the market share of more efﬁcient ﬁrms gradually grows at the expense
of the less efﬁcient ones. They show that an increase in competition has conﬂicting effects on incentives
to innovate: equilibrium prices go down, reducing proﬁts from innovating, but the faster reallocation of
market shares increases the innovators’ proﬁts. The net effect on innovation, when competition is tough, is
however positive.
6In many of these areas antitrust law deﬁnes ’safe harbors’ in terms of market shares or concentration in-
dexes which establish a presumption of legality. For instance, in the European Union the legal and absolute
presumptions are that some vertical restraints are compatible with competition law if none of the parties of
the agreement has more than 30% of the relevant market.
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though reducing competition, improve efﬁciency and beneﬁt consumers. Therefore, the
’efﬁciency defense’ provides a protection for the investments ﬁrms make to innovate.7
Our CPIs reﬂect the extent to which the various competition policy regimes allow this
defense, and therefore incorporate the protection of investments in the interpretation of
the antitrust rules. Hence, our measure of competition policy takes a higher value (ceteris
paribus) where the protection of investments is a goal that shapes the interpretation of
the applicable rules. Combining these two considerations, we should expect a positive
relationship between good competition policy and innovation, both because competition
policy increases competition only (or mostly) when the relevant market is in the ﬁrst
part of the inverted-U curve, and because competition policy refrains from increasing
competition if this is likely to result in inefﬁciencies and/or less innovation.8
Competition policy is embedded in a wider and interconnected system of institutions
andpoliciesthatmightpresentinherentcomplementarities(AghionandHowitt, 2006). In
our context, legal institutions stand out as particularly relevant, since the enforcement of
competition law is intimately linked to the functioning of the judiciary system for several
reasons. First, competition law is enforced by public bodies and by private ﬁrms and
individuals who can bring suits in courts for alleged anti-competitive conducts. Second,
in some jurisdictions the competition authority can only challenge a conduct or a merger
before a court. Finally, even in those jurisdictions where the competition authority acts
as an ’adjudicator’, its decisions are subject to judicial review, so that courts have the last
7Baker (2007) argues that the application of modern economic theory has helped antitrust agencies to
identify the types of ﬁrm’s conduct and industry settings where antitrust interventions are most likely to
foster innovation. Similarly, Gilbert (2008) maintains that antitrust policy has recognized the importance
of ﬁnding a right balance between providing incentives to innovate and limiting practices that may harm
competition.
8Of course, we are not claiming that our argument applies to any aspect of competition policy and to any
antitrust decision. There may be speciﬁc interventions that may have a less positive effect on innovation
and productivity growth. This may occur if a competition authority wrongfully believes that a high level
of concentration is a sign of weak competition, while in fact it is the result of the selection process that
characterizes intense competition. We believe that this type of error is less likely nowadays than it used
to be 20 or 30 years ago. Indeed, the idea that the degree of concentration is a poor indicator of (the lack
of) competition is now widespread in the daily work of many antitrust agencies around the world. Hence,
our view is that these cases are likely to represent exceptions and therefore should not alter the positive
relationship between competition policy and innovation.
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/31694B.. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 93
say on all competition policy interventions.
The interaction between a country’s legal rules and economic activities has recently
attracted a large interest following the path-breaking work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)
who argue that legal traditions spread around through conquests and colonization and
shaped the subsequent evolution of legal and regulatory institutions. It has been shown
that legal origins affect many other dimensions including bank ownership (La Porta et
al. 2002), entry regulations (Djankov et al. 2002), labor market regulation (Botero et al.
2004), and government ownership of the media (Djankov et al. 2003a). Some studies also
looked at how the characteristics of the judiciary and other government institutions affect
the security of property rights and contract enforcement (Djankov et al., 2003b; La Porta
et al., 2008). On the basis of the results by Djankov et al. (2003a) and La Porta et al. (2004)
we expect that a lower level of formalism of the judicial procedures and greater judicial
independence should improve the quality of the judicial review of the decisions made by
competition authorities. Hence, we expect positive complementarities between several
indicators of the quality of the judiciary system and competition policy.9 In doing this,
we are close to the recent work of Aghion and Howitt (2006), and more generally to the
literature on institutions and long-term economic performance as surveyed in Acemoglu
et al. (2005), Glaeser et al. (2004), and Beck and Levine (2005).
More importantly, our paper contributes to the still very limited empirical literature
that evaluates the effectiveness of competition policy. Dutz and Hairy (1999) and Dutz
and Vagliasindi (2000) use a cross-section of 52 countries and a small sample of transi-
tion economies respectively and ﬁnd a positive effect of antitrust effectiveness on GDP
growth. However, they use ’subjective’ measures of competition policy that are based
on the perceptions of market participants which, as a consequence, may not correctly
represent the objective features of a competition policy regime. Konings et al. (2001)
9Recently, Malmendier (2009) critically discusses the literature on the nexus between law, ﬁnance, and
growth. Analyzing the role of the Roman shareholder company, she provides empirical support for the
view that political institutions can dominate the role of legal institutions in shaping economic performance.
She concludes by suggesting a cautious use of the legal origin approach to measure the transaction costs of
institutional environment. The debate is still unsettled and it is not the aim of this paper to enter it.
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and Kee and Hoekmann (2007) look at the impact of the introduction of competition pol-
icy on industrial mark-ups in two very different samples (the ﬁrst one includes Belgium
and the Netherlands and the second includes a large panel of industries in developed
and developing countries). Neither paper ﬁnds direct evidence of a positive effect of the
introduction of competition policy or competition law on mark-ups.10 However, the in-
terpretation of the results might be misleading as the employed measure of competition
policy appears inadequate to capture those features that are likely to impact on its effec-
tiveness.
Finally, especially for the empirical approach, our work is closely related to the litera-
ture that examines the impact of regulation and other competition enhancing policies on
productivity growth. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) focus on the direct effect of privati-
zation and liberalization on TFP growth. They show that market-oriented regulatory re-
forms signiﬁcantly contributed to improving productivity in OECD countries during the
Nineties, especially by reducing the gap to the technological frontier.11 Pavcnik (2002)
ﬁnds a direct impact of trade liberalization on productivity improvements that works
through the reallocation of resources to more efﬁcient producers. Several other papers,
instead, look at the effect of competition and entry on productivity growth (e.g. Grifﬁth
and Harrison, 2004, and Aghion et al., 2009). They use policy variables, such as the intro-
ductionoftheEUsinglemarketprogramortheUKprivatizationprogram, asinstruments
for competition, which is proxied by the price-cost margin, and entry. They show that the
policies have a positive impact on competition and entry and these, in turn, increase pro-
ductivity. Unlike these latter studies, we do not attempt to measure the channel through
which competition policy affects productivity. First, this is not essential to our exercise as
we want to assess the policy effectiveness. Second, in this way we avoid specifying any
10See also Sproul (1993), who ﬁnds that prices increase in industries after a cartel has been discovered and
convicted; Clarke and Evenett (2003), who ﬁnd that the vitamin cartel reduces cartel prices in jurisdictions
where antitrust conviction is more likely and costly; and Voigt (2009), who ﬁnds a positive effect of a set of
indicators of the quality of competition policy on total factor productivity, that however disappears when
controlling for institutional quality.
11This results are partially critically challenged by Bourl` es et al. (2010) and Amable et al. (2009).
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notion of competition which might be problematic both theoretically and empirically.12
C. Econometric Speciﬁcation
To make robust causal inference on the effectiveness of competition policy, we ana-
lyze the direct link between the policy and TFP growth.13 Our empirical implementation
builds on a general quality-laggard framework typical of endogenous growth models
(e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 2006). The basic idea is that laggard industries/countries can
catch up with the technological frontier by innovating or adopting the leading technolo-
gies. Therefore, the technological and organizational transfer from technology-frontier’s
ﬁrmsinﬂuencestheproductivityoflaggardindustriesand, hence, theirproductivityisco-
integrated with that of the leader. Under the assumption of long-run homogeneity, this
process has an Error Correction Model (ECM) representation where the industry-level
TFP growth (DTFPi,j,t) in country i and time t depends on the technology transfer from
the country on the technological frontier (TFPL,j,t), and the productivity gap or distance
to the technological frontier (TFPL,j,t/TFPi,j,t) (e.g. Grifﬁth et al., 2004, pg. 886). These di-
mensions constitute sources of observed heterogeneity that should explain productivity
growth and, hence, should be empirically controlled for.
Clearly, the rates of TFP growths are affected by other country-industry character-
istics. From our previous discussion, competitive pressure is one of these important
drivers. In particular, following the theoretical framework proposed by Aghion and
Schankerman (2004) and Acemoglu et al (2006), and the empirical approach suggested by
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Grifﬁth and Harrison (2004), and Aghion et al. (2009), we
assume that competition-enhancing policies – such as competition policy (CPI), product
12For instance, from a theoretical point of view, the price cost margin (PCM) is a poor indicator as it
(imperfectly) captures only a short-run notion of competition. Even in this case, the relationship can be non
linear and an increase in competition may result in a higher PCM (Boone, 2000).
13While under strict neoclassical assumptions, TFP disembodis technical change or dynamic efﬁciency, in
practice it integrates a range of other efﬁciency effects including those from organizational and institutional
change, changes in returns to scale, and unmeasured inputs such as research and development and other
intangible investments (e.g. Inklaar et al., 2008). Moreover, industry-level TFP also captures the effects of
reallocation of market shares across ﬁrms.
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market regulations (PMR), as well as trade liberalization – are some of the main drivers
of this residual heterogeneity which is not captured in the quality-ladder framework.
Moreover, followingGrifﬁthetal. (2004), wealsoassumethatotherobservableindustry-
country-speciﬁc factors connected to innovation – such as R&D intensity (R&D) and
human capital – directly affect the rate of TFP growth.14 Finally, following the exist-
ing literature (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003 and Grifﬁth et al., 2004) we model the
remaining unobserved heterogeneity by means of an error term, which takes the form
#i,j,t = yi,j + ft + ui,j,t. The country-industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed-effects yi,j account for the
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and the full set of time dummies (ft) controls
for common macroeconomic shocks that may affect TFP growth in all countries at the
same time.15 The basic equation that we estimate is thus the following:
DTFPi,j,t = a + bCPIi,t 1 + dDTFPL,j,t   s
TFPL,j,t
TFPi,j,t
+ gXi,j,t 1 + cZi,t 1 + #i,j,t, (C.1)
where CPIi,t is one of our indicators of competition policy in country i at time t, Xi,j,t 1
are country-industry-speciﬁc control variables (human capital, trade openness, R&D, and
a country-industry-speciﬁc trend), Zi,t are country-speciﬁc controls (product market reg-
ulation and the quality of institutions).16
As we mentioned in section 2, some recent papers (e.g Aghion et al., 2005, and Ace-
moglu et al. 2006) suggested that competition-enhancing policies may also inﬂuence TFP
growth through an indirect channel, by interacting with the distance to the technologi-
14Differently from them, however, we do not analyze how R&D might indirectly affect TFP growth by
shaping the catch-up process.
15Werunalargeamountofalternativespeciﬁcationstoanalyzehowtheseassumptionsontheerrorterms
affect our results. This discussion is reported in more details in appendix C. Neither the choice of different
individual effects, nor the accounting of potential serial correlation in the residuals affects our main results.
16Potentially, competition policy might have a non-linear effect on productivity growth akin to the non-
linear effect of competition on innovation found in the literature (Aghion et al., 2005). In section 2 we
theoretically motivate why we do not think that such a non-linear effect should be observed. To empirically
validate our claim, we tried two alternative speciﬁcations. First, we used a quadratic, rather than a linear,
term for the Aggregate CPI. Second, we used a step function for low, medium, and high levels of the
Aggregate CPI. In both cases we do not ﬁnd evidence of such non-linear effect, which make us conﬁdent of
the chosen speciﬁcation (C.1).
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cal frontier.17 Indeed, competition policy, by increasing competition and reducing entry
barriers, may increase the opportunities and incentives for the adoption of leading tech-
nologies. However, the returns from increasing productivity and improving efﬁciency in
order to escape competitive pressure might be higher for ﬁrms competing neck-and-neck
with rivals that are close to the technological frontier. Hence, the effect of competition
policy might differ, depending on the level of technological development of a country-
industry. We therefore look at an additional speciﬁcation where the effect of competition
policy on TFP is interacted with the technology gap.
Identiﬁcation
Theidentiﬁcationofacausallinkbetweencompetitionpolicyandproductivitygrowth
crucially relies on the ability to account for the potential endogeneity of our key policy
variables. Especially when looking at country-level aggregates, endogeneity might arise
from omitted variable bias as well as from two-way causality and measurement errors. In
this paper we adopt a multi-steps approach, using several alternative strategies to pursue
the ultimate goal of establishing a robust causal relationship between competition policy
and TFP growth.
First, we believe that two-way causality is not a major concern in our case. In prin-
ciple, the application of competition policy might be focused on less competitive and
productive markets, which in turn might lead to a negative correlation between the CPIs
and the error term. However, our CPIs aggregate several institutional characteristics,
which are unlikely to respond swiftly to changes in TFP growth rates. Institutions face in-
ertia and slowly evolve over time quite independently of speciﬁc and short-run changes
in market outcomes.18 Even those variables that represent some relevant enforcement
17Similarly, some empirical studies recently analyzed the differential effect of product market regulation
on productivity and innovation depending on the distance to the frontier (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003,
Amable et al., 2009, Bourl` es et al., 2010).
18For instance, the introduction of leniency programs or the adoption of the EU competition law model
in Eastern European countries are likely to be the consequence of the diffusion of some institutional inno-
vations, rather than a response to inadequate short-run market performances.
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features, such as the human and ﬁnancial resources, depend on political decisions that
generally take time to be put in practice. In any case, in order to reduce the potential bias
resulting from two-way causality, we use lagged values of the policy variables with re-
spect to our dependent variable. This is a standard approach that relieson the assumption
that the lagged values of the policy are uncorrelated with the error terms of the estimated
equation (e.g. Grifﬁth et al., 2004 use this exclusion restriction to identify the causal effect
of R&D on industry TFP growth).
The main identiﬁcation issue in the context of our model is related to the existence of
an omitted variable bias. The panel structure of our data-set allows us to control for time-
invariantunobservedindividualheterogeneityattheindustry-countrylevelthroughﬁxed-
effects as well as for time ﬁxed-effects. However, there still might be time-varying unob-
served heterogeneity. In particular, this might derive from the existence of several other
competition-enhancing policies or, in general, other policies correlated with competition
policy that might affect TFP growth rates. In our basic speciﬁcations, we control for those
we believe to be the most prominent policies affecting competition (product market reg-
ulation, liberalization, and privatization) and for trade openness. While we are conﬁdent
that these controls should help mitigate the endogeneity problem, we nonetheless pro-
pose a twofold approach to provide further evidence on the causal nature of the link
between competition policy and productivity growth.
First, we propose an instrumental variable estimation, which allows us to explicitly
test whether endogeneity matters and to control for another source of potential inconsis-
tency of OLS estimates: the existence of measurement errors. We use two very different
sets of instruments. Following some recent contributions which ﬁnd political variables
to determine policy outcomes (e.g. Besley and Case, 2000; Duso and Roller, 2003; Duso
and Seldeslachts, 2010), we use the government type and its ideological position on reg-
ulatory issues as a ﬁrst set of instruments. An alternative set of instruments derives from
a well-established practice in industrial organization (e.g. Hausman, 1997). This consists
of using different aggregations of the potentially endogenous variables in other markets
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as an instrument for the same variables in the market of interest. While the formulation
of competition policy in a given country is likely to be affected by the evolution of com-
petition policy in neighboring countries, the latter should not correlate with the rate of
TFP growth in the country of interest. This provides the exclusion restriction necessary
for identiﬁcation. The existence of a correlation among policies in different countries is
supported by the observable common trends in the evolution of competition policy dur-
ing the last decades. These trends are possibly due to the leading policy-setting role taken
by jurisdictions such as the US or the EU, after which the other jurisdictions’ policies are
modeled. Moreover, a vigorous international academic and policy debate established a
general consensus about the most efﬁcient policies to adopt in the ﬁeld of competition
laws, which surely also generate common trends in its evolution over time.19
Second, in addition to the IV estimation, we adopt a less formal approach to improve
our identiﬁcation strategy by looking at potential non-linear effects of competition policy
on TFP growth. We search for situations where we expect competition policy to have a
differential effect on productivity as compared to other omitted factors or policies. If we
were to observe this kind of behavior in the data, this would enhance our conﬁdence that
the estimated nexus between the quality of a competition policy regime and TFP growth
can be interpreted in a causal way. Although one can never fully rule out the possibil-
ity that some complex interactions of omitted shocks would drive the results, this would
then seem unlikely. There are two dimensions of heterogeneity that we think are impor-
tant in this respect. The ﬁrst is related to country-speciﬁc characteristics. As discussed
in section 2, we expect competition policy to be more effective in those countries where
the quality of legal institutions is higher. In fact, national courts are strongly involved in
the enforcement of competition policy, as they often retain the power to adjudicate an-
19The role of multinational cooperation for the discussion and adoption of best practices around the
world increased over the years covered in our sample. Such cooperation, which took place within the
OECD and other international organizations, was fostered by the creation of the International Competition
Network (ICN). This informal forum was initiated by the US in 1995 with the aim of providing a platform
for competition authorities from around the world to discuss the whole range of practical competition
policy enforcement and policy issues. The main objective of the ICN is exactly to spread best practice and
promote convergence.
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titrust cases either directly or in appeal. Yet, crucially for our argument, courts are not
involved in the adoption of other productivity-enhancing policies (for instance, regula-
tion, R&D subsidies or ﬁscal policy) or, at least, they are involved only indirectly. The
second dimension of heterogeneity we look at is related to industry-speciﬁc character-
istics. Our data encompass industries belonging both to the manufacturing and service
sectors. We expect the former to be signiﬁcantly more affected by competition policy.
The reason is that services are in general subject to strong sector-speciﬁc product mar-
ket regulations – such as price control, entry regulations, and state ownership – which, in
these industries, play a more signiﬁcant role in shaping the competitive environment and,
hence, productivity outcomes than competition policy. This intuition is empirically sup-
ported by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) who ﬁnd that deregulation plays a signiﬁcantly
greater role in fostering productivity in services than in manufacturing sectors. This kind
of regulation clashes with competition policy, and for this reason we expect ex-ante that
competition policy will be less effective in those industries where the tightness of product
market regulation is greater.20
D. Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We estimate our model (C.1) on a sample of 22 industries in 12 countries over the
period 1995-2005. The countries included in the study are: Canada, the Czech-Republic,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the
US.21 We use data both at the national level and at the industry level. National level data
are used to measure the policy variables (competition policy, product market regulation)
and the quality of institutions. The remaining variables are measured at the industry
20Clearly, other forms of regulation – e.g. health and safety regulations – might have an additional ef-
fect on productivity growth also in manufacturing industries. However, these regulations are inherently
different from those policies that directly control the competitive process and, hence, should not affect our
identiﬁcation argument.
21These countries have been selected to be representative of different legal systems (common law and
civil law), to include both EU and non-EU countries and, among the EU countries, both founding members
and countries that have recently entered the Union, namely Hungary and the Czech Republic.
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level, which belong both to the manufacturing and to the service sectors.22
In the following sections we introduce the main variables that we use in our regres-
sions. We begin by discussing our main explanatory variables, the competition policy
indexes. We then move to the discussion of the TFP growth measure and the other ex-
planatory variables. We conclude by introducing our instruments.
Measuring the Quality of Competition Policy: The CPIs
The ultimate aim of competition policy is to maximize social welfare. Hence, the qual-
ity of a competition policy regime should be evaluated on the basis of the ability of this
policy to deter ﬁrms that operate within its jurisdiction from undertaking those behav-
iors that, by impairing competition, reduce social welfare. In this section, we therefore
provide a self-contained discussion on how we measure the quality of a competition pol-
icy regime. We shortly report on the theoretical background behind our data collection
exercise, the measurement issues, as well as the steps of the aggregation process we un-
dertook to generate a set of summary indicators of the quality of competition policy, the
CPIs. An exhaustive discussion of all the issues touched upon in this section can be found
in the companion paper (Buccirossi et al., 2010). Moreover, in appendix A we give a more
in-depth overview of the properties of some of our indicators and their distributions.
Following Becker’s (1968) theory of optimal deterrence, we consider that the level
of deterrence is determined by three fundamental elements: the size of the sanctions, the
probability of detection and conviction, and the probability of errors. Several institutional
and enforcement features of a competition policy regime might affect these three factors
(see Buccirossi et al., 2009). The features which we believe have the strongest impact on
the level of deterrence of anti-competitive behaviors are: the degree of independence of
22The 22 industries (ISIC rev.3 codes) included in the study are the following: agriculture, forestry and
ﬁshing; mining and quarrying; food products; textile, clothing and leather; wood products; paper, printing
and publishing; petroleum and coal products; chemical products; rubber and plastics; non-metallic mineral
products; metal products; machinery; electrical and optical equipment; transport equipment; furniture and
miscellaneous manufacturing; electricity, gas and water; constructions; hotels and restaurants; transport &
storage; communication; ﬁnancial intermediation; business services.
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the competition authority (or CA) with respect to political or economic interests (formal
independence); the separation between the adjudicator and the prosecutor in a compe-
tition case (separation of powers); how close the rules that make the partition between
legal and illegal conducts are to their effect on social welfare (the quality of the law on the
books); the scope of the investigative powers the CA holds (powers during investigation);
the level of the overall loss that can be imposed on ﬁrms and their employees if these are
convicted (sanctions and damages); the toughness of a CA, which is given by its level
of activity and the size of the sanctions that are imposed on ﬁrms and their employees
in the event of a conviction, and the amount and the quality of the ﬁnancial and human
resources the CA can rely on when performing its tasks.
We collected information on each of these features, by asking several speciﬁc ques-
tions.23 We gathered these data separately for the three possible infringements of the
antitrust legislation (hard-core cartels, other anti-competitive agreements, and abuses of
dominance) and for the merger control policy in each country and for each of the years
in the sample. Most of this information was directly obtained from the CAs of the 13 ju-
risdictions included in our sample through a tailored questionnaire.24 The data obtained
from this survey were integrated with information derived from the country studies car-
riedoutbytheOECDinthecontextofitsreviewsofregulatoryreforms, fromthechapters
23For instance, to measure the quality of the law, we collected information on the standard of proof that
is required when deciding on a speciﬁc type of violation as well as the nature of the goals that inform
the decision-making process. To measure the CA’s powers during investigations we collected information
on the power to impose, or request, interim measures; the powers to gather information by inspecting
the premises of the ﬁrms under investigation or the private premises of the ﬁrms’ employees; the powers
to gather information by wiretapping the conversations of the ﬁrms’ employees. Buccirossi et al (2010)
describes all these issues in depth.
24Our sample includes 12 countries and 13 jurisdictions, as it includes the European Union. We only
surveyed the CAs which are either independent public bodies or ministerial agencies/departments, while
we did not survey the courts (but we have collected data on their powers and activities). The bodies sur-
veyed are: Competition Bureau (Canada); Urad pro ochranu hospodarske souteze (Czech Republic); Di-
rectorate General for Competition Affairs (European Union); Conseil de la Concurrence (France); Direction
G` en` erale de la Concurrence (France); Bundeskartellaamt (Germany); Gazdas´ agi Versenyhivatal (Hungary);
Autorit` a Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italy); Japan Fair Trade Commission (Japan); Neder-
landse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands); Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia (Spain); Tribunal de
Defensa de la Competencia (Spain); Konkurrensverket (Sweden); Ofﬁce of Fair trading (UK); Competition
Commission (UK); Federal Trade Commission (US); Antitrust Division - Department of Justice (US).
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on competition and economic performance in the OECD Economic Surveys and from the
CAs’ own websites and publications.25 Despite this extensive data gathering exercise, we
encountered some difﬁculties in obtaining data on the toughness of the CAs and we could
include in our database only details on the maximum jail term imposed on managers of
ﬁrms involved in hard-core cartels (for those jurisdiction that have this type of sanction)
and the number of hard-core cartels and mergers investigated every year.26
The CPIs have a pyramidal structure.27 We collected data for each of the seven key
feature of competition policy mentioned above. Each piece of information is then as-
signed a score, on a scale of 0-1, against a benchmark of generally agreed best practice
(from worst to best).28 The best practice is determined by relying on scientiﬁc papers and
books, on documents prepared by international organizations such as the International
Competition Network and the OECD, and on our judgement. All the information on a
speciﬁc policy feature is summarized in a separate low-level index using a set of weights
25Despite the active collaboration of most CAs, it was not possible to collect all data on the enforcement
characteristics of the competition policy necessary to build the CPIs for the period considered. Hence, our
database has some missing observations. We tried to ﬁll the gaps by asking the CAs to provide us with
an imputation of the missing observations based either on other data at their disposal or on their historical
knowledge of the trends. When this was not possible, whenever this was allowed by the characteristics
of the other available data on that speciﬁc feature, we performed some limited imputation of the missing
data. Nevertheless, the database still has some gaps. This means that in some cases we do not have all
the information necessary to calculate a speciﬁc index. To avoid calculating indexes whose value could be
altered by the lack of information, we do not calculate an index (at any level of aggregation) if 50%, or more,
of the relevant information content was missing.
26It is therefore clear that our measure of enforcement is less accurate than our measure of institutions.
However, our CPIs capture most of the features that have a likely impact on the deterrence properties of the
analyzed competition policy regimes as they fully describe their institutional features and proxy the level of
enforcement by important variables such as the budget dedicated to the implementation of this policy, the
amount of human resources devoted to the same aim and their quality. Furthermore, we believe that the
institutional features of a competition policy regime play the greatest role in determining its effectiveness.
As Kovacic (2009, 145) recently pointed out ”Good policy runs on an infrastructure of institutions, and
broadband-quality policy cannot be delivered on dial-up-quality institutions.” Hence, one can see good
institutions as a necessary, yet possibly not sufﬁcient, condition for a good enforcement.
27Our methodology is akin to the one developed by the OECD for the indicators of product market
regulations (PMR) and the competition law and policy indexes (CPL). See Boylaud, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta
(2000), Conway and Nicoletti, (2005) Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for the former and Høj (2007) for the
latter.
28When a data entry is quantitative it is normalized by dividing it by the highest corresponding value
held by any CAs in the sample, so that even quantitative information assumes a value between 0-1.
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to linearly aggregate it.29 We calculated separate indexes for each of the three possible
competition law infringements and for mergers, to take into account the differences in
the legal framework and, where possible, in the enforcement.30
The low-level indicators are subsequently aggregated into two medium-level indexes
for each of three types of possible competition law infringements and for mergers: one
which summarizes the institutional features of the competition policy regime and one
which summarizes its enforcement features. The medium-level indexes are then aggre-
gated to form a number of different summary indexes. More speciﬁcally, we calculate
(for each country and each year in the sample): i) one index that measures the deterrence
properties of the competition policy regime with regard to all antitrust infringements
(the Antitrust CPI) and one that measures its deterrence properties in the merger control
process (the Mergers CPI); ii) one index that assesses the institutional features (the Insti-
tutional CPI) and one that assesses the enforcement features (the Enforcement CPI); iii) a
single index that incorporates all the information on the competition policy regime in a
jurisdiction (the Aggregate CPI).
The weights employed in this aggregation process are based on the relevance that
each item, in our view, deserves.31 However, in order to check whether our choice of
weights has a decisive inﬂuence on the results, we also use three alternative weighting
schemes. The ﬁrst uses an agnostic approach and weights each piece of information
equally. The second, aggregates the features of competition policy using factor analy-
29We are aware that there might be complementarities among different aspect of competition policy that
we may miss by using this linearly additive speciﬁcation. However, we believe that it would be difﬁcult to
choose a more precise approximation of the relationship that could exist between these variables. Hence,
we have selected this aggregation form that has the advantage of being simple and at the same time rather
complete.
30This was not always easy. For example, the CAs rarely have separate divisions that deal with the dif-
ferent types of infringements, hence we could not obtain separate data on the resources employed for each
of them. Hence, the resource index takes the same value for all the three possible antitrust infringements,
as well as for merger control.
31We have been very conservative in the choice of the weights and we departed from equal weights
only for situations for which there were robust theoretical reasons to do so. Moreover, we tried to be
as transparent and explicit as possible in explaining why we chose each particular weight. The in-depth
description of these issues can be found in Buccirossi et al. (2010).
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sis.32 The correlation coefﬁcients between the values of the Aggregate CPIs built with
our weights and these two alternative CPIs built with equal weights and the weights
obtained from the factor analysis take very high values (0.97 and 0.96 respectively) and
they are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level. In the robustness section we
run our basic regression using the CPIs calculated by means of these alternative weight-
ing schemes and show that the results are robust. The third alterative weighting scheme
is based on random weights. We randomly generate, from a uniform distribution (0,1),
1,000 sets of weights, which are then normalized to sum to one. For each of these sets, we
build one Aggregate CPI. In the results section, we report the distribution of the coefﬁ-
cients estimates for these 1,000 Aggregate CPIs and we show that our main ﬁndings are
not affected.
Main Variables
In this section we describe the main variables that we employ in our regressions.
We start by presenting TFP growth and then we move on to the control variables. All
monetary measures are in real terms, using 2000 as the base year.
TFP growth. The dependent variable in our empirical model comes from the EU-
KLEMS database.33 TFP growth is measured by the Solow residual within the growth
accounting framework as developed by Jorgenson et. al. (2005). Within this framework,
TFP is measured under certain restrictive assumptions, among which that of prices equal
tomarginalcosts. FollowingGrifﬁthetal. (2006), werelaxthisassumptionbymultiplying
the labor and capital shares by the industry-level mark-up, which is estimated as the
ratio between industry-level value added and labor and capital costs (see Paquet and
32A complete description of this alternative methodology and the results can be found in Buccirossi et al.
(2010).
33The EU-KLEMS project is funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part
of the 6th Framework Programme, Priority 8, ’Policy Support and Anticipating Scientiﬁc and Technolog-
ical Needs’. The aim of the project is to create a database on measures of economic growth, productivity,
employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the industry level for all European
Union member states plus selected non-European countries from 1970 onwards. For a short overview of
the methodology and results of the EU KLEMS database, see Timmer et al. (2007).
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Roubidoux, 2001).34 In our sample, the average TFP growth at the industry level ranges
between -1.7% for the business services sector and 3.7% for the communications sector.
The average TFP growth in the entire sample is 0.0096%. A more in-depth description of
this and other TFP-based variables can be found in appendix B.
Technology Gap. We use TFP levels to determine the technology frontier at the
country-industry level and the technology gap between each country-industry and the
frontier. Following the existing literature (Grifﬁth et al., 2004; Nicoletti and Scarpetta,
2003), we obtain the technology gap using a two-step procedure. First, we calculate the
ratio between the level of TFP in each country-industry and the geometric mean of the
TFP levels in all the countries included in the sample for that industry. The frontier is
deﬁned as the country-industry with the highest ratio. Second, we obtain the technology
gap by subtracting all the observed country-industry ratios from the frontier ratio.35
R&D. The variable we use in our regressions is the ratio between R&D expenditure
and the industry-level value added, both in nominal values. We gathered detailed data
on the level of expenditure in R&D in different industries from the OECD Analytical
Business Enterprise Research and Development (ANBERD) database, which covers 19
OECD countries, from 1987 to 2004. We took data on value added from the EU-KLEMS
database. Unfortunately, data on R&D for the ’Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing’ sector
and the ’Mining and quarrying’ sectors for all countries involved in the study as well as
data for Hungary are not available in ANBERD.
Human Capital. We measure human capital as the share of high-skilled labor em-
ployed in each country-industry in a given year. We took data on human capital from
the KLEMS database, which holds information on the level of educational attainment of
workers by industry for all the EU member countries, the US and Japan from 1970 to 2004.
34The concerns that we expressed on the ability of the mark-up to measure the intensity of competition
in a market are not necessarily relevant for the correction implemented in the calculation of the Solow
residual. Indeed, this correction cleans the TFP measure of the error due to the existence of a divergence
between price and marginal cost (the mark-up).
35Given the potential measurement errors in the construction of the Technology Gap (see appendix B),
we test the robustness of our results using Labor Productivity (value added per worker) as a proxy for the
distance from the technology frontier.
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Unfortunately, data on Human Capital are not available for Canada.
Trade openness. We measure the degree of openness to trade by the ratio of industry
import over value added in each speciﬁc industry. The data come from the OECD STAN
database, which contains data on total exports and imports for 19 OECD countries, plus
the EU, from 1987 to 2004, disaggregated by industry.
Product Market Regulation. We measure the tightness of product market regula-
tion by the aggregate PMR index, taken from the OECD PMR database. The aggregate
PMR index covers formal regulations in the following areas: state control of business
enterprizes, legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to inter-
national trade and investment. The tightness of regulation is measured at the national
level on a scale between 0 and 6, where lower values indicate less tight regulation. Data
on PMR are available for two years: 1998 and 2003.36
Quality of Institutions. The quality of the institutions of a country enters in our
regressions both as a control variable and as an interaction with the competition policy
indexes in order to explore non-linearities in the effectiveness of competition policy. We
use variables from four different sources to proxy the quality of the national institutions.
The ﬁrst source of data is the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
database, which collects aggregate and individual indicators for six dimensions of gov-
ernance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption.37 The data cover 212
countries and territories over the period 1996-2006 and are based on the views of a large
number of enterprisers, citizens, and experts. We use the index that measures the na-
tional rule of law, as the most proper indicator of a country’s legal system. The index
takes values from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating better governance outcomes.
The second source of data is the Fraser Institute Database, which is used to construct
the ’Economic Freedom of the World’ indexes. From this database, we use an aggregate
36We assume regulation before 1998 to be as tight as in 1998, and regulation after 2003 to be as tight as in
2003. For the period between 1998 and 2003 we impute an average between the two available observations.
37Note that all these indexes are highly correlated and contain, therefore, very similar information.
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index (index 2) called ’legal system’, which aggregates information on variables measur-
ing judiciary independence, impartiality of the courts, protection of intellectual property,
law and order, and legal enforcement of contracts. These indexes, as the WGIs, are based
on the perceptions of enterprisers, citizens and experts. The indexes take values between
0 and 10, with higher values indicating better governance outcomes.
The third source of data is the Doing Business database of the World Bank and the
International Finance Corporation, which collects data representing ’objective measures’
of the overall quality of the regulatory and institutional environment on 181 countries.
The data we use in our empirical model relate to the time and cost of enforcing debt
contracts through the national courts system.38 Finally, we use the legal origins dummies
from La Porta et al. (1997).
Industry-level deviations from the trend. We use country-industry deviations from
a linear and a quadratic trend to account for the effect of business cycles on TFP. When
capacity is constrained, TFP growth may in fact reﬂect short-run demand ﬂuctuations.
We measure a different deviation from the trend for each country-industry using value
added taken from the EU-KLEMS database.
Instruments for Policy
In our IV regressions we use two different sets of instruments for the policies (com-
petition policy and PMR). First, we use political variables which are derived from the
dataset developed by Cusack and Fuchs (2002) which uses two main sources:39 the ﬁrst is
a database on political parties’ programmatic position developed in the Manifesto dataset
by Klingemann et al. (2006), while the second is the database developed by Woldendorp,
38The time of enforcing debt contracts represents the estimated duration, in calendar days, between the
moment of issuance of judgment and the moment the landlord repossesses the property (for the eviction
case) or the creditor obtains payment (for the check collection case). The cost of enforcing contracts rep-
resents the estimated cost as a percentage of the debt involved in the contract. For a full description, see
Djankov et. al (2003b). Both variables have been measured within the Doing Business Project from 2004
on. In our speciﬁcations, we use the end of sample (2005) values, and assume it represents the quality of
contracts enforcing for the entire sample period.
39We are very grateful to Tom Cusack for providing us with the original data and the updates for the last
years in our sample.
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Keman, and Budge (2000) on government compositions for 48 countries from 1948 on-
wards. For each country and year in our sample, we create measures of a government
location along the Manifestos political dimensions by taking a weighted average of the
programmatic positions of each of the parties belonging to government coalition. As
weights, we used the number of each party’s votes. We used the following programmatic
positions:
Market regulation (per403). This variable measures favorable mentions in the par-
ties’ programs of the need for regulations to make private enterprizes work better, ac-
tions against monopoly and trusts, in defence of consumer, and encouraging economic
competition.
Economic planning (per404). This variable measures favorable mentions in the par-
ties’ programs of long-standing economic planning of a consultative or indicative nature.
Welfare state limitations planning (per505). This variable measures negative men-
tions in the parties’ programs of the need to introduce, maintain or expand any social
service or social security scheme.
European Community (per108): This variable measures favorable mentions in the
parties’ programs of the European Community in general, and on the desirability of ex-
panding its competency.
Second, as we mentioned in the previous section, as additional instruments for the
CPI and for regulation for a given country we use different aggregations of the level of
these variables in other countries as possible instruments. In particular, we build different
set of instruments based on country grouping (EU countries vs. non-EU countries). We
then use as instruments for the policies (CPI and PMR) in one country the average value
of these variables in all other countries from the same group, as well as the average value
of these variables in all countries from other groups.40
Table 3.1 reports the preliminary statistics for the main variables discussed in these
40Moreover, we also try using alternative instruments, such as the US policies as instruments for EU
countries, the mean policies of EU member states (including the EC) as instruments for the US policies, and
the mean between the EU and US policies for the policies in non-European countries such as Canada and
Japan.
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sections.
Descriptive Analysis
As a ﬁrst motivating step, we look at simple moments. We start by looking at the
correlation between TFP growth and the CPI at the country-aggregate level. We compute
a weighted average for TFP growth using the industry value added as a weight. The
correlation coefﬁcient is large and positive (0.29) and signiﬁcantly different from zero at
the 1% level. Figure 3.1 gives a graphical representation of this relationship at the country
level. The positive correlation between the average TFP growth and the CPI is clear for
most of the countries. In particular, we calculate a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
coefﬁcient for the Czech Republic (0.83), France (0.32), Germany (0.43), Hungary (0.13),
Japan (0.21), Netherlands (0.39), and UK (0.51).
Figure 3.1 also shows that there is substantial variation in TFP growth measures
among the several industries within a country. In this study we also exploit this het-
erogeneity dimension, as competition policy might affect various industries in a different
way. We make use of this argument as an additional step in our identiﬁcation strategy.
We therefore look at the pairwise correlation between the CPI and TFP growth at the
industry-country level. Again, this correlation is positive (0.08) and signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero at the 1% level. Our empirical model starts from this simple correlation to
identify the causal effect of the policy.
E. The Results
We start by considering the average effect of competition policy on total factor pro-
ductivity growth by using the various CPI indexes discussed above. All regressions in
the following tables include year dummies and industry-country ﬁxed-effects. We fur-
ther control for other competition-enhancing policies as measured by the OECD PMR in-
dex, trade liberalization, a country-industry-speciﬁc deviation from the trend to account
for potentially different business cycles at the country-industry level, as well as for the
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other determinants of productivity growth, which we previously discussed. Most of the
explanatory variables are lagged by one year to reduce possible endogeneity issues. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the country level to allow for correlation among industries
in the same country. We estimate the model by OLS. Our sample, after discarding some
extreme outliers, consists of 1,847 country-industry-time observations.41
The Basic Model
In column 1 of table 3.2 we report the results of the basic speciﬁcation. The key result
is that the coefﬁcient estimate for the Aggregate CPI is positive (0.0924) and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level: good competition policy is strongly positively correlated to
productivity growth in a statistically signiﬁcant way.42 This estimates also points to an
economically signiﬁcant effect. A coefﬁcient estimate of 0.09 for the aggregate CPI im-
plies an average elasticity of TFP growth with respect to the aggregate CPI of around
4.66.43 Estimates for all other control variables conform to our expectations and to pre-
vious results reported in the literature and hence give us conﬁdence about the quality
of our speciﬁcation. In particular, the TFP level of the leader, the technology gap, and
import penetration have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on TFP growth; while product
market regulation, in the form of barriers to competition, has a negative effect on pro-
ductivity growth, though this is not signiﬁcant mimicking the ﬁndings by Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003). Finally, the country-industry-speciﬁc trend that we inserted to account
for short-run cyclical ﬂuctuations in demand also has a positive and signiﬁcant impact.
As we mentioned in section 4.2, there are two other important control variables –
41We dropped the observations corresponding to the ﬁrst and the last percentiles of the TFP growth
distribution.
42This value is quite close to the value of the simple correlation coefﬁcient that is equal to 0.08.
43To give a more concrete idea of the economic meaning of this, we can look at one example such as the
’food products’ industry in the UK. Over the period 2001-2004, the average productivity growth rate in this
industry was 2.23%. Our model implies that part of this growth rate is due to the effect of the improvement
of competition policy. In the same period, the average growth rate of the aggregate CPI was 3.75%. Using
our average coefﬁcient would imply that, had competition policy not improved, the average TFP growth
rate would have been 1.92%.
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/31694E.. THE RESULTS 112
R&D and human capital – for which we unfortunately have many missing values.44 Yet,
we still want to analyze whether their introduction substantially affects our results, espe-
cially in light of potential omitted variable bias. In column 2 we therefore add R&D to
our basic speciﬁcation, which reduces the number of observations to 1,463. In line with
Grifﬁth et al. (2003), R&D intensity has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on TFP growth.
All other results, and especially the size and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient estimate for the
Aggregate CPI, are not affected. In column 3, we report the results for our basic speciﬁ-
cation using the sub-sample where R&D is not missing. Again, our results are almost not
affected. In column 4 we add to our basic speciﬁcation human capital as a further control,
which reduces the observation to 1,783. Again, this variable has a positive effect on TFP
growth which, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant. The other results are not substan-
tially changed. We ﬁnally introduce both R&D intensity and human capital (column 5)
and run our basic regression without these controls in the sub-sample where both vari-
ables are non-missing (column 6). Again, our main results are not affected, yet now the
two controls are signiﬁcant. This can be due to the sample selection effect, given that we
run this speciﬁcation on a much smaller sub-sample (1,408 observations). From this point
on, we therefore decide to use our basic speciﬁcation, so that we can use the maximum
possible number of observations.45
The last column (7) reports the results from the speciﬁcation where we assume that
competitionpolicymightaffectTFPgrowthdifferentlydependingonthecountry-industry’s
distance from the frontier. We therefore deﬁne three categories for the technology gap
(low, medium, high) and allow the coefﬁcient for the CPI to differ among them.46 The
estimated effect of competition policy is much larger and more signiﬁcant (0.124) for
country-industries far away from the frontier than for country-industries close to the
44In particular, R&D data are missing for Hungary and for several industries-years in other countries,
while Human Capital is missing for Canada.
45We dohowever runall regressions and robustness checksalso addingR&D intensity andhuman capital
as additional controls. These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
46We deﬁne the three dummies according to the distribution of the gap variable: low level (up to the 33rd
percentile of the distribution), medium level (from the 33rd to the 66th percentile), and high level (from the
66th percentile).
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frontier (0.053). This result is in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2003) who show that liberalization is mostly beneﬁcial for productivity in manufacturing
industries the further a given country is from the technology leader. Hence, increasing
competition through an effective competition policy (or reducing entry-limiting regula-
tions) may facilitate the adoption and development of advanced technologies, which in-
crease productivity. The beneﬁts of increasing competition in country-industries close to
the technological frontier seem, instead, to be more modest, yet still positive and signiﬁ-
cant.47
We then move to analyze the impact of the various dimensions of competition pol-
icy as measured by our disaggregated indexes. In table 3.3, we focus on the difference
between institutions and enforcement in columns 1 and 2 and between mergers and an-
titrust in columns 3 and 4. Again, we obtain similar results to our basic model: the various
dimensions of competition policy have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on productivity
growth. With the exception of the Antitrust CPI, the size of the effect is, however, always
smaller than the one measured by the Aggregate CPI and, in some cases, it is also less
signiﬁcant. In particular, the results for the Enforcement CPI are the weakest, as the co-
efﬁcient estimate drops to 0.04 and loses signiﬁcance. Our interpretation for this result
lies in the quality of the information summarized in this index. As we mentioned, we
do not have complete measures of antitrust enforcement in terms of actions taken by the
authorities but rather measures of the monetary and human capital resources.
The established positive and signiﬁcant relationship between the quality of competi-
tion policy, and in particular of its institutional design in the area of antitrust, and produc-
47These empirical ﬁndings might, at ﬁrst glance, appear at odds with the theoretical framework proposed
by Acemoglu et al. (2006), who show that a limited level of competition might be beneﬁcial for sectors far
away from the frontier, as we discussed in section 2. These are adopters and ﬁnd it optimal to pursue an
investment-based strategy rather than selecting high-skill managers and ﬁrms through a highly competi-
tive process, which is necessary for innovation. Yet, our results do not necessarily refute this theoretical
argument, as they might rather be driven by the fact that the country-industries in our sample are not, on
average, so far from the technological frontier to switch to the investment-based strategy. This seems plau-
sible in our context, as all countries in our sample are quite homogenous, being part of the OECD. Indeed,
the empirical evidence put forward by Acemoglu et al. (2006) is based on data for non-OECD countries so
as to approximate real technology ’followers’, which are signiﬁcantly behind the world frontier.
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tivity growth is the key ﬁnding of this study. As we discussed thoroughly in section 3.1,
one major concern for the causal interpretation of this effect is the potential endogeneity
of the policy. In this section we started tackling this issue by lagging the policy variables
and controlling for most of the determinants of TFP growth discussed in the literature.
The next sections aim at providing further evidence to get more conﬁdence in the causal
interpretation of the established link between competition policy and TFP growth.
Instrumental Variables
The next step that we propose in terms of identiﬁcation strategy is to use an instru-
mental variables (IV) approach. The results of these IV estimations are reported in table
3.4. In the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations (columns 1, 2, and 3), we use the political variables
discussed in section 4.3 as instruments for the policy. Independent of whether we in-
strument only for the Aggregate CPI (column 1), for both the Aggregate CPI and PMR
(column 3), or if we control for R&D while instrumenting both policies (column 2), we
always ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate for the Aggregate CPI, which
is even larger than those reported in our basic OLS speciﬁcations. This result is reassur-
ing, as IV estimates are consistent in the presence of endogeneity. The instruments used
seem to work properly: they are correlated to the instrumented variables as shown by the
high values taken by the F-statistic for the excluded instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sions. Furthermore, they are not correlated with the error term as shown by the Sargan
statistic.48 Although being always consistent, IV estimates are not efﬁcient in the absence
of endogeneity. We therefore run a Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity and cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the policies are exogenous at the 1% level, hence OLS estimates
should be preferred because they are more efﬁcient.
48In table 3.5 (columns 1 to 3), we report the ﬁrst-stage regressions for the IV speciﬁcations 1 and 3 of
table 3.4. As expected, a pro-regulation attitude of the government (per403) and a pro-welfare limitation
programmatic position (per404) are, respectively, negatively and positively correlated to the CPI and pos-
itively and negatively correlated to PMR. A pro EU attitude (per104) correlates positively with the CPI
and negatively with the PMR index, which is consistent with the tendency of the European Commission to
support the development of more competitive markets.
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Even though, as we motivated, the proposed instruments seem to be a reasonable
choice, one could still be concerned that they might be potentially correlated with other
omitted factors. We therefore present a second set of results, based on a very different set
of instruments. Following an established literature in industrial organization, we use the
policies in neighboring jurisdictions as instruments for the policies in a given country. We
instrument for the Aggregate CPI alone (column 4), for both the Aggregate CPI and PMR
(column 6) and also control for R&D while instrumenting for both policies (column 5).
Again, we consistently estimate a positive and mostly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for competi-
tion policy. Similarly to the previous speciﬁcations, the instruments seem to be good in
terms of correlation to the potentially endogenous variables (F-statistic for the excluded
instruments), while they are uncorrelated to the error terms (Sargan test).49 Moreover,
also in this case the Wu-Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity,
which might also partially explain the reduction in the signiﬁcance level, as the IV esti-
mates are less efﬁcient than OLS estimates.
These sets of results conﬁrm our claim that the established positive link between com-
petition policy and productivity growth can be interpreted in a causal way, as we can
reject the hypothesis that the policies are endogenous. Therefore, from now on we will
focus on the OLS estimates which, in the absence of endogeneity, are more efﬁcient.
Non-Linearities
The ﬁnal, informal, step of our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the exploitation of
non-linearities. The idea is that competition policy is more effective in some countries
than in others, due to their better institutional environment, and in those sectors which
are less subject to industry-speciﬁc regulations. This should not be the case for other
49In table 3.5 (columns 3 to 6) we report the ﬁrst-stage regressions for the IV speciﬁcations 4 and 6 of
table 3.4. The instruments are the mean of the policies in other countries from the same group (CPI G
and PMR G) and a different group (CPI NG and PMR NG). While we could potentially expect a positive
correlation if all policies move in the same direction, it is not a priori clear whether this should be expected
for the mean policies over the entire sample period. Indeed, we report negative and signiﬁcant average
correlations.
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(omitted) policies. Moreover, the analysis of such non-linearities with respect to insti-
tutional details is an important contribution on a more theoretical basis, as it allows us
to identify the existence of complementarities between competition policy and the efﬁ-
ciency of (legal) institutions and therefore to provide a novel contribution to a recently
expanding literature (Aghion et Howitt, 2006). These results are reported in table 3.6.50
In the ﬁrst column, we present our basic speciﬁcation where we simultaneously con-
trol for several institutional dimensions. Institutions seem to have a signiﬁcant direct im-
pact on productivity growth. Yet, unlike previous studies (e.g. Voigt, 2009), the positive
and signiﬁcant effect of competition policy is not affected by these additional controls.
This reinforces the view that our indicators are able to capture the speciﬁc features of a
competition policy regime, which we aimed to measure, and not the general quality of a
country institutional environment.
In column 2 we then interact the Aggregate CPI with the dummies for legal origins.
While the effectiveness of competition policy is signiﬁcantly higher in countries with Ger-
man and Nordic legal origins, it is clearly less so in countries with French legal origins,
which in our sample are France, Italy, and Spain. These results seem to be in line with
ﬁndings reviewed by La Porta et al. (2008) who report that countries with civil law are
associated with a heavier-hand regulation, which has an adverse impact on markets and
economic performance.
We thenexplore whatspeciﬁc characteristics of alegal systemare importantdrivers of
competition policy effectiveness. To exploit in the best possible way the limited variation
in our institutional data and, at the same time, to allow for non-linear effects through a
step function, we have transformed our continuous institutional variables into categorical
variables based on their distribution. Thus, for each institutional variable we deﬁned
three dummies: low level ’l’ (up to the 33rd percentile of the distribution), medium level
’m’ (from the 33rd to the 66th percentile), and high level ’h’ (from the 66th percentile) of
institutional quality. Finally, we interact these dummies with the Aggregate CPI.
50Notice that, for lack of space, we do not report the coefﬁcient estimates for all control variables as they
are anyway very similar to those reported in our previous regressions.
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In column 3 we report results for the speciﬁcation where we interact the Aggregate
CPI with dummies measuring the cost of enforcing contract (EC).51 Although competi-
tion policy seems to have a positive and signiﬁcant effect independently of the levels of
contract enforcement, the effect is substantially larger – indeed more than double (0.240)
– for those countries with low enforcement costs (CPI lEC). Hence, our results support
the view that competition policy effectiveness might be reinforced in countries where law
enforcement is more efﬁcient. In columns 4 and 5 we report the results of the speciﬁca-
tions where we interact the Aggregate CPI with the Fraser ’Rule of Law’ (RL) index and
the WGI’s ’Legal System’ (LS) index.52 In both cases, we observe competition policy to be
less effective in countries with less efﬁcient legal institutions, such as a low rule of law or
a poor legal system.
The reported results point out to complementarities between competition policy and
some dimensions of legal institutions. This does not mean that policies in countries with
a worse legal system or higher costs of enforcing contracts must be ineffective, but rather
that their (partial) ineffectiveness can be better explained by the bad functioning of the
more general legal institutions. Therefore, policy changes in this country must be ade-
quately designed to account for the additional constraints imposed by the legal system.
The second dimension of heterogeneity of the degree of competition policy’s effec-
tiveness is industry-speciﬁc. As we pointed out, most of the service industries in our
sample (e.g. electricity, gas, water, communication, ﬁnancial intermediation) are subject
to more or less heavy-handed sector-speciﬁc regulations and the organization of competi-
tion matters in these industries is delegated to sectoral authorities. Our claim is therefore
that competition policy should have less of a bite in such industries, but this should not
necessarily be true for other productivity-enhancing policies (e.g. ﬁscal policy and labor
regulations). We report the results of the speciﬁcation where we estimate separate coefﬁ-
cients for the Aggregate CPI as well as for PMR in service and manufacturing sectors in
51Very similar results are obtained by using the general index for contract enforcement. However, in that
case we lose Italy since there is no information on the time needed to enforce the contracts for this country.
52We also try speciﬁcations where we use sub-components of the legal system index, speciﬁcally ’Inde-
pendence of the Judiciary’ and ’Impartiality of the Courts’ and ﬁnd similar results.
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column 6 of table 3.6. For the Aggregate CPI, we ﬁnd a large (0.143) and statistically sig-
niﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate in manufacturing, while the coefﬁcient is much smaller and
not signiﬁcant in the service industries. Moreover, similarly to Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2003), we also ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of product market regulation is negative and sig-
niﬁcant in services but not in manufacturing industries.53 These results perfectly conform
with our expectations.
All results reported in this section point to the existence of signiﬁcant and sizable non-
linear effects of competition policy on productivity growth. The estimated differential
effects should not be expected for other kinds of policies, which might constitute our
problematic omitted factors and generate endogeneity issues that would invalidate our
causal inference. Hence, these further results might be seen as an additional step, which
makes us more conﬁdent of the causal nature of the link we identify.
Extensions and Robustness Checks
We ﬁnally perform several robustness checks by using different CPIs and different
measures for productivity growth, as well as different sample sizes.
First, to show that our results are not driven by the subjective weights we have chosen
to build the CPIs, we use the three alternative weighting schemes, which were discussed
in brief in section 4.1. In column 1 and 2 of table 3.7, we report the results obtained when
using the Aggregate CPI constructed using equal weights or the weights generated by
factor analysis, respectively. Our qualitative results are unchanged and competition pol-
icy still has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on TFP growth at the 1% and 5% level, with
a point estimates for the policy effect of 0.0925 and 0.0726, respectively. As an additional
robustness check, we run 1,000 regressions, each using a different Aggregate CPI gener-
ated with a different set of weights randomly drawn from a uniform distribution (0,1).
We therefore obtain estimates for 1,000 b coefﬁcients and their relative t-statistics, whose
53We also tried to disaggregate this result even more and estimate industry-speciﬁc coefﬁcients for the
Aggregate CPI and the PMR indicators. The Aggregate CPI has a signiﬁcant impact exclusively in manu-
facturing industries while the PMR indicator mostly in service industries.
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distributions are represented in ﬁgure 3.2. The distribution of the coefﬁcients, which is
represented in the ﬁrst panel, ranges between 0.052 and 0.11, with a mean value of 0.084,
which is close to our estimate in the basic speciﬁcation. As shown by the second panel of
the ﬁgure, all of the 1,000 coefﬁcient estimates are statistically signiﬁcantly different from
zero (the lowest t-value is 2.98).
A second concern with the CPIs relates to the role of the EU competition policy in
the EU member states. To correctly evaluate the effectiveness of each EU member state’s
competition policy, it is necessary to account for the fact the EU competition policy works
alongside the national one. Therefore, for these countries, we have built a set of CPIs
which are an average of each member states individual index and the EU index.54 The
coefﬁcient estimate for the Aggregate CPI is still positive, highly signiﬁcant and larger in
size (0.115) with respect to our basic speciﬁcation. This means that EU competition policy
improves, on average, the effectiveness of national competition policies.
Third, we need to consider the limitations of the TFP measure we use. Until now,
following Grifﬁth et al. (2004), we have used a measure for TFP growth corrected for the
mark-ups (as measured by the PCM) to account for imperfect competition. However, one
may have some concerns about the quality of an industry-level aggregated PCM mea-
sure. Hence, we propose an alternative speciﬁcation where we use TFP measures (i.e. the
growth rate, TFP of the leader, and the technology gap) which are not corrected for the
mark-ups. The coefﬁcient estimate reported in column 3 is still positive and signiﬁcant at
the 10% level.
Fourth, while TFP growth is constructed using detailed information on labor and cap-
ital input (see appendix B) provided by the KLEMS, the Technology Gap uses OECD data,
which are provided at a less detailed level of aggregation.55 For this reason, we employed
54Unfortunately, DG Competition did not provide us with information on enforcement features (such as
the budget and the composition of the staff), at the EU level. Hence, we can only use information about
EU institutional features. The precise deﬁnition of the variable is thus as follows: AggregateCPI EUit =
2
3(0.5 Institutions CPIit + 0.5 Institutions CPIEU,t) + 1
3Enforcement CPIit
55Unfortunately, we could not employ the KLEMS data to construct the technology gap, since the KLEMS
does not publish the series on capital stock and labor for all countries with the necessary level of detail.
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as an alternative a much simpler measure of productivity to measure the technology gap:
labor productivity, as measured by value added per worker. In this speciﬁcation, we kept
TFP growth as our dependent variable and used TFP growth on the frontier as an in-
dependent variable (though the frontier is deﬁned in terms of labor productivity). The
coefﬁcient estimate reported in column 4 is still positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Fifth, one might be concerned with the frequency of the data. TFP measures change
quickly over time as a response to demand shocks, while our policy measures, although
showing some signiﬁcant time variation, present much more inertia. We therefore change
the frequency of the data and look at long-run effects. We propose three different speciﬁ-
cations along this dimension. In the ﬁrst one, whose results are reported in column 5, we
take longer three-year lags for all explanatory variables. Still, the coefﬁcient of interest
is similar in size to that of our basic speciﬁcation, though it loses a bit of signiﬁcance, as
expected given the long lag used. In the second robustness check (column 6), we deﬁne
TFP growth over a time span of three years, and sum up the ﬁgures from year t to year
t + 2. We then ’lag’ all explanatory variables by taking their value at the initial year, i.e.
we look at how the value of competition policy in year t affects TFP growth between year
t and t+2. In doing so, the number of observations is obviously reduced. We still ﬁnd
a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate (0.332) for the Aggregate CPI. As expected
the coefﬁcient is much larger, as it represents the effect of the policy on the three-year
TFP growth rate. In the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, we use three-year averages for all variables
(column 7). Also in this case, the coefﬁcient estimate for the Aggregate CPIs is positive
(0.0903) and signiﬁcant.56
Sixth, one might be concerned that the right level of aggregation of our data should
be the country rather than the industry, as the main interest of our study is in the impact
of a national policy. In Section 4.4 we reported a signiﬁcant simple positive correlation
between country-level TFP growth and competition policy. In this robustness check, we
56Similar, though a bit less signiﬁcant, results are obtained using a ﬁve-year interval. The loss of signif-
icance is due to the imprecision of the point estimation deriving from the reduction of the data variability
via the aggregation process.
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re-estimate our model by taking weighted averages of all our industry-speciﬁc variables
using the value added of the industry as a weight (column 8). Also in this case, the
coefﬁcient estimate for the Aggregate CPIs is positive (0.0417) and signiﬁcantly different
from zero at the 10% level.
Finally, given the heterogeneity of competition policy’s effectiveness across countries
and industries, one might be concerned that our average results do not hold to the ex-
clusions of particular countries and/or industries. We therefore run our basic regression
on several sub-samples, sequentially excluding one or two countries (156 sub-samples) or
one or two industries (506 sub-samples). For each sub-sample, we run our basic regres-
sion. The distribution of the b coefﬁcients and their t-statistics are represented in ﬁgures
3.3 and 3.4. In all sub-samples, our estimates for the CPI are positive and, in the very large
majority of the cases (99.4%), they are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level
at least. While none of the estimates are insigniﬁcant when we exclude one or two indus-
tries, only in 4 out of the 156 sub-samples where we simultaneously exclude two countries are
the coefﬁcients signiﬁcantly positive (one-tailed test) yet not signiﬁcantly different from
zero (two-tailed test).57
Where does Identiﬁcation comes from?
In appendix A we show that there is signiﬁcant and quite continuous within-country
variation in the Aggregate CPI in almost all countries, which identiﬁes our policy effect.
Nevertheless, in this section we try to spot which speciﬁc policy changes in the Aggregate
CPI might be the major identiﬁer of the average increase in TFP growth estimated in our
regressions.
In ﬁgure 3.5 we plot the evolution of the average residual TFP growth and its 95% con-
ﬁdence interval across the 22 industries of each country as well as the competition policy
57The only speciﬁcation for which the t-value is further apart from a critical level (p-value of 0.21) is when
we simultaneously exclude the UK and the Czech Republic. The reason is that the coefﬁcient estimates drops
to 0.04, while the standard error increases a bit with respect to our basic speciﬁcation. Notice, however that,
even in this unique case, we still cannot reject the null hypothesis of the coefﬁcient being positive at the
10% signiﬁcance level with a one-tailed test.
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indexes over the period 1995-2005. To mimic our estimation and control for sources of
observable heterogeneity, we use the residual component of TFP growth which is not ex-
plained by the ﬁxed-effects and the other variables included in our model (C.1) – exclud-
ing, of course, the Aggregate CPI. Again, we observe clear correlation patterns between
the evolution of the Aggregate CPIs and of the residual average TFP growth. Our atten-
tion focuses on the evolution in the subset of countries and time periods for which the
changes in policy are more noticeable and, therefore, which are most likely to inﬂuence
the average effect identiﬁed in our estimation.
The ﬁrst country that appears to drive the estimated relationship is the Netherlands:
the residual TFP growth rises toward the end of our sample period, and then decreases
between 2004 and 2005. The same evolution is associated to the aggregate competition
policy index, which rises in 2003 following an upward trend in the investment in human
and ﬁnancial resources and then goes slightly down, again because of a contraction in
the resources allocated to the competition authorities. In the UK, over the 2000-2003 pe-
riod, we also observe a strong correlation between the rise of residual TFP growth and
the evolution of the aggregate CPI index. Such evolution is due to a steady growth in
the ﬁnancial and human resources available to the two CAs after the introduction of the
Competition Act in 2000. In the USA, the period between 1999 and 2003 seems to be the
one that identiﬁes a positive link between residual TFP growth and the CPIs, as the two
series follow a much correlated pattern. The residual productivity growth performance
is accompanied by an increase in the budget/gdp ratio in the US competition authorities,
as well by an increase in the human resources.
In Hungary, we observe a common upward trend in residual productivity growth
and competition policy. The major institutional changes that mark the evolution of the
Hungarian competition policy are the attribution of more investigative powers to the
competition authority and the modiﬁcation of the criteria to sanction ﬁrms. The latter are
no longer based on discretionary decisions of the competition authority, but are based on
ﬁrms’ turnover. These new tools were introduced starting from 2000. Moreover, a budget
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increase took place in 2002. A similar common upward trend can be observed in the
Czech Republic. Indeed, while the residual productivity growth is constantly increasing,
the competition policy experiences a slight increase due to the larger amount of resources
available to the competition authority. From the institutional side, an important change




ber of behaviors that reduce social welfare by impairing competition. Hence, an effective
competition policy is one that deters most anti-competitive practices. Since by deterring
anti-competitive practices competition policy should make markets work effectively and
foster efﬁciency, in this paper we evaluate the direct impact of competition policy on efﬁ-
ciency. Hence, we estimate the effect of the key institutional and enforcement features of
a competition policy, summarized in a set of indicators, the CPIs, on total factor produc-
tivity growth in 22 industries of 12 OECD countries between 1995 and 2005.
Our results imply that good competition policy has a strong impact on TFP growth.
The coefﬁcient for the Aggregate CPIs is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in a variety
of speciﬁcations of our model. The Aggregate CPI also remains highly signiﬁcant when
we control for R&D, human capital, and the quality of a country’s institutions. All these
variables have a direct impact on TFP growth but do not alter the fact that competition
policy is effective in increasing productivity. We obtain similar results when we look at
a more disaggregated picture and separately consider the effects of a competition pol-
icy’s institutional and enforcement characteristics and when we differentiate between the
policing of antitrust infringements and the merger control discipline. Yet, the institutional
and the antitrust elements of the competition policy appear to have the strongest impact
on TFP growth. We adopt a multi-steps approach to identiﬁcation based on instrumental
variable regressions and the exploitation of non-linearities. We therefore provide careful
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support to the causal nature of the established link between competition policy and TFP
growth. Furthermore, we observe complementarities between competition policy and the
quality of legal institutions. The effect of the former is indeed larger in those countries
where the enforcement costs are low and with a better legal system. Finally, our main
ﬁndings prove to be robust to several checks, such as various measures of productivity,
different aggregation techniques for the CPIs, and several sub-samples.
Our results provide support for the argument that competition policy creates gross
beneﬁts to the long-term performance of a country’s economy. Nevertheless, these bene-
ﬁts should be compared to the costs of introducing competition laws and enforcing com-
petition policy to perform a clear welfare assessment. Unfortunately, we did not have
access to sufﬁciently precise and encompassing cost estimates to allow us to undertake
such an analysis, which could, however, be undertaken in future work subject to further
data collection. There is also scope for further reﬁnements. Currently, we have used
data on 22 industries in 12 OECD countries over ten years, but it would be interesting to
expand the database so as to include more countries over a longer time period and, partic-
ularly, to analyze the impact of the policy in less developed economies, which are further
apart from the technological frontier. Moreover, the CPIs could be improved by includ-
ing more detailed information on the enforcement features, in particular on the sanctions
that are effectively imposed on convicted ﬁrms and individuals and on the resources em-
ployed and the number of cases investigated by the EU Commission. However, such a
reﬁnement of the CPIs is difﬁcult because of the lack of available data. Indeed, if compe-
tition authorities were to increase their accountability by collecting and keeping reliable
data on the enforcement of competition policy in an easily accessible format, studying the
effectiveness of competition policy would become much easier.
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G. Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: TFP Growth and the CPIs
TFP growth is corrected for mark-ups. For each country, we report the weighted average of TFP growth
across the 22 industries in the sample. The shaded area represents the 95% conﬁdence interval around
the mean.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the b Coefﬁcients and t-statistics obtained by Random Weights
In the ﬁrst panel, we represent the distribution of the estimated b coefﬁcients from 1,000 regressions.
In each of these regressions, the CPI index is built using random weights derived from a uniform
distribution (0,1) and normalized to sum to 1. In the second panel, we represent the distribution of the
t-statistics for the estimated coefﬁcients. The red line represents the critical value for signiﬁcance at the
10% level.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of the b Coefﬁcients and t-statistics obtained by Excluding Coun-
tries
In the ﬁrst panel, we represent the distribution of the estimated b coefﬁcients from 156 regressions. In
each of these regressions, we exclude one or two countries from our sample. In the second panel, we
represent the distribution of the t-statistics for the estimated coefﬁcients. The red line represents the
critical value for signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the b Coefﬁcients and t-statistics obtained by Excluding Indus-
tries
In the ﬁrst panel, we represent the distribution of the estimated b coefﬁcients from 506 regressions. In
each of these regressions, we exclude one or two industries from our sample. In the second panel, we
represent the distribution of the t-statistics for the estimated coefﬁcients. The red line represents the
critical value for signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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Figure 3.5: Residual TFP Growth and the CPIs
TFP growth is measured as the residual from equation (C.1], where we exclude the CPI from the regres-
sors. The shaded area represents the 95% conﬁdence interval around the mean TFP growth among the
22 industries for each country.
Ciari, Lorenzo (2011), Essays in Economic Policy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/31694G.. FIGURES AND TABLES 138
Table 3.1: Preliminary Statistics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
TFP Growth 1847 0.0096 0.0686 -0.2818 0.2727
TFP Leader 1847 0.0154 0.0931 -0.7863 0.6246
Technology Gap 1847 0.6891 0.6697 0 5.6063
R&D 1463 0.0253 0.0574 0 0.4041
Human Capital 1783 0.1171 0.0977 0.0058 0.5588
Trade openness 1847 1.0096 1.8350 0 17.2785
PMR 1847 1.6721 0.5227 0.9234 3.0336
CPI 1847 0.4976 0.1019 0.3167 0.7035
CPI institution 1847 0.6048 0.1114 0.3513 0.7735
CPI enforcement 1847 0.2802 0.1587 0.0499 0.7513
CPI antitrust 1847 0.5023 0.1032 0.3292 0.7047
CPI mergers 1847 0.4834 0.1137 0.1372 0.6999
Enforcement Costs 1847 22.1471 8.2423 9.4000 33.5000
Rule of Law 1847 1.4263 0.4141 0.5251 1.8801
Legal System 1847 8.1494 1.0655 5.5667 9.6246
Market regulation (per403) 1847 1.3767 1.2564 0 5.5007
Economic planning (per404) 1847 0.3348 0.6229 0 2.6971
Welfare state limitation (per505) 1847 0.5264 0.5679 0 1.9637
We present preliminary statistics for all used variables in the selected estimation
sample.
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Table 3.2: Basic OLS Regressions - Aggregated Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
TFP leader 0.0653 0.0885 0.0870 0.0599 0.0811 0.0863 0.0651
(0.0233) (0.0251) (0.0257) (0.0232) (0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0228)
L.Techno Gap 0.0075 0.0162 0.0168 0.0085 0.0181 0.0178 -0.00169
(0.0041) (0.00706) (0.00724) (0.0042) (0.0069) (0.0072) (0.00566)
Industry trend 0.0445 0.127 0.127 0.0369 0.131 0.127 0.0405
(0.0052) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0052) (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.00595)
L.Import penetration 0.0144 0.0171 0.0174 0.0147 0.0170 0.0171 0.0134
(0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.00415) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.00400)
L.PMR -0.0312 -0.0380 -0.0379 -0.0390 -0.0506 -0.0410 -0.0251
(0.0196) (0.0172) (0.0163) (0.0205) (0.0175) (0.0168) (0.0212)
L.CPI 0.0924 0.0827 0.1064 0.0945 0.0800 0.111









L.Human Capital 0.286 0.460
(0.172) (0.218)
Constant -0.137 -0.433 -0.439 -0.00989 0.0147 0.0205 -0.134
(0.0536) (0.0543) (0.0516) (0.0240) (0.0292) (0.0308) (0.0525)
R2 0.269 0.294 0.290 0.273 0.299 0.292 0.275
Observations 1847 1463 1463 1783 1408 1408 1847
ThedependentvariableisTFPgrowthcorrectedformark-ups. Standarderrorsinparenthesesarerobust
and allow for correlation among industries in the same country. In all regressions we insert country-
industry dummies and time dummies. The symbols ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% signiﬁcance respectively.
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Table 3.3: OLS Regressions - Dissagregated Indexes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
TFP leader 0.0656 0.0659 0.0654 0.0653
(0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0234)
Industry trend 0.0428 0.0438 0.0444 0.0443
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0054)
L.Techno Gap 0.0075 0.0076 0.0075 0.0075
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0042)
L.Import penetration 0.0142 0.0144 0.0144 0.0144
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
L.PMR -0.0304 -0.0266 -0.0336 -0.0249









Constant -0.133 -0.117 -0.132 -0.143
(0.0551) (0.0594) (0.0526) (0.0587)
R2 0.268 0.267 0.269 0.268
Observations 1847 1847 1847 1847
The dependent variable is TFP growth corrected for mark-ups.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and allow for correlation
among industries in the same country. In all regressions we insert
country-industry dummies and time dummies. The symbols ***, **,
and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance re-
spectively.
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Table 3.4: IV Regressions - Aggregated Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
TFP leader 0.0638 0.0852 0.0640 0.0636 0.0870 0.0649
(0.0186) (0.0211) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0210) (0.0185)
Industry trend 0.0487 0.125 0.0486 0.0491 0.126 0.0459
(0.0237) (0.0398) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0395) (0.0236)
L.Techno Gap 0.0074 0.0155 0.0072 0.0074 0.0159 0.0074
(0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0040)
L.Import penetration 0.0146 0.0175 0.0146 0.0147 0.0173 0.0145
(0.0036) (0.0041) (0.00361) (0.00361) (0.0041) (0.0036)
L.R&D 0.481 0.587
(0.262) (0.260)
L.PMR -0.0402 -0.0543 -0.0493 -0.0410 -0.0454 -0.0388
(0.0137) (0.0179) (0.0195) (0.0142) (0.0177) (0.0133)
L.CPI 0.2220 0.2890 0.218 0.233 0.277 0.136
(0.1020) (0.1460) (0.102) (0.115) (0.143) (0.0832)
Constant -0.276 -0.324 -0.258 -0.212 -0.0118 0.222
(0.0699) (0.0780) (0.0750) (0.105) (0.0749) (0.0799)
First-stage F-test (CPI) 51.00 29.75 47.23 77.33 61.53 60.29
First-stage F-test (PMR) 194.49 147.84
Sargan test 2.616 (3) 4.212 (3) 2.450 (2) 0.781 (1) 0.899 (1) 1.230 (2)
Wu-Hausman test 0.2105 0.2219 0.4037 0.2366 0.5278 0.5067
Observations 1847 1463 1847 1847 1463 1847
The dependent variable is TFP growth corrected for mark-ups. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and allow for correlation among industries in the same country. The instruments in the IV
regressions reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 are: coal, per108, per403, per404, per505. In column 1
only the CPI is instrumented, wile in columns 2 and 3 both CPI and PMR are instrumented. The
instruments in the IV regressions reported in columns 4, 5, and 6 are the average values of CPI
and PMR among the other countries in the same group (European and non-European countries)
and among the other countries in a different group. In columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 only the CPI is
instrumented, while in columns 3 and 6 both CPI and PMR are instrumented. The value of the F-
statistic for the test of excluded instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regressions is reported. The Sargan
statistic is distributed as a c2 and the degrees of freedom parameters are in parentheses. We
report the p-value for the Wu-Hausman F-Statistic. In all regressions we insert country-industry
dummies and time dummies. The symbols ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% signiﬁcance respectively.
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Table 3.5: First-Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Speciﬁcation (1) (3) (3) (4) (6) (6)
Dep. Var. CPI CPI PMR CPI CPI PMR
L.per108 0.1292 0.0124 -0.0071
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0030)
L.per403 -0.0083 -0.0126 0.0578
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0033)
L.per404 0.0060 0.0034 -0.0353
(0.0030) (0.0054) (0.0072)
L.per505 0.0011 0.0191 -0.2404
(0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0075)
L.CPI NG -1.8651 -1.3312 1.7896
(0.1569) (0.1512) (0.2265)
L.CPI G -0.2728 -0.2172 0.0995
(0.0335) (0.0328) (0.0492)
L.PMR NG 0.0899 -8.0118
(0.0787) (0.1179)
L.PMR G -0.2287 -1.9799
(0.0230) (0.0345)
Partial R2 0.1148 0.1229 0.4056 0.0894 0.1641 0.7748
Test of excluded
instrum.: F(4,1574) 51.00 55.16 286.56 77.33 77.23 1354.06
Observations 1847 1847 1847 1847 1847 1847
ThedependentvariableisCPIincolumns1, 2, 4, and5andPMRincolumns3and6. Incolumn
1 and 4 only the CPI is instrumented, wile in columns 2-3 and 5-6 both CPI and PMR are
simultaneously instrumented. The Partial R-squared of excluded instruments and the value of
the F-statistic for the test of excluded instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regressions is reported. In
all regressions we insert country-industry dummies and time dummies, as well as all the other
exogenous variables from the main regression. The symbols ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance respectively.
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Table 3.6: Interactions Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Enforcement Cost -0.0100 -0.0063
(0.0007) (0.0027)
Rule of law 0.0211 0.0471
(0.0298) (0.0391)






































heightR2 0.273 0.270 0.271 0.270 0.270 0.272
Observations 1847 1847 1847 1847 1847 1847
The dependent variable is TFP growth corrected for mark-ups. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust and allow for correlation among industries in the same country. In all regressions
we insert country-industry dummies and time dummies. We control for the following vari-
ables ’TFP leader’, ’Techno Gap’, ’Industry trend’, ’PMR’, ’Import penetration’ and a constant
term but we do not report the coefﬁcient estimates for space limitation and as they are com-
parable with those reported in Table 3.2. The symbols ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance respectively.
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The Competition Policy Indexes, CPIs, incorporate data on how the key features of a
competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices
and summarizes them. The CPIs have a pyramidal structure which encompasses a large
number of sub-indicators that are progressively linearly combined using a set of weights
at each level of aggregation. This structure is described in Tables A1, A2 and A3.
Table A1 shows the content of low-level indexes. The weights used to sum the infor-
mation contained in each index are indicated in brackets.
Table A2 shows the eight medium-level indexes, which are given by the weighted
average of the relevant low-level indexes. The weights are indicated in brackets.
Table A3 shows the different CPIs we built and the weights (in brackets) used in the
aggregation process.
We now turn to the values of the Aggregate CPIs for the countries in our sample over
the period 1995-2005. Figures 3.6 to 3.8 give a general idea of the measure of the deter-
rence properties of the competition policy in those countries and of the relevant changes
occurred over time. It is evident from them that there is substantial cross-sectional and
cross-time variation. It should be stressed that the institutional component of the ag-
gregate index takes a greater weight (2/3), hence the evolution of the Aggregate CPIs is
mostly explained by the institutional features of the competition policy which is relatively
stable.58
58The enforcement features undergo more frequent changes and so do the Enforcement CPIs. For the
sake of space we have only shown the values of Aggregate CPIs. For more details on the values of the other
CPIs refer to Buccirossi et al. (2009a).
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To allow a clearer interpretation of the results we include only a limited number of
countries in each ﬁgure. Yet, to allow readers to easily perform comparisons among them,
we report the sample average in each ﬁgure. Figure 3.6 shows the Institutional CPIs for
the three OECD countries in our sample that are not part of the EU: Canada, Japan, and
the US.
As a starting point, the sample average of the aggregate CPIs shows an upwards trend
during the sample period, which is common to almost all the 12 countries. Moreover, the
time variation of the average index is signiﬁcant with an average increase of almost 2%
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points per year (18% over the sample period). The Aggregate CPIs of the non-EU coun-
tries changed more or less markedly over the period under exam, and their levels differ
considerably among each other. The aggregate CPI for the US takes very high values
which are constantly among the highest in the sample ranging between 0.58 and 0.62,
showing therefore a signiﬁcant time variation. The values for Canada are also quite high
(between 0.53 and 0.56) and above the sample average. The range of variation is however
limited to some percentage points per year. Japan’s values are very low and among the
lowest in the sample for the entire period (between 0.34 and 0.35). Differently from most
other countries, also the changes in the Aggregate CPI are lower than an average of 1%
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Figure 3.6: Aggregated CPI for the Non-EU Countries
per year. The reason behind Japan’s low performance is manifold. First, Japan suffers
from the lack of a leniency program for cartel whistleblowers. Second, in Japan there
is no separation between the body that prosecutes violators of the antitrust law and the
body that adjudicates such cases. Third, the Japanese CA has limited human and ﬁnan-
cial resources. Further elements are the absence of the possibility to start a class action
and the fact that the Japanese competition legislation envisages the consideration of non
strictly-economic goals when assessing the effects of abuses of dominance.
Figure 3.7 depicts the Aggregate CPIs for the large EU member states in our sample:
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK.
The ﬁrst noticeable element in this ﬁgure is that the data for the ﬁrst ﬁve years in the
sample are missing for Spain and France. This lack of information does not allow one to
have a clear picture of the trend for these two jurisdictions. Anyhow, the Aggregate CPIs
forthesetwocountries, aswellasforItaly, areverylowandconsistentlybelowthesample
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Figure 3.7: Aggregated CPI for the Large EU Countries
average (0.38-0.42 for France, 0.36-0.42 for Spain, and 0.41-0.44 for Italy). Both Spain
and France experience a substantial improvement between 2000 and 2003. The former
beneﬁted from the introduction of class action in 2001 and of the powers to investigate
business premises in 2003. In the latter, the quality of the institutional CPI improved
because of the introduction of a leniency program for cartels whistleblowers and of the
obligation to notify mergers. Germany shows a good and constant performance ranging
between 0.49 and 0.52. Notably, the CPIs for the UK start well below all the values of the
CPIs of the other countries (0.3), but over time they become the highest in the group (0.6).
This is due to the dramatic institutional changes that accompanied the introduction of
the Competition Act in 2000, coupled with a steady increase in the ﬁnancial and human
resources of the two CAs.
Figure 3.8 depicts the Aggregate CPIs for the small EU member states in our sample:
the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
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Figure 3.8: Aggregated CPI for the Small EU Countries
Sweden is consistently the country with the highest CPI value, not just in this group
but in the whole sample, yet this slowly declines over time (from 0.7 to 0.66) because of a
reduction, in real terms, of the ﬁnancial and human resources available to its CA. Instead,
the CPIs for the other jurisdictions start below the sample average, but they all improve
over time. The Czech Republic experiences a ﬁrst, considerable shift in 1996, due to the
CA acquiring independence from the government – previously all decisions were taken
by a ministerial department. A further improvement takes place in 2004, when the power
to investigate business premises is introduced. In the sample period, the CPI increases by
70% from a low of 0.3 to a high of 0.51. In Hungary the major changes happen in 2000,
when there is an increase in the investigative powers of the CA and a shift in the criterion
used to set the sanctions for antitrust infringements, which changed from a discretionary
decision left to the adjudicator to an approach based on the ﬁrm’s turnover. Moreover, in
2002 there was a substantial increase in the budget of the CA. These changes are captured
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by an increase in the CPI by over 30% from a low of 0.45 to a high of 0.59. The Netherlands
did nothave aCA before1998. Hence, it wasnot possibleto calculatea CPIuntil thatyear.
In subsequent years, the index steadily rises by almost 50% over the sample period from
a low of 0.4 to a high of 0.6 as a consequence of a regular increase in the amount and in
the quality of its CA’s resources.
These three ﬁgures give a general idea of the factors that affect the ability of a com-
petition policy regime to deter anti-competitive behavior in the jurisdictions included in
our sample and of how these have changed over time. It is evident from them that there
is substantial cross-sectional and cross-time variation.
Table A4 instead shows the ranking of the 12 countries in our sample based on the
average value of their Aggregate CPIs over the years 1995 to 2005 and on its value in
2005. Sweden and the US are the best-scoring countries and this is true for each year in
the sample, similarly France, Spain, and Japan constantly have the lowest scores. The UK
and Canada are the countries that experience the most marked change.
B. The TFP Measures
In this appendix we describe in more detail the TFP growth and Technology Gap
variables employed in our regressions.
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TFP growth. The measure of TFP growth employed in our regressions is taken from
the EU-KLEMS database.59 The database improves substantially on the existing indus-
try level databases, among which the OECD STAN database and its predecessor the
ISDB database. The main limitation of previously existing databases is that they provide
industry-level series on output, aggregate hours worked and aggregate capital stock, ig-
noring changes in the composition of factor inputs. As a result, TFP measures based on
these aggregate quantities might be biased. On the contrary, the KLEMS database takes
into account changes in the composition of the labor force over time. Furthermore, it
discriminates among different types of capital input measures.
The TFP measure reported by the KLEMS database and employed in our regressions
is based on the growth accounting methodology, which essentially consists of decom-
posing output growth into the contribution of input growth (labor and capital) and TFP
growth.60 TFP measures within the growth accounting framework are based on several
assumptions: in particular, it is assumed that markets are perfectly competitive and that

















where Yijt is real value added, Lijt measures the labor input and the Kijt capital in-
put. Within the EU-KLEMS database, accurate measures of labor and capital input are
based on a breakdown of aggregate hours worked and aggregate capital stock into vari-
ous components. Hours worked are cross-classiﬁed by various categories to account for
differences in the productivity of various labor types, such as high- versus low-skilled
labor. Similarly, capital stock measures are broken down into stocks of different asset
59The EU-KLEMS database is the result of a research project funded by the European Commission that
involves major national level economic and statistical research centers. Details about the EU-KLEMS project
can be found at the website: www.euklems.net. An overview of the methodology employed to collect data
and build the measures of productivity can be found in Timmer et al. (2007).
60The growth accounting methodology for computing productivity has a long standing history. For a full
description of the methodology see Jorgenson et al. (1967, 2005) and Caves (1982a).
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types.61 The term aijt measures the labor share in value added. For our study, given
that we measure the effectiveness of competition policy in promoting competition and
ultimately efﬁciency, the main concern related to the TFP measure reported in the EU-
KLEMS database is the assumption of perfect competition in the product markets. In
order to take the existence of imperfectly competitive product markets into account, we
modify the expression in equation (B.2) and multiply the labor share by industry-speciﬁc
mark-ups.62






where ValueAddedijt is nominal value added, Labor Costs is labor compensation and
Capital Costs is capital compensation.63 The main source of data for computing mark-ups
is still the EU-KLEMS database.64 An important aspect to notice is that the measure of
capital input necessary to compute capital costs is a somewhat cruder measure than the
one employed in the construction of the TFP measure. In particular, we use an aggregate
measure of capital stock, not accounting for different types of capital assets.65 This capi-
tal stock measure is computed starting from the real gross ﬁxed-capital formation series
available in the EU-KLEMS database, using the perpetual inventory method.
61The EU-KLEMS database covers all the countries involved in our study except for Canada. For measur-
ing TFP growth for Canada, we use data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC).
The GGDC methodology is totally analogous to the one adopted by the EU-KLEMS consortium, of which
the GGDC is member. The correlation between the EU-KLEMS TFP and the GGDC TFP is high (0.7) and
strongly signiﬁcant. However, we run speciﬁcations excluding Canada and results remain qualitatively
and quantitatively unchanged.
62In this, we follow the existing literature that explores the determinants of TFP growth. See, for example,
Grifﬁth et al. (2004), Aghion et al. (2009) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
63TheCapitalCostsmeasureisobtainedbymultiplyingthecapitalstockfortheusercostofcapital, which
takes into account the real interest rate and the extent of capital depreciation. For details see Grifﬁth et al.
(2006).
64For the computation of capital costs, we needed data on the inﬂation rate as well as on the yield on
10-years Federal Reserve Bonds. These come from the OECD MEI (Main Economic Indicators) database.
65The reason why we use an aggregate measure of the capital stock is that the series on gross ﬁxed-capital
formation disaggregated for different types of assets are publicly available in the EU-KLEMS database only
for a limited number of countries.
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Technology gap. One of the main regressors in our speciﬁcations is the technology
gap between a country-industry in a given year and the technological frontier. There are
several ways which can potentially be used to measure the technology gap. In our study,
we follow the existing literature and use the TFP level to compute the distance to the
technological frontier.66 The computation of the technology gap is made in two steps.
The ﬁrst step consists of evaluating the level of TFP in each country-industry relative to
a common reference point – the geometric mean of the TFPs of all other countries in the




)   e sijtln(
Lijt
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where the output and input measures are the same employed in the measurement
of TFP growth, and the bar denotes a geometric mean.67 The variable e sijt = 1
2(aijt +
ajt) is the average of the labor share in country i and the geometric mean labor share.
The technology leader is deﬁned as the country-industry with the highest value for the
TFP level relative to the common reference point. The second step for computing the
technology gap consists of subtracting TFPijt from TFPLjt, where the latter is the TFP
level in the identiﬁed country-industry leader. The technology gap variable used in our
regressions is thus: TechnoGapijt = TFPLjt   TFPijt
C. The Assumptions on the Error Terms
Followingtheexistingliterature(e.g. NicolettiandScarpetta, 2003, Griﬁfthetal., 2004,
and Bourl` es et al., 2010) we speciﬁed a particular structure for the individual effects and
the error term in equation C.1. In this appendix, we present and discuss a large amount
66In the effort to verify the robustness of our results, we also employ a different measures of technology
gap, based on labor productivity (value added per worker) differences among country-industries. The
results remain basically unchanged, suggesting a stronger role for the technology gap in explaining TFP
performance and weaker one for TFP growth on the technological frontier.
67Data are aggregated using national level purchasing power parities (PPPs). For the base year we use
for measuring real variables (2000), neither industry level PPPs for value added nor capital speciﬁc PPPs
are available.
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of speciﬁcations, which are aimed at testing the robustness of our assumptions along two
lines. First, since our data have a nested structure, as an industry is ’naturally’ nested
within a country, we follow Baltagi et al. (2001) and estimate several mixed-models to ﬁt
two-way, multilevel effects by maximum likelihood. Second, we more carefully analyze
the autocorrelation structure of the residuals, to check and, eventually, correct for serial
correlation in the residuals. Table A5 reports the results of our robustness checks.
We start by estimating a model with 12 country, 22 industry, and 9 time ﬁxed-effect
and cluster the standard error at the country level, which we use as a ﬁrst benchmark
(column 1). Then, we replicate our main speciﬁcation with 264 country-industry and 9
time ﬁxed-effects and standard error clustered at the country level (column 2). We then
try a speciﬁcation with country and time-industry ﬁxed-effects (column 3). We then use
three different speciﬁcations that make use of the nested structure we talked above and
which are estimated by maximum likelihood with xtmixed in Stata. First, we specify
country ﬁxed-effects by the means of country dummies and use industry-within-country
random effects. We allow for a complex, unspeciﬁed covariance structure and distinctly
estimate all variances-covariances (column 4). We then assume country and industry-
within-country random effects. Our model now has two random-effects equations. The
ﬁrst is a random intercept (constant-only) at the country level, the second a random inter-
cept at the industry-within-country level (this, by the way, is exactly the model estimated
by Baltagi et al. (2001) to investigate the productivity of public capital in private pro-
duction). As before, we distinctly estimate all variances-covariances (column 5). While
the size of the coefﬁcient estimates is slightly affected, its sign and signiﬁcance are not.
In all speciﬁcations, we do ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant impact of the Aggregate CPI on
TFP growth. Notice that, if we estimate a simple random effect model with country-
industry random effects and time ﬁxed-effects, i.e. a simpliﬁed version of speciﬁcation
(5), we also ﬁnd a coefﬁcient estimate for the Aggregate CPI equal to 0.0550 and signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level. However, when we run a Hausman test to verify whether the ﬁxed
or the random-effects speciﬁcation should be preferred, we reject the appropriateness of
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the random-effects estimator.
The second robustness check concerns another aspect of the correlation structure of
the residuals and, in particular, the potential existence of serial correlation. We start from
ourpreferredﬁxed-effectsspeciﬁcations(1)-(3)withclusteredstandarderrorsatthecoun-
try level. We run the Arellano and Bond (2001) test of autocorrelation of the ﬁrst order.68
The Arellano-Bond test rejects the null hypothesis in model (1) but not in model (2) and
(3). We therefore re-estimate the basic models (1)-(3) by assuming a AR(1) structure for
the error term. Results are reported in columns (6)-(8). Again, in all speciﬁcations we
estimate a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the CPI.69 This is very similar in size to
the coefﬁcient estimated in our reference model. Eventually, the coefﬁcients estimates are
a bit larger in the models with AR(1) disturbances if compared to the basic speciﬁcations.
To conclude, while the structure for the error term that we adopted might appear to
be subjective, we believe that it does not signiﬁcantly affect our conclusions.
68The test was originally proposed for a particular linear Generalized Method of Moments dynamic panel
data estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), but is quite general in its applicability (more general than the
xtserial test in Stata). It can be applied to linear GMM regressions in general, and thus to the special cases
of ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least-squares (2SLS). To run this test we therefore estimate
the LSDV version of models (1)-(3).
69Notice that the TFP level of the leader was dropped from speciﬁcation (8) because of collinearity.
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